(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Having in many places said, that those who have a long time been happy are nothing more so, but equally and in like manner with those who have but a moment been partakers of felicity, he has again in many other places affirmed, that it is not fit to stretch out so much as a finger for the obtaining momentary prudence, which flies away like a flash of lightning. It will be sufficient to set down what is to this purpose written by him in his Sixth Book of Moral Questions. For having said, that neither does every good thing equally cause joy, nor every good deed the like glorying, he subjoins these words: For if a man should have wisdom only for a moment of time or the last minute of life, he ought not so much as to stretch out his finger for such a short-lived prudence. And yet men are neither more happy for being longer so, nor is eternal felicity more eligible than that which lasts but a moment. If he had indeed held prudence to be a good, producing felicity, as Epicurus thought, one should have blamed only the absurdity and the paradoxicalness of this opinion; but since prudence of itself is not another thing differing from felicity, but felicity itself, how is it not a contradiction to say, that momentary happiness is equally desirable with eternal, and yet that momentary happiness is nothing worth?
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ἐν πολλοῖς εἰρηκὼς ὅτι παρὰ τὸν πλείονα χρόνον οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονοῦσιν ἀλλʼ ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπίσης τοῖς τὸν ἀμερῆ χρόνον εὐδαιμονίας μετασχοῦσιν ἐν πολλοῖς πάλιν εἴρηκεν ὡς οὐδʼ ἂν τὸν δάκτυλον καθήκοι προτεῖναι χάριν ἀμεριαίας φρονήσεως, καθάπερ ἀστραπῆς διερχομένης. ἀρκέσει δὲ παραθεῖναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν Ζητημάτων ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων· ὑπειπὼν γὰρ ὡς οὔτε πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίσης εἰς χαρὰν πίπτει οὔτε πᾶν κατόρθωμα εἰς σεμνολογίαν ἐπενήνοχε ταῦτα καὶ γάρ, εἰ μόνον μέλλοι ἀμερῆ χρόνον ἢ τὸν ἔσχατον ἕξειν φρόνησιν, οὀδʼ ἂν τὸν δάκτυλον καθήκοι ἐκτεῖναι ἕνεκα τῆς οὕτω παρεσομένης φρονήσεως, καίπερ παρὰ τὸν πλείονα χρόνον οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονούντων οὐδὲ τῆς ἀιδίου εὐδαιμονίας αἱρετωτέρας γιγνομένης παρὰ τὴν ἀμεριαίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὴν φρόνησιν ἡγεῖτο ποιητικὸν εἶναι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀγαθὸν ὥσπερ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, αὐτῆς ἔδει μόνον τῆς ἀτοπίας καὶ παραδοξολογίας ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ δόγματος· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κατʼ αὐτὸν ἀλλʼ εὐδαιμονία, πῶς οὐ μάχεται τὸ λέγειν ἐπίσης μὲν αἱρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀμεριαίαν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν ἀίδιον, μηδενὸς δʼ ἀξίαν τὴν ἀμεριαίαν;
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA