(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
And yet he says, that God punishes vice, and does many things for the chastising of the wicked. And in his Second Book of the Gods he says, that many adversities sometimes befall the good, not as they do the wicked, for punishment, but according to another dispensation, as it is in cities. And again in these words: First we are to understand of evils in like manner as has been said before: then, that these things are distributed according to the reason of Jupiter, whether for punishment, or according to some other dispensation, having in some sort respect to the universe. This therefore is indeed severe, that wickedness is both done and punished according to the reason of Jupiter. But he aggravates this contradiction in his Second Book of Nature, writing thus: Vice, in reference to grievous accidents, has a certain reason of its own. For it is also in some sort according to the reason of Nature, and, as I may so say, is not wholly useless in respect of the universe. For otherwise also there would not be any good. Thus does he reprehend those that dispute indifferently on both sides, who, out of a desire to say something wholly singular and more exquisite concerning every thing, affirms, that men do not unprofitably cut purses, calumniate, and play madmen, and that it is not unprofitable there should be unprofitable, hurtful, and unhappy persons. What manner of God then is Jupiter,— I mean Chrysippus’s Jupiter,—who punishes an act done neither willingly nor unprofitably? For vice is indeed, according to Chrysippus’s discourse, wholly reprehensible; but Jupiter is to be blamed, whether he has made vice which is an unprofitable thing, or, having made it not un profitable, punishes it.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν θεὸν κολάζειν φησὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν πονηρῶν· ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Θεῶν ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐχ ὥσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως χάριν, ἀλλὰ κατʼ ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι. καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις πρῶτον δὲ τῶν κακῶν παραπλησίως ἐστὶν ἀκουστέον τοῖς προειρημένοις· εἶθʼ ὅτι ταῦτʼ ἀπονέμεται κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον ἢτοι ἐπὶ κολάσει ἢ κατʼ ἄλλην ἔχουσάν πως πρὸς τὰ ὅλα οἰκονομίαν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο δεινόν, τὸ καὶ γίγνεσθαι τὴν κακίαν καὶ κολάζεσθαι κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον. ἐπιτείνει δὲ τὴν ὑπεναντίωσιν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Φύσεως γράφων τάδε ἡ δὲ κακία πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ συμπτώματα ἴδιὸν τινʼ ἔχει λόγον· γίγνεται μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὐτή πως κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καί, ἵνʼ οὕτως εἴπω, οὐκ ἀχρήστως γίγνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τἀγαθὸν ἦν. καὶ οὗτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τοῖς ἐπίσης πρὸς τἀναντία διαλεγομένοις, ὃς ὑπὸ τοῦ πάντως τι βούλεσθαι καὶ περὶ παντὸς εἰπεῖν ἴδιον καὶ περιττὸν οὐκ ἀχρήστως λέγει βαλλαντιοτομεῖν, συκοφαντεῖν καὶ ἀφραίνειν, οὐκ ἀχρήστως ἀχρήστους εἶναι, βλαβερούς, κακοδαίμονας. εἶτα ποῖός τις ὁ Ζεύς, λέγω δὲ τὸν Χρυσίππου, κολάζων πρᾶγμα μήτʼ ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ μήτʼ ἀχρήστως γιγνόμενον; ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία πάντως ἀνέγκλητός ἐστι κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Χρυσίππου λόγον ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς ἐγκλητέος εἴτʼ ἄχρηστον οὖσαν τὴν κακίαν πεποίηκεν εἴτε, ποιήσας οὐκ ἀχρήστως, κολάζει.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA