Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER IX. · That when we are unable to fulfil what the Character of a Man promises, we assume that of a Philosopher.
1It is no common Attainment, merely to fulfil what the Nature of Man promises. For what is Man? A rational and mortal Being. Well: from what are we distinguished by Reason? From wild Beasts. From what else? From Sheep, and the like. Take care, then, to do nothing like a wild Beast otherwise, you have destroyed the Man; you have not fulfilled what your Nature promises. Take care too, to do nothing like Cattle: for thus likewise the Man is destroyed. In what do we act like Cattle? When we act gluttonously, lewdly, rashly, sordidly, inconsiderately, into what are we sunk? Into Cattle. What have we destroyed? The rational Being. When we behave contentiously, injurious, passionately, and violently, into what are we sunk? Into wild Beasts. 2And farther; some of us are wild Beasts of a larger Size: others, little mischievous Vermin; whence there is room to say, Let me rather be eaten by a Lion. By all these Means, is destroyed what the Nature of Man promises. For, when is a conjunctive Proposition preserved? When it fulfils what its Nature promises. So that the Preservation of such a Proposition consists in this; that its several Parts are a Conjunction of Truths. When is a disjunctive Proposition preserved? When it fulfils what its Nature promises. When is a Flute, a Harp, a Horse, or a Dog, preserved? When each fulfils what its Nature promises. Where is the Wonder then, that Man should be preserved, and destroyed, in the same Manner? All are preserved and improved by Operations correspondent [to their several Faculties]; as a Carpenter, by Building; a Grammarian, by Grammar: but if he accustom himself to write ungrammatically, his Art will necessarily be spoiled and destroyed. Thus modest Actions preserve the modest Man, and immodest ones destroy him: faithful Actions, the faithful Man; and the contrary destroy him. On the other hand, contrary Actions heighten contrary Characters. Thus Impudence, an impudent one; Knavery, a knavish one; Slander, a slanderous one; Anger, an angry one; and inequitable Dealings, a covetous one. 3For this Reason, Philosophers advise us, not to be contented with mere Learning; but to add Meditation likewise, and then Practice. For we have been long accustomed to contrary Actions, and have practised upon wrong Opinions. If therefore, we do not likewise habituate ourselves to practise upon right Opinions, we shall be nothing more than Expositors of the Principles of others. For who among us is not already able to discourse, according to the Rules of Art, upon Good and Evil? That some Things are good, some evil, and others indifferent: the Good, Virtue, and whatever partakes of Virtue, the Evil, the contrary; and the Indifferent, Riches, Health, Reputation: and then, if, while we are saying all this, there should happen some more-than-ordinary Noise, or one of the By-standers should laugh at us, we are disconcerted. Philosopher, what is become of what you were saying? Whence did it proceed? Merely from your Lips? Why then, do you pollute the Aids which others have provided? Why do you trifle on the most important Subjects? It is one thing to hoard up Provision in a Store-house, and another to eat it. What is eaten is concocted, digested, and becomes Nerves, Flesh, Bones, Blood, Colour, Breath. Whatever is hoarded up is ready indeed, whenever you have a Mind to show it; but of no further Use to you than the mere Notion, that you have it. For what Difference is there, whether you explain these Doctrines, or those of Persons of opposite Principles? Sit down now, and comment, according to the Rules of Art, upon the Principles of Epicurus: and perhaps you may comment more practically than he could have done himself. Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do you act a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do not you see on what Terms each is called a Jew, a Syrian, an Egyptian? And when we see any one wavering, we are wont to say, This is not a Jew; but acts one. But, when he assumes the Sentiments of one who hath been baptized and circumcised, then he both really is, and is called, a Jew. Thus we, falsifying our Profession, are Jews in Name, but in reality something else. Our Sentiments are inconsistent with our Discourse; far from practicing what we teach, and what we pride ourselves in the Knowledge of. Thus, while we are unable to fulfill what the Character of a Man promises, we assume, besides, so vast a Weight as that of a Philosopher. As if a Person, incapable of lifting ten Pounds, should endeavor to heave the same Stone with Ajax.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (1)
- The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Conjecture.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
That some persons, failing to fulfil what the character of a man implies, assume that of a philosopher.
It were no slight attainment, could we merely fulfil what the nature of man implies. For what is man? A rational and mortal being. Well; from what are we distinguished by reason? From wild beasts. From what else? From sheep, and the like.
Take care, then, to do nothing like a wild beast; otherwise you have destroyed the man; you have not fulfilled what your nature promises. Take care too, to do nothing like cattle; for thus likewise the man is destroyed.
In what do we act like cattle?
When we act gluttonously, lewdly, rashly, sordidly, inconsiderately, into what are we sunk? Into cattle. What have we destroyed? The rational being.
When we behave contentiously, injuriously, passionately, and violently, into what have we sunk? Into wild beasts.
And further, some of us are wild beasts of a larger size; others little mischievous vermin, such as suggest the proverb, Let me rather be eaten by a lion.
By all these means, that is destroyed which the nature of man implies.
For when is a conjunctive proposition sustained? When it fulfils what its nature implies. So then the sustaining of such a proposition consists in this, that its several parts remain a series of truths.
When is a disjunctive proposition sustained? When it fulfils what its nature implies.
When is a flute, a harp, a horse, or a dog, preserved in existence? While each fulfils what its nature implies.
Where is the wonder, then, that manhood should be preserved or destroyed in the same manner? All things are preserved and improved by exercising their proper functions; as a carpenter, by building; a grammarian, by grammar; but if he permit himself to write ungrammatically, his art will necessarily be spoiled and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest ones destroy him; faithful actions preserve the faithful man, and the contrary destroy him. On the other hand, the contrary actions heighten the contrary characters. Thus the practice of immodesty develops an immodest character; knavery, a knavish one; slander, a slanderous one; anger, an angry one; and fraud, a covetous one.
For this reason, philosophers advise us not to be contented with mere learning, but to add meditation likewise, and then practice. For we have been long accustomed to perverse actions, and have practised upon wrong opinions. If, therefore, we do not likewise habituate ourselves to practise upon right opinions, we shall be nothing more than expositors of the abstract doctrines of others. For who among us is not already able to discourse, according to the rules of art, upon good and evil?—That some things are good, some evil, and others indifferent; the good include the virtues and all things appertaining; the evil comprise the contrary; and the indifferent include riches, health, reputation; and then, if while we are saying all this, there should happen some more than ordinary noise, or one of the by-standers should laugh at us, we are disconcerted. Philosopher, what is become of what you were saying? Whence did it proceed,—merely from your lips? Why, then, do you confound the remedies which might be useful to others? Why do you trifle on the most important subjects? It is one thing to hoard up provision in a storehouse, and another to eat it. What is eaten is assimilated, digested, and becomes nerves, flesh, bones, blood, color, breath. Whatever is hoarded is ready indeed, whenever you desire to show it; but is of no further use to you than in the mere knowledge that you have it.
For what difference does it make whether you discourse on these doctrines, or those of the heterodox? Sit down and comment skilfully on Epicurus, for instance; perhaps you may comment more profitable than himself. Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do you act like a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do not you see on what terms each is called a Jew, a Syrian, an Egyptian? And when we see any one wavering, we are wont to say, This is not a Jew, but only acts like one. But, when he assumes the sentiments of one who has been baptized and circumcised, then he both really is, and is called, a Jew. Thus we, falsifying our profession, may be Jews in name, but are in reality something else. We are inconsistent with our own discourse; we are far from practising what we teach, and what we pride ourselves on knowing. Thus, while we are unable to fulfil what the character of a man implies, we are ready to assume besides so vast a weight as that of a philosopher. As if a person, incapable of lifting ten pounds, should endeavor to heave the same stone with Ajax.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
That when we cannot fulfil that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher.
It is no common (easy) thing to do this only, to fulfil the promise of a man’s nature. For what is a man? The answer is, a rational and mortal being. Then by the rational faculty from whom are we separated? From wild beasts. And from what others? From sheep and like animals. Take care then to do nothing like a wild beast; but if you do, you have lost the character of a man; you have not fulfilled your promise. See that you do nothing like a sheep; but if you do, in this case also the man is lost. What then do we do as sheep? When we act gluttonously, when we act lewdly, when we act rashly, filthily, inconsiderately, to what have we declined? To sheep. What have we lost? The rational faculty. When we act contentiously and harmfully and passionately, and violently, to what have we declined? To wild beasts. Consequently some of us are great wild beasts, and others little beasts, of a bad disposition and small, whence we may say, Let me be eaten by a lion. But in all these ways the promise of a man acting as a man is destroyed. For when is a conjunctive (complex) proposition maintained? When it fulfils what its nature promises; so that the preservation of a complex proposition is when it is a conjunction of truths. When is a disjunctive maintained? When it fulfils what it promises. When are flutes, a lyre, a horse, a dog, preserved? (when they severally keep their promise). What is the wonder then if man also in like manner is preserved, and in like manner is lost? Each man is improved and preserved by corresponding acts, the carpenter by acts of carpentry, the grammarian by acts of grammar. But if a man accustoms himself to write ungrammatically, of necessity his art will be corrupted and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest actions destroy him: and actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the contrary actions destroy him. And on the other hand contrary actions strengthen contrary characters: shamelessness strengthens the shameless man, faithlessness the faithless man, abusive words the abusive man, anger the man of an angry temper, and unequal receiving and giving make the avaricious man more avaricious.
For this reason philosophers admonish us not to be satisfied with learning only, but also to add study, and then practice. For we have long been accustomed to do contrary things, and we put in practice opinions which are contrary to true opinions. If then we shall not also put in practice right opinions, we shall be nothing more than the expositors of the opinions of others. For now who among us is not able to discourse according to the rules of art about good and evil things (in this fashion)? That of things some are good, and some are bad, and some are indifferent: the good then are virtues, and the things which participate in virtues; and the bad are the contrary; and the indifferent are wealth, health, reputation.— Then, if in the midst of our talk there should happen some greater noise than usual, or some of those who are present should laugh at us, we are disturbed. Philosopher, where are the things which you were talking about? Whence did you produce and utter them. From the lips, and thence only. Why then do you corrupt the aids provided by others? Why do you treat the weightiest matters as if you were playing a game of dice? For it is one thing to lay up bread and wine as in a storehouse, and another thing to eat. That which has been eaten, is digested, distributed, and is become sinews, flesh, bones, blood, healthy colour, healthy breath. Whatever is stored up, when you choose you can readily take and show it; but you have no other advantage from it except so far as to appear to possess it. For what is the difference between explaining these doctrines and those of men who have different opinions? Sit down now and explain according to the rules of art the opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps you will explain his opinions in a more useful manner than Epicurus himself. Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do you deceive the many? Why do you act the part of a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do you not see how (why) each is called a Jew, or a Syrian or an Egyptian? and when we see a man inclining to two sides, we are accustomed to say, This man is not a Jew, but he acts as one. But when he has assumed the affects of one who has been imbued with Jewish doctrine and has adopted that sect, then he is in fact and he is named a Jew. Thus we too being falsely imbued (baptized), are in name Jews, but in fact we are something else. Our affects (feelings) are inconsistent with our words; we are far from practising what we say, and that of which we are proud, as if we knew it. Thus being unable to fulfil even what the character of a man promises, we even add to it the profession of a philosopher, which is as heavy a burden, as if a man who is unable to bear ten pounds should attempt to raise the stone which Ajax lifted.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (8)
- The abuse of the faculties, which are proper to man, called rationality and liberty, is the origin of evil. By rationality is meant the faculty of understanding truths and thence falses, and goods and then evils; and by liberty is meant the faculty of thinking, willing and acting freely—and these faculties distinguish man from beasts. Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 264 and also 240. See Epictetus, ii. c. 8
- This seems to be a proverb. If I am eaten, let me be eaten by the nobler animal.
- A conjunctive or complex ( συμπεπλεγμένον ) axiom or lemma. Gellius ( xvi. 8 ) gives an example: P. Scipio, the son of Paulus, was both twice consul and triumphed, and exercised the censorship and was the colleague of L. Mummius in his censorship. Gellius adds, in every conjunctive if there is one falsehood, though the other parts are true, the whole is said to be false, For the whole is proposed as true: therefore if one part is false, the whole is not true. The disjunctive ( διεζευγμένον ) is of this kind: pleasure is either bad or good, or neither good nor bad.
- We often say a man learns a particular thing: and there are men who profess to teach certain things, such as a language, or an art; and they mean by teaching that the taught shall learn; and learning means that they shall be able to do what they learn. He who teaches an art professes that the scholar shall be able to practise the art, the art of making shoes for example, or other useful things. There are men who profess to teach religion, and morality, and virtue generally. These men may tell us what they conceive to be religion, and morality, and virtue; and those who are said to be taught may know what their teachers have told them. But the learning of religion, and of morality and of virtue, mean that the learner will do the acts of religion and of morality and of virtue; which is a very different thing from knowing what the acts of religion, of morality, and of virtue are. The teacher’s teaching is in fact only made efficient by his example, by his doing that which he teaches
- He is not a Stoic philosopher, who can only explain in a subtle and proper manner the Stoic principles: for the same person can explain the principles of Epicurus, of course for the purpose of refuting them, and perhaps he can explain them better than Epicurus himself. Consequently he might be at the same time a Stoic and an Epicurean; which is absurd. —Schweig. He means that the mere knowledge of Stoic opinions does not make a man a Stoic, or any other philosopher. A man must according to Stoic principles practise them in order to be a Stoic philosopher. So if we say that a man is a religious man, he must do the acts which his religion teaches; for it is by his acts only that we can know him to be a religious man. What he says and professes may be false; and no man knows except himself whether his words and professions are true. The uniformity, regularity, and consistency of his acts are evidence which cannot be mistaken.
- It has been suggested that Epictetus confounded under the name of Jews those who were Jews and those who were Christians. We know that some Jews became Christians. But see Schweig.’s note 1 and note 7.
- It is possible, as I have said, that by Jews Epictetus means Christians, for Christians and Jews are evidently confounded by some writers, as the first Christians were of the Jewish nation. In book iv. c. 7, Epictetus gives the name of Galilaeans to the Jews. The term Galilaeans points to the country of the great teacher. Paul says (Romans, ii. 28), For he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly—but he is a Jew which is one inwardly, etc. His remarks (ii. 17–29) on the man who is called a Jew, and rests in the law and makes his boast of God may be compared with what Epictetus says of a man who is called a philosopher, and does not practise that which he professes.
- See ii. 24, 26; Iliad, vii. 264, etc.; Juvenal, xv. 65, Nec hunc lapidem, quales et Turnus et Ajax Vel quo Tydides percussit pondere coxam Aeneae. —Upton.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τυχὸν αὐτὸ μόνον ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελίαν πληρῶσαι. 2τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; — ζῷον, φησί, λογικὸν θνητόν. — εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ λογικῷ τίνων χωριζόμεθα; — τῶν θηρίων. — καὶ τίνων ἄλλων; 3— τῶν προβάτων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. — ὅρα οὖν μή τί πως ὡς θηρίον ποιήσῃς· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπώλεσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ ἐπλήρωσας τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν. ὅρα μή τι ὡς πρόβατον· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ οὕτως ἀπώλετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος. 4τίνα οὖν ποιοῦμεν ὡς πρόβατα; ὅταν τῆς γαστρὸς ἕνεκα, ὅταν τῶν αἰδοίων, ὅταν εἰκῇ, ὅταν ῥυπαρῶς, ὅταν ἀνεπιστρέπτως, ποῦ ἀπεκλίναμεν; ἐπὶ τὰ πρόβατα. 5τί ἀπωλέσαμεν; τὸ λογικόν. ὅταν μαχίμως καὶ βλαβερῶς καὶ θυμικῶς καὶ ὠστικῶς, ποῦ ἀπεκλίναμεν; 6ἐπὶ τὰ θηρία. λοιπὸν οἱ μὲν ἡμῶν μεγάλα θηρία εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ θηρίδια κακοήθη καὶ μικρά, ἀφʼ ὧν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν λέων με καὶ φαγέτω. 7διὰ πάντων δὲ τούτων ἀπόλλυται ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελία. 8πότε γὰρ σῴζεται συμπεπλεγμένον; ὅταν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν πληρώσῃ, ὥστε σωτηρία συμπεπλεγμένου ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀληθῶν συμπεπλέχθαι. πότε διεζευγμένον; ὅταν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν πληρώσῃ. πότε αὐλοί, πότε λύρα, πότε ἵππος, πότε κύων; 9τί οὖν θαυμαστόν, εἰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὡσαύτως μὲν σῴζεται, ὡσαύτως δʼ ἀπόλλυται; 10αὔξει δʼ ἕκαστον καὶ σῴζει τὰ κατάλληλα ἔργα· τὸν τέκτονα τὰ τεκτονικά, τὸν γραμματικὸν τὰ γραμματικά. ἂν δʼ ἐθίσῃ γράφειν ἀγραμμάτως, ἀνάγκη καταφθείρεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὴν τέχνην. 11οὕτως τὸν μὲν αἰδήμονα σῴζει τὰ αἰδήμονα ἔργα, ἀπολλύει δὲ τὰ ἀναιδῆ· τὸν δὲ πιστὸν τὰ πιστὰ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἀπολλύει. 12καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους πάλιν ἐπαύξει τὰ ἐναντία· τὸν ἀναίσχυντον ἀναισχυντία, τὸν ἄπιστον ἀπιστία, τὸν λοίδορον λοιδορία, τὸν ὀργίλον ὀργή, τὸν φιλάργυρον αἱ ἀκατάλληλοι λήψεις καὶ δόσεις. 13διὰ τοῦτο παραγγέλλουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι μὴ ἀρκεῖσθαι μόνῳ τῷ μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μελέτην προσλαμβάνειν, εἶτα ἄσκησιν. 14πολλῷ γὰρ χρόνῳ τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖν εἰθίσμεθα καὶ τὰς ὑπολήψεις τὰς ἐναντίας ταῖς ὀρθαῖς χρηστικὰς ἔχομεν. ἂν οὖν μὴ καὶ τὰς ὀρθὰς χρηστικὰς ποιήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐξηγηταὶ ἐσόμεθα ἀλλοτρίων δογμάτων. 15ἄρτι γὰρ τίς ἡμῶν οὐ δύναται τεχνολογῆσαι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν; ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δʼ ἀδιάφορα· ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα τῶν ἀρετῶν· κακὰ τὰ δʼ ἐναντία· ἀδιάφορα δὲ πλοῦτος, ὑγεία, δόξα. 16εἶτʼ ἂν μεταξὺ λεγόντων ἡμῶν ψόφος μείζων γένηται ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις καταγελάσῃ ἡμῶν, ἐξεπλάγημεν. 17ποῦ ἐστιν, φιλόσοφε, ἐκεῖνα ἃ ἔλεγες; πόθεν αὐτὰ προφερόμενος ἔλεγες; ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν αὐτόθεν. τί οὖν ἀλλότρια βοηθήματα μολύνεις; τί κυβεύεις περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; 18ἄλλο γάρ ἐστιν ὡς εἰς ταμιεῖον ἀποθέσθαι ἄρτους καὶ οἶνον, ἄλλο ἐστὶ φαγεῖν. τὸ βρωθὲν ἐπέφθη, ἀνεδόθη, νεῦρα ἐγένετο, σάρκες, ὀστέα, αἷμα, εὔχροια, εὔπνοια. τὰ ἀποκείμενα ὅταν μὲν θελήσῃς ἐκ προχείρου λαβὼν δεῖξαι δύνασαι, ἀπʼ αὐτῶν δέ σοι ὄφελος οὐδὲν εἰ μὴ μέχρι τοῦ δοκεῖν ὅτι ἔχεις. τί γὰρ διαφέρει ταῦτα ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων; 19τεχνολόγει νῦν καθίσας τὰ Ἐπικούρου καὶ τάχα ἐκείνου χρηστικώτερον τεχνολογήσεις. τί οὖν Στωικὸν λέγεις σεαυτόν, τί ἐξαπατᾷς τοὺς πολλούς, τί ὑποκρίνῃ Ἰουδαῖον ὢν Ἕλλην; 20οὐχ ὁρᾷς, πῶς ἕκαστος λέγεται Ἰουδαῖος, πῶς Σύρος, πῶς Αἰγύπτιος; καὶ ὅταν τινὰ ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα ἴδωμεν, εἰώθαμεν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν Ἰουδαῖος, ἀλλʼ ὑποκρίνεται. ὅταν δʼ ἀναλάβῃ τὸ πάθος τὸ τοῦ βεβαμμένου καὶ ᾑρημένου, τότε καὶ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ καλεῖται Ἰουδαῖος. 21οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς παραβαπτισταί, λόγῳ μὲν Ἰουδαῖοι, ἔργῳ δʼ ἄλλο τι, ἀσυμπαθεῖς πρὸς τὸν λόγον, μακρὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἃ λέγομεν, ἐφʼ οἷς ὡς εἰδότες αὐτὰ ἐπαιρόμεθα. 22οὕτως οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελίαν πληρῶσαι δυνάμενοι προσλαμβάνομεν τὴν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τηλικοῦτο φορτίον οἷον εἴ τις δέκα λίτρας ἆραι μὴ δυνάμενος τὸν τοῦ Αἴαντος λίθον βαστάζειν ἤθελεν.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA