Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER VIII. · That Faculties are not safe to the Uninstructed.
1In as many Ways as equivalent Syllogisms may be varied, in so many may the Forms of Arguments, and Enthymemas, be varied likewise. As for Instance: If you had borrowed, and not paid, you owe me Money. But you have not borrowed, and not paid, therefore you do not owe me Money. To perform this skilfully, belongs to no one more than to a Philosopher. For if an Enthymema be an imperfect Syllogism; he who is exercised in a perfect Syllogism, must be equally ready at an imperfect one. Why then do not we exercise ourselves and others, after this Manner? Because, even now, though we are not exercised in these Things, nor diverted, by me, at least, from the Study of Morality; yet we make no Advances in Virtue. What is to be expected then if we should add this Avocation too? Especially, as it would not only be an Avocation from more necessary Studies, but likewise a capital Occasion of Conceit and Insolence. For the Faculty of arguing, and of persuasive Reasoning is great; and, particularly, if it be much laboured, and receive an additional Ornament from Rhetoric. For, in general, every Facuity is dangerous to weak and uninstructed Persons; as being apt to render them arrogant and elated. For by what Method can one persuade a young Man, who excells in these Kinds of Study, that he ought not to be an Appendix to them, but they to him? Will he not trample upon all such Advice; and walk about elated, and puffed up, not bearing any one should touch him, to put him in mind, where he is wanting, and in what he goes wrong. What then, was not Plato a Philosopher? Well, and was not Hippocrates a Physician? Yet you see [how elegantly] he expresses himself. But is it in Quality of Physician, then, that he expresses himself so? Why do you confound Things, accidentally united, from different Causes, in the same Men? If Plato was handsome and well-made, must I too set myself to endeavour at becoming handsome and well-made; as if this was necessary to Philosophy, because a certain Person happened to be at once handsome and a Philosopher? Why will you not perceive and distinguish what are the Things that make Men Philosophers, and what belong to them on other Accounts? Pray, if I were a Philosopher, would it be necessary that you should be lame too? 2What then? Do I reject these Faculties? By no means. For neither do I reject the Faculty of Seeing. But if you ask me, what is the Good of Man; I have nothing else to say to you, but that it is a certain Regulation of the Choice, with regard to the Appearances of Things.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (2)
- This is spoken by one of the Audience.
- Epictetus, whenever he has Occasion to mention himself, speaks with remarkable Modesty; and in a Stile very different from that of many of the more ancient Philosophers: as appears by the several arrogant Speeches recorded of them by Diogenes Laertius, &c. It is probable he might improve in this humble Disposition, by the Character of Socrates, which he seems particularly to have studied, and admired. Yet other Philosophers had studied and admired the same Character, without profiting by it. Perhaps the sober and unassuming Temper of Christianity might, from the Example of its Professors in those Days, have produced this, and other good Effects, in the Minds of many who knew little, if any thing, of the Gospel itself.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
That logical subtleties are not safe to the uninstructed.
In as many ways as equivalent syllogisms may be varied, in so many may the technical forms be varied likewise. As, for instance: If you had borrowed and not paid, you owe me money; but you have not borrowed and not paid; therefore you do not owe me money. To perform these processes skilfully, is held to be the peculiar mark of a philosopher. For if an enthymema be an imperfect syllogism, he who is versed in the perfect syllogism must be equally ready to detect an imperfect one.
Why, then, do not we exercise ourselves and others after this manner?
Because, even now, though we are not wholly absorbed in these things, nor diverted, by me at least, from the study of morality, yet we make no eminent advances in virtue. What is to be expected, then, if we should add this avocation too? Especially as it would not only withdraw us from more necessary studies, but likewise afford a capital occasion of conceit and insolence. For the faculty of arguing and of persuasive reasoning is great; and particularly, if it is constantly practised, and receives an additional ornament from rhetoric. In general, every such faculty is dangerous to weak and uninstructed persons, as being apt to render them arrogant and elated. For by what method can one persuade a young man who excels in these kinds of study that he ought not to be an appendage to these accomplishments, but they to him? Will he not trample upon all such advice, and walk about elated and puffed up, not bearing that any one should touch him, to put him in mind where he is wanting, and in what he goes wrong?
What, then, was not Plato a philosopher?
Well, and was not Hippocrates a physician? Yet you see how he expresses himself. But what has his style to do with his professional qualities? Why do you confound things accidentally united in the same men? If Plato was handsome and well made, must I too set myself to becoming handsome and well made,—as if this was necessary to philosophy, because a certain person happened to be at once handsome and a philosopher? Why will you not perceive and distinguish what are the things that make men philosophers, and what belong to them on other accounts? Pray, if I were a philosopher, would it be necessary that you should be lame too [like me]?
What then? Do I reject these special faculties? By no means; neither do I reject the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me what is the good of man, I know not where it lies save in dealing wisely with the phenomena of existence.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
That the faculties The faculties, as Wolf says, are the faculties of speaking and arguing, which, as he also says, make men arrogant and careless who have no solid knowledge, according to Bion’s maxim, ἡ γὰρ οἴησις ἐγκοπὴ τῆς προκοπῆς ἐστιν , arrogance (self-conceit) is a hindrance to improvement. See viii. 8. are not safe to the uninstructed
In as many ways as we can change things which are equivalent to one another, in just so many ways we can change the forms of arguments ( ἐπιχειρήματα) and enthymemes (ἐνθυμήματα) in argumentation. This is an instance: if you have borrowed and not repaid, you owe me the money: you have not borrowed and you have not repaid; then you do not owe me the money. To do this skilfully is suitable to no man more than to the philosopher; for if the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, it is plain that he who has been exercised in the perfect syllogism must be equally expert in the imperfect also.
Why then do we not exercise ourselves and one another in this manner? Because, I reply, at present, though we are not exercised in these things and not distracted from the study of morality, by me at least, still we make no progress in virtue. What then must we expect if we should add this occupation? and particularly as this would not only be an occupation which would withdraw us from more necessary things, but would also be a cause of self-conceit and arrogance, and no small cause. For great is the power of arguing and the faculty of persuasion, and particularly if it should be much exercised, and also receive additional ornament from language: and so universally, every faculty acquired by the uninstructed and weak brings with it the danger of these persons being elated and inflated by it. For by what means could one persuade a young man who excels in these matters, that he ought not to become an appendage to them, but to make them an appendage to himself? Does he not trample on all such reasons, and strut before us elated and inflated, not enduring that any man should reprove him and remind him of what he has neglected and to what he has turned aside?
What then was not Plato a philosopher? I reply, and was not Hippocrates a physician? but you see how Hippocrates speaks. Does Hippocrates then speak thus in respect of being a physician? Why do you mingle things which have been accidentally united in the same men? And if Plato was handsome and strong, ought I also to set to work and endeavour to become handsome or strong, as if this was necessary for philosophy, because a certain philosopher was at the same time handsome and a philosopher? Will you not choose to see and to distinguish in respect to what men become philosophers, and what things belong to them in other respects? And if I were a philosopher, ought you also to be made lame? What then? Do I take away these faculties which you possess? By no means; for neither do I take away the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me what is the good of man, I cannot mention to you anything else than that it is a certain disposition of the will with respect to appearances.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (6)
- Things mean propositions and terms. See Aristot. Analyt. Prior. i. 39, δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν , etc. Ἐπιχειρήματα are arguments of any kind with which we attack ( ἐπιχειρεῖν ) an adversary.
- The Enthymeme is defined by Aristotle: ἐνθύμημα μὲν οὖν ἐστι συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων ἢ σημείων (Anal. Prior. ii. c. 27). He has explained, in the first part of this chapter, what he means by εἰκός and σημεῖον . See also De Morgan’s Formal Logic, p. 237; and P. C. Organon, p. 6, note.
- A man, as Wolf explains it, should not make oratory, or the art of speaking, his chief excellence. He should use it to set off something which is superior.
- Plato was eloquent, and the adversary asks, if that is a reason for not allowing him to be a philosopher. To which the rejoinder is that Hippocrates was a physician, and eloquent too, but not as a physician.
- Epictetus was lame.
- In i. 20, 15. Epictetus defines the being ( οὐσία ) or nature of good to be a proper use of appearances; and he also says, i. 29, 1, that the nature of the good is a kind of will ( προαίρεσις ποιά ), and the nature of evil is a kind of will. But Schweighaeuser cannot understand how the good of man can be a certain will with regard to appearances; and he suggests that Arrian may have written, a certain will which makes use of appearances.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1καθʼ ὅσους τρόπους μεταλαμβάνειν ἔστι τὰ ἰσοδυναμοῦντα ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ τοσούτους καὶ τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων τε καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐκποιεῖ μεταλαμβάνειν. 2οἷον φέρε τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· εἰ ἐδανείσω καὶ μὴ ἀπέδωκας, ὀφείλεις μοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐχὶ ἐδανείσω μὲν καὶ οὐκ ἀπέδωκας· οὐ μὴν ὀφείλεις μοι τὸ ἀργύριον. 3καὶ τοῦτο οὐδενὶ μᾶλλον προσήκει ἢ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἐμπείρως ποιεῖν. εἴπερ γὰρ ἀτελὴς συλλογισμός ἐστι τὸ ἐνθύμημα, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ περὶ τὸν τέλειον συλλογισμὸν γεγυμνασμένος οὗτος ἂν ἱκανὸς εἴη καὶ περὶ τὸν ἀτελῆ οὐδὲν ἧττον. 4τί ποτʼ οὖν οὐ γυμνάζομεν αὑτούς τε καὶ ἀλλήλους τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον; 5ὅτι νῦν καίτοι μὴ γυμναζόμενοι περὶ ταῦτα μηδʼ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τοῦ ἤθους ὑπό γε ἐμοῦ περισπώμενοι ὅμως οὐδὲν ἐπιδίδομεν εἰς καλοκἀγαθίαν. 6τί οὖν χρὴ προσδοκᾶν, εἰ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀσχολίαν προσλάβοιμεν; καὶ μάλισθʼ, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἀσχολία τις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτέρων αὐτὴ προσγένοιτʼ ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰήσεως ἀφορμὴ καὶ τύφου οὐχ ἡ τυχοῦσα. 7μεγάλη γάρ ἐστι δύναμις ἡ ἐπιχειρητικὴ καὶ πιθανολογική, καὶ μάλιστʼ εἰ τύχοι γυμνασίας ἐπιπλέον καί τινα καὶ εὐπρέπειαν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων προσλάβοι. 8ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ καθόλου πᾶσα δύναμις ἐπισφαλὴς τοῖς ἀπαιδεύτοις καὶ ἀσθενέσι προσγενομένη πρὸς τὸ ἐπᾶραι καὶ χαυνῶσαι ἐπʼ αὐτῇ. 9ποίᾳ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔτι μηχανῇ πείσαι τὸν νέον τὸν ἐν τούτοις διαφέροντα, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ προσθήκην αὐτὸν ἐκείνων γενέσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνα αὐτῷ προσθεῖναι; 10οὐχὶ δὲ πάντας τοὺς λόγους τούτους καταπατήσας ἐπηρμένος ἡμῖν καὶ πεφυσημένος περιπατεῖ μηδʼ ἀνεχόμενος, ἄν τις ἅπτηται [τι] αὐτοῦ ὑπομιμνῄσκων, τίνος ἀπολελειμμένος ποῦ ἀποκέκλικεν; 11τί οὖν; Πλάτων φιλόσοφος οὐκ ἦν; — Ἱπποκράτης γὰρ ἰατρὸς οὐκ ἦν; ἀλλʼ ὁρᾷς πῶς φράζει Ἱπποκράτης. μή τι οὖν Ἱπποκράτης οὕτω φράζει, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστιν; 12τί οὖν μιγνύεις πράγματα ἄλλως ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων συνδραμόντα; 13εἰ δὲ καλὸς ἦν Πλάτων καὶ ἰσχυρός, ἔδει κἀμὲ καθήμενον ἐκπονεῖν, ἵνα καλὸς γένωμαι ἢ ἵνα ἰσχυρός, ὡς τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, ἐπεί τις φιλόσοφος ἅμα καὶ καλὸς ἦν καὶ φιλόσοφος; 14οὐ θέλεις αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διακρῖναι κατὰ τί οἱ ἄνθρωποι γίνονται φιλόσοφοι καὶ τίνα ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν; ἄγε εἰ δʼ ἐγὼ φιλόσοφος ἤμην, ἔδει ὑμᾶς καὶ χωλοὺς γενέσθαι; τί οὖν; 15αἴρω τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας; μὴ γένοιτο· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ὁρατικήν. 16ὅμως δʼ, ἄν μου πυνθάνῃ τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἔχω σοι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν ἢ ὅτι ποιὰ προαίρεσις [φαντασιῶν].
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA