(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
He has written one volume of lives divided into four books; in the fourth of these he says, that a wise man meddles with no business but his own, and is employed about his own affairs. His words are these: For I am of opinion, that a prudent man shuns affairs, meddles little, and at the same time minds his own occasions; civil persons being both minders of their own affairs and meddlers with little else. He has said almost the same in his book of Things eligible for Themselves, in these very words: For indeed a quiet life seems to have in it a certain security and freedom from danger, though there are not very many who can comprehend it. It is manifest that he does not much dissent from Epicurus, who takes away Providence that he may leave God in repose. But the same Chrysippus in his First Book of Lives says, that a wise man willingly takes upon him a kingdom, making his profit by it; and if he cannot reign himself, will dwell with a king, and go to the wars with such a king as was Hydanthyrsus the Scythian or Leucon the Pontic. But I will here also set down his very discourse, that we may see whether, as from the treble and the base strings there arises a symphony in music, so the life of a man who chooses quietness and meddling with little accords with him who, upon any necessity, rides along with the Scythians and manages the affairs of the tyrants in the Bosphorus: For that a wise man will both go to the wars and live with potentates, we will again consider this hereafter; some indeed upon the like arguments not so much as suspecting this, and we for semblable reasons admitting it. And a little after: Not only with those who have proceeded well, and are become proficients in discipline and good manners, as with Leucon and Hydanthyrsus.
Some there are who blame Callisthenes for sailing to Alexander in hopes to obtain the rebuilding of Olynthus, as Aristotle had procured that of Stagira; and commend Ephorus, Xenocrates, and Menedemus, who rejected Alexander’s invitation. But Chrysippus thrusts his wise man headforwards for the sake of gain, as far as Panticapaeum and the desert of the Scythians. And that he does this for the sake of profit and gain, he has showed before, supposing three ways of gaining most suitable for a wise man,—the first by a kingdom, the second by his friends, and the third, besides these, by teaching of philosophy. And yet he frequently even tires us with his praises of this saying: What need have men of more than these two things?
And in his books of Nature he says, that a wise man, if he has lost the greatest wealth imaginable, seems to have lost but a single groat. But having there thus elevated and puffed him up, he again here throws him down to mercenariness and sophistry; nay, to asking pay and even to receiving it beforehand, sometimes at the very entrance of his scholar, and otherwhiles after some time past. The latter, he says indeed, is the more civil, but to receive beforehand the more sure; delay being subject to sustain injuries. Now he says thus: All who are well advised do not require their salary in the same manner, but differently; a multitude of them, as opportunity offers, not promising to make their scholars good men, and that within a year, but to do this, as far as in them lies, within a time agreed on. And again going on, he says: But he will know his opportunity, whether he ought to receive his recompense presently at the very entrance (as many have done), or to give them time, this manner being more liable to injuries, but withal, seeming the more courteous. And how is the wise man a contemner of wealth, who upon a contract delivers virtue for money, and if he has not delivered it, yet requires his reward, as having done what is in him? Or how is he above being endamaged, when he is so cautious lest he be wronged of his recompense? For no man is wronged who is not endamaged. Therefore, though he has elsewhere asserted that a wise man cannot be injured, he here says, that this manner of dealing is liable to injury.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
μία σύνταξις ἡ περὶ Βίων τέτταρα βιβλία· τούτων ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ λέγει τὸν σοφὸν ἀπράγμονὰ τʼ εἶναι καὶ ὀλιγοπράγμονα καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν ἔστι δʼ ἡ λέξις αὕτη οἶμαι γὰρ ἔγωγε τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀπράγμονα εἶναι καὶ ὀλιγοπράγμονα καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν ὁμοίως τῆς τʼ αὐτοπραγίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγοπραγμοσύνης ἀστείων ὄντων. τὰ δʼ ὅμοια σχεδὸν ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν Διʼ αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν εἴρηκε ταύταις ταῖς λέξεσι τῷ γὰρ ὄντι φαίνεται ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἡσυχίαν βίος ἀκίνδυνόν τι καὶ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχειν, οὐ πάνυ τῶν πολλῶν δυναμένων τοῦτο συνιδεῖν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τῷ Ἐπικούρῳ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναιροῦντι διὰ τῆς ἀπραγμοσύνης τῆς περὶ τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἀπᾴδει, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Βίων βασιλείαν τε τὸν σοφὸν ἑκουσίως ἀναδέχεσθαι λέγει, χρηματιζόμενον ἀπʼ αὐτῆς· κἂν αὐτὸς βασιλεύειν μὴ δύνηται, συμβιώσεται βασιλεῖ καὶ στρατεύσεται μετὰ βασιλέως, οἷος ἦν Ἰδάνθυρσος ὁ Σκύθης ἢ Λεύκων ὁ Ποντικός. παραθήσομαι δὲ καὶ ταύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὅπως εἰδῶμεν εἰ, καθάπερ ἐκ νήτης καὶ ὑπάτης γίγνεταί τι σύμφωνον, οὕτως ὁμολογεῖ βίος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀπραγμοσύνην αἱρουμένου καὶ ὀλιγοπραγμοσύνην, εἶτα συνιππαζομένου Σκύθαις καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐν Βοσπόρῳ τυράννων πράττοντος ἐξ οἱασδήτινος ἀνάγκης· ὅτι γάρ φησὶ καὶ στρατεύσεται μετὰ δυναστῶν καὶ βιώσεται, πάλιν ἐπισκεψώμεθα τούτων ἐχόμενοι, τινῶν μὲν οὐδὲ ταῦτʼ ὑπονοούντων διὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους ὑπολογισμούς, ἡμῶν δὲ καὶ ταῦτʼ ἀπολειπόντων διὰ τοὺς παραπλησίους λόγους. καὶ μετὰ μικρὸν οὐ μόνον δὲ μετὰ τῶν προκεκοφότων ἐπὶ ποσὸν καὶ ἐν ἀγωγαῖς καὶ ἐν ἔθεσι ποιοῖς γεγονότων, οἷον παρὰ Λεύκωνι καὶ Ἰδανθύρσῳ. Καλλισθένει τινὲς ἐγκαλοῦσιν, ὅτι πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἔπλευσεν ἐλπίζων ἀναστήσειν Ὄλυνθον, ὡς Στάγειρα Ἀριστοτέλης· Ἔφορον δὲ καὶ Ξενοκράτην καὶ Μενέδημον ἐπαινοῦσι παραιτησαμένους τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος ἕνεκα χρηματισμοῦ τὸν σοφὸν ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ἐς Παντικάπαιον ὠθεῖ καὶ τὴν Σκυθῶν ἐρημίαν. ὅτι γὰρ ἐργασίας ἕνεκα καὶ χρηματισμοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖ, καὶ προδεδήλωκε τρεῖς ὑποθέμενος ἁρμόζοντας μάλιστα τῷ σοφῷ χρηματισμούς, τὸν ἀπὸ βασιλείας καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ φίλων καὶ τρίτον ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν ἀπὸ σοφιστείας. καίτοι πολλαχοῦ μὲν ἀποκναίει ταῦτʼ ἐπαινῶν ἐπεὶ τί δεῖ βροτοῖσι πλὴν δυοῖν μόνων,
Δήμητρος ἀκτῆς πώματὸς θʼ ὑδρηχόου;
ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ Φύσεως λέγει τὸν σοφόν, εἰ τὴν μεγίστην οὐσίαν ἀποβάλοι, δραχμὴν μίαν ἐκβεβληκέναι δόξειν. οὕτω δʼ αὐτὸν ἄρας ἐκεῖ καὶ ὀγκώσας ἐνταῦθα πάλιν εἰς μισθαρνίαν καταβάλλει καὶ σοφιστείαν καὶ γὰρ αἰτήσειν καὶ προλήψεσθαι τὸ μὲν εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου, τὸ δὲ χρόνου τῷ μαθητῇ διελθόντος, ὅπερ εὐγνωμονέστερον εἶναί φησιν, ἀσφαλέστερον δὲ τὸ προλαμβάνειν, ὡς ἀδικήματα τοῦ τόπου ἐπιδεχομένου. λέγει δʼ οὕτως εἰσπράττονται δὲ τὸν μισθὸν οὐ πάντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες ὡσαύτως· ἀλλʼ ἄλλως πλῆθος,ὡς ἂν ὁ καιρὸς φέρῃ, οὐκ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι ποιήσειν ἀγαθούς, καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτούς, ταῦτα ποιήσειν πρὸς τὸν συμφωνηθέντα χρόνον καὶ πάλιν προελθών τὸν τε καιρὸν εἴσεται, πότερον εὐθὺς δεῖ τὸν μισθὸν λαμβάνειν ἅμα τῇ προσόδῳ καθάπερ πλείους πεποιήκασιν, ἢ καὶ χρόνον αὐτοῖς διδόναι, τοῦ τόπου τούτου μᾶλλον καὶ ἀδικήματα ἐπιδεχομένου, δόξαντος δʼ ἂν εἶναι εὐγνωμονεστέρου. καὶ πῶς ἂν εἴη χρημάτων καταφρονητὴς ὁ σοφός, ὑπὸ συγγραφὴν ἐπʼ ἀργυρίῳ τὴν ἀρετὴν παραδιδούς, κἂν μὴ παραδῷ τὸ μισθάριον εἰσπράττων, ὡς,· πεποιηκὼς τὰ παρʼ αὑτόν; ἢ βλάβης κρείττων, φυλαττόμενος μὴ ἀδικηθῇ περὶ τὸ μισθάριον; ἀδικεῖται γὰρ οὐδεὶς μὴ βλαπτόμενος· ὅθεν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀποφηνάμενος ἐνταῦθά φησιν ἀδίκημά τι τὸν τόπον ἐπιδέχεσθαι.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA