(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
In every one of his natural and ethical books, he asserts vice to be the very essence of unhappiness; writing and contending that to live viciously is the same thing as to live unhappily. But in his Third Book of Nature, having said that it is profitable for a fool to live rather than to die, though he is never to become wise, he subjoins: For such is the nature of good things among men, that evil things are in some sort preferred before indifferent ones. I let pass therefore, that having elsewhere said that nothing is profitable to fools, he here says that to live foolishly is profitable to them. Now those things being by them called indifferent which are neither bad nor good, when he says that bad things precede them, he says nothing else but that evil things precede those that are not evil, and that to be unhappy is more profitable than not to be unhappy; and if so, he esteems not to be unhappy to be more unprofitable—and if more unprofitable, more hurtful—than to be unhappy. Desiring therefore to mitigate this absurdity, he adds concerning evils: But it is not these evils that are preferred, but reason; with which it is more convenient to live, though we shall be fools. First therefore he says that vice and things participating of vice are evil, and that nothing else is so. Now vice is something reasonable, or rather depraved reason. For those therefore who are fools to live with reason, is nothing else but to live with vice. Thence to live being fools is to live being unhappy. In what then is this preferred to indifferent things? For he surely will not say that with regard to happiness unhappiness is to be preferred. But neither, say they, does Chrysippus altogether think that the remaining in life is to be reckoned amongst good things, or the going out of it amongst bad; but both of them amongst indifferent ones, according to Nature. Wherefore also it sometimes becomes meet for the happy to make themselves away, and again for the unhappy to continue in life. Now what greater repugnance can there be than this in the choice and avoiding of things, if it is convenient for those who are in the highest degree happy to forsake those good things that are present, for the want of some one indifferent thing? And yet they esteem none of the indifferent things either desirable or to be avoided; but only good desirable, and only evil to be avoided. So that it comes to pass, according to them, that the reasoning about actions regards neither things desirable nor things refusable; but that aiming at other things, which they neither shun nor choose, they make life and death dependent on these.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
οὐσίαν κακοδαιμονίας ἀποφαίνει τὴν κακίαν, ἐν παντὶ βιβλίῳ φυσικῷ καὶ ἠθικῷ γράφων καὶ διατεινόμενος ὅτι τὸ κατὰ κακίαν ζῆν τῷ κακοδαιμόνως ζῆν ταὐτόν ἐστιν· ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Φύσεως ὑπειπὼν ὅτι λυσιτελεῖ ζῆν ἄφρονα μᾶλλον, ἢ μὴ βιοῦν, κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσειν ἐπιλέγει τοιαῦτα γὰρ τἀγαθά ἐστι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀνὰ μέσον προτερεῖν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰρηκὼς ἐν ἑτέροις μηδὲν εἶναι λυσιτελὲς τοῖς ἄφροσιν ἐνταῦθά φησι λυσιτελεῖν τὸ ἀφρόνως ζῆν, ἀφίημι. τῶν δʼ ἀνὰ μέσον λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς μήτε κακῶν ὄντων μήτʼ ἀγαθῶν, τὰ κακὰ προτερεῖν λέγων οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγει πλὴν τῶν μὴ κακῶν τὰ κακὰ προτερεῖν καὶ τὸ κακοδαιμονεῖν λυσιτελέστερον εἶναι τοῦ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν καὶ τοῦ κακοδαιμονεῖν ἀλυσιτελέστερον ἡγεῖται τὸ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν· εἰ δʼ ἀλυσιτελέστερον, καὶ βλαβερώτερον τὸ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν ἄρα βλαβερώτερον τοῦ κακοδαιμονεῖν βουλόμενος οὖν ταύτην ἐπιλεαίνειν τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἐπιλέγει περὶ τῶν κακῶν ἔστι δʼ οὐ ταῦτα προτεροῦντα, ἀλλʼ ὁ λόγος, μεθʼ οὗ βιοῦν ἐπιβάλλει μᾶλλον, καὶ εἰ ἄφρονες ἐσόμεθα πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ κακὰ κακίαν λέγει καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα κακίας, ἄλλο δʼ οὐδέν· ἡ δὲ κακία λογικόν ἐστι μᾶλλον δὲ λόγος ἡμαρτημένος· οὐδὲν οὖν ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ μετὰ λόγου βιοῦν ἄφρονας ὄντας ἢ τὸ μετὰ κακίας βιοῦν ἔπειτα τὸ βιοῦν ἄφρονας ὄντας βιοῦν ἐστι κακοδαιμονεῖν ὄντας. πρὸς τί οὖν προτερεῖ τοῦτο τῶν ἀνὰ μέσον; οὐ γὰρ πρός γε τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν φήσει προτερεῖν τὸ κακοδαιμονεῖν. ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ὅλως, φασίν, οἴεται δεῖν Χρύσιππος οὔτε μονὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὔτʼ ἐξαγωγὴν τοῖς κακοῖς παραμετρεῖν ἀλλὰ τοῖς μέσοις κατὰ φύσιν· διὸ καὶ τοῖς εὐδαιμονοῦσι γίγνεταί ποτε καθῆκον ἐξάγειν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μένειν αὖθις ἐν τῷ ζῆν τοῖς κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. εἶτα τί τούτου μεῖζὸν ἐστιν ὑπεναντίωμα πρὸς αἳρεσιν καὶ φυγήν, εἰ τοῖς ἐπʼ ἄκρον εὐδαιμονοῦσιν ἀπουσίᾳ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἀφίστασθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων καθήκει; καίτοι τῶν ἀδιαφόρων οὐδὲν αἱρετὸν οὐδὲ φευκτόν, ἀλλὰ μόνον αἱρετὸν τἀγαθὸν καὶ μόνον φευκτὸν ἡγοῦνται τὸ κακόν. ὥστε συμβαίνει κατʼ αὐτοὺς μὴ πρὸς τὰ αἱρετὰ μηδὲ πρὸς τὰ φευκτὰ τοὺς τῶν πράξεων γίγνεσθαι λογισμούς, ἑτέρων στοχαζομένους ἃ μήτε φεύγουσι μήθʼ αἱροῦνται, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA