(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Yet that very thing which is now praised may be objected, not once or twice or thrice, but even ten thousand times, against Chrysippus: ’Tis a most easy thing t’ accuse the Gods.
For first having in his book of Nature compared the eternity of motion to a drink made of divers species confusedly mixed together, turning and jumbling the things that are made, some this way, others that way, he goes on thus: Now the administration of the universe proceeding in this manner, it is of necessity we should be in the condition we are, whether contrary to our own nature we are sick or maimed, or whether we are grammarians or musicians. And again a little after, According to this reason we shall say the like of our virtue and vice, and generally of arts or the ignorance of arts, as I have said. And a little after, taking away all ambiguity, he says: For no particular thing, not even the least, can be otherwise than according to common Nature and its reason. But that common Nature and the common reason of Nature are with him Fate and Providence and Jupiter, is not unknown even to the antipodes. For these things are everywhere inculcated by the Stoics; and Chrysippus affirms that Homer said very well, Jove’s purposes were ripening, having respect to Fate and the Nature of the universe, according to which every thing is governed. How then do these agree, both that God is no way the cause of any dishonest thing, and again, that not even the least thing imaginable can be otherwise done than according to common Nature and its reason? For amongst all things that are done, there must of necessity be also dishonest things attributed to the Gods. And though Epicurus indeed turns himself every way, and studies artifices, devising how to deliver and set loose our voluntary free will from this eternal motion, that he may not leave vice irreprehensible; yet Chrysippus gives vice a most absolute liberty, as being done not only of necessity or according to Fate, but also according to the reason of God and best Nature. And these things are yet farther seen in what he says afterwards, being thus word for word: For common Nature extending to all things, it will be of necessity that every thing, howsoever done in the whole or in any one soever of its parts, must be done according to this common Nature and its reason, proceeding on regularly without any impediment. For there is nothing without that can hinder the administration, nor is there any of the parts that can be moved or habituated otherwise than according to common Nature. What then are these habits and motions of the parts? It is manifest, that the habits are vices and diseases, covetousness, luxury, ambition, cowardice, injustice; and that the motions are adulteries, thefts, treasons, murders, parricides. Of these Chrysippus thinks, that no one, either little or great, is contrary to the reason of Jupiter, or to his law, justice, and providence; so neither is the transgressing of the law done against the law, nor the acting unjustly against justice, nor the committing of sin against Providence.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
(ed.)’s notes (1)
- Il. I. 5.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ αὐτό γε τοῦτο τὸ νῦν ἐπαινούμενον οὐχ ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δὶς οὐδὲ τρὶς ἀλλὰ μυριάκις ἔσται πρὸς Χρύσιππον εἰπεῖν τὸ ῥᾷστον εἶπας, αἰτιάσασθαι θεούς. πρῶτον γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Φύσεως τὸ ἀίδιον τῆς κινήσεως κυκεῶνι παρεικάσας, ἄλλα ἄλλως· στρέφοντι καὶ ταράσσοντι τῶν γιγνομένων, ταῦτʼ εἴρηκεν· οὕτω δὲ τῆς τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίας προαγούσης, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ ταύτην, ὡς ἄν ποτʼ ἔχωμεν, ἔχειν ἡμᾶς, εἴτε παρὰ φύσιν τὴν ἰδίαν νοσοῦντες εἴτε πεπηρωμένοι εἴτε γραμματικοὶ γεγονότες ἢ μουσικοί. καὶ πάλιν μετʼ ὀλίγον κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀτεχνιῶν, ὡς ἔφην. καὶ μετʼ ὀλίγον ἃπασαν ἀναιρῶν ἀμφιβολίαν οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατά μέρος γενέσθαι οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον. ὅτι δʼ ἡ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ ὁ κοινὸς τῆς φύσεως λόγος εἱμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεύς ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀντίποδας λέληθε· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπʼ αὐτῶν· καὶ τὸ Διὸς δʼ ἐτελείετο βουλή, τὸν Ὅμηρον εἰρηκέναι φησὶν ὀρθῶς, ἐπὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἀναφέροντα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν, καθʼ ἣν πάντα διοικεῖται. πῶς οὖν ἅμα μὲν οὐδενὸς αἰσχροῦ παραίτιος ὁ θεός, ἅμα δʼ οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον; ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ δήπουθὲν ἐστιν. καίτοι ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἁμωσγέπως στρέφεται καὶ φιλοτεχνεῖ, τῆς ἀιδίου κινήσεως μηχανώμενος ἐλευθερῶσαι καὶ ἀπολῦσαι τὸ ἑκούσιον ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καταλιπεῖν ἀνέγκλητον τὴν κακίαν· ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος ἀναπεπταμένην παρρησίαν αὐτῇ δίδωσιν, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδὲ καθʼ εἱμαρμένην ἀλλὰ καὶ· κατὰ λόγον θεοῦ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν πεποιημένῃ τὴν ἀρίστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῦθʼ ὁρᾶται κατὰ λέξιν οὕτως ἔχοντα· τῆς γὰρ κοινῆς φύσεως εἰς πάντα διατεινούσης, δεήσει πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν γιγνόμενον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τῶν μορίων ὁτῳοῦν κατʼ ἐκείνην γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀκωλύτως· διὰ τὸ μήτʼ ἔξωθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐνστησόμενον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ μήτε τῶν μερῶν μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅπως κινηθήσεται ἢ σχήσει ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν. τίνες οὖν αἱ τῶν μερῶν σχέσεις εἰσὶ καὶ κινήσεις; δῆλον μὲν ὅτι σχέσεις αἱ κακίαι καὶ τὰ νοσήματα, φιλαργυρίαι φιληδονίαι φιλοδοξίαι δειλίαι ἀδικίαι· κινήσεις δὲ μοιχεῖαι κλοπαὶ προδοσίαι ἀνδροφονίαι πατροκτονίαι. τούτων οἴεται Χρύσιππος οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγα παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον εἶναι καὶ νόμον καὶ δίκην καὶ πρόνοιαν· ὥστε μὴ γίγνεσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον τὸ παρανομεῖν μηδὲ παρὰ τὴν δίκην τὸ ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ παρὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν τὸ κακοποιεῖν.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA