(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Now, as for his doctrine of possibles, how can it but be repugnant to his doctrine of Fate? For if that is not possible which either is true or shall be true, as Diodorus has it, but every thing which is capable of being, though it never shall be, is possible, there will be many things possible which will never be according to invincible, inviolable, and all-conquering Fate. And thus either Fate will lose its power; or if that, as Chrysippus thinks, has existence, that which is susceptible of being will often fall out to be impossible. And every thing indeed which is true will be necessary, being comprehended by the principal of all necessities; and every thing that is false will be impossible, having the greatest cause to oppose its ever being true. For how is it possible that he should be susceptible of dying on the land, who is destined to die at sea? And how is it possible for him who is at Megara to come to Athens, if he is prohibited by Fate?
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ὁ δὲ τῶν δυνατῶν λόγος πρὸς τὸν τῆς εἱμαρμένης λόγον αὐτῷ πῶς οὐ μαχόμενός ἐστιν; εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δυνατὸν ὅπερ ἤ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ ἔσται κατὰ Διόδωρον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ γενέσθαι, κἂν μὴ μέλλῃ γενήσεσθαι, δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἔσται δὲ δυνατὰ πολλὰ τῶν μὴ καθʼ εἱμαρμένην ἀνίκητον καὶ ἀνεκβίαστον καὶ περιγενητικὴν ἁπάντων, ἢ ἡ εἱμαρμένη τὴν δύναμιν ἀπόλλυσιν ἢ, τοιαύτης, οἵαν ἀξιοῖ Χρύσιππος, οὔσης, τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ γενέσθαι πολλάκις εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἐμπεσεῖται. καὶ πᾶν μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται τῇ κυριωτάτῃ πασῶν ἀνάγκῃ κατειλημμένον· πᾶν δὲ ψεῦδος ἀδύνατον, τὴν μεγίστην ἔχον αἰτίαν ἀντιπίπτουσαν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς γενέσθαι. ᾧ γὰρ ἐν θαλάσσῃ πεπρωμένον ἐστὶν ἀποθανεῖν, πῶς ἅμʼ οἷόν τε τοῦτον ἐπιδεκτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐν γῇ ἀποθανεῖν; τί δέ; τὸν Μεγαροῖ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐλθεῖν εἰς Ἀθήνας ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης κωλυόμενον;
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA