Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XX. · Concerning the Epicureans, and Academics.
1True and evident Propositions must, of Necessity, be used even by those, who contradict them. And, perhaps, one of the strongest Proofs, that there is such a Thing as Evidence, is the Necessity which those, who contradict it, are under, to make use of it. If a Person, for Instance, should deny, that any thing is universally true, he will be obliged to assert the contrary, that nothing is universally true. What, Wretch, not even this itself? For what is this, but to say, that every thing universal is false. Again: if any one should come, and say, "Know that there is nothing to be known; but all Things are uncertain:" or another; "Believe me, and it will be the better for you, no Man ought to be believed in any thing" or a Third, "Learn from me, that nothing is to be learned; I tell you this, and will teach the Proof of it, if you please." Now what Difference is there between such as these, and those who call themselves Academics? Who say to us, "Be convinced, that no one ever is convinced [on good Grounds]. Believe us, that no body believes any body." 2Thus also, when Epicurus would destroy the natural Relation of Mankind to each other, he makes use of the very thing he is destroying. For what doth he say? "Be not deceived; be not seduced, and mistaken. There is no natural Relation between reasonable Beings. Believe me. Those who say otherwise, mislead and impose upon you."——Why are you concerned for us then? Let us be deceived. You will fare never the worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded, that there is a natural Relation between Mankind; and that it is by all means to be preserved. Nay, it will be much safer and better. Why do you give yourself any Trouble about us, Sir? Why do you break your Rest for us? Why do you light your Lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you compose so many Volumes? Is it that none of us should be deceived, concerning the Gods; as if they took any Care of Men? Or that we may not suppose the Essence of Good consists in any thing, but Pleasure? For, if these Things be so, lie down and sleep, and lead the Life of which you judge yourself worthy; that of a mere Reptile. Eat and drink, and satisfy your Passion for Women, and ease yourself and snore. What is it to you, whether others think right or wrong about these Things? For what have you to do with us? You take care of Sheep, because they afford us their Milk, their Wool, and, at last, their Flesh. And would it not be a desirable Thing that Men might be so lulled and inchanted by the Stoics, as to give themselves up to be milked and fleeced by you, and such as you? Should not these Doctrines be taught to your Brother Epicureans only, and concealed from the rest of the World; who should by all means, above all things, be persuaded, that we have a natural Relation to each other: and that Temperance is a good Thing, in order that all may be kept safe for you? Or is this Relation to be preserved towards some, and not towards others? Towards whom then, is it to be preserved? Towards such as mutually preserve, or such as violate it? And who violate it more, than you, who teach such Doctrines? 3What was it then, that waked Epicurus from his Sleep; and compelled him to write what he did? What else, but that which is of all others the most powerful in Mankind, Nature; which draws every one, however unwilling and reluctant, to its own Purposes. For since, says she, you think that there is no Relation between Mankind, write this Doctrine, and leave it for the Use of others; and break your Sleep upon that Account; and, by your own Practice, confute your own Principles. Do we say, that Orestes was roused from Sleep by the Agitation of the Furies; and was not Epicurus waked by Furies, more cruel and avenging, which would not suffer him to rest; but compelled him to divulge his own Evils, as Wine and Madness do the Priests of Cybele? So strong and unconquerable a Thing is human Nature! For how can a Vine have the Properties not of a Vine, but of an Olive Tree? Or an Olive Tree, not those of an Olive Tree, but of a Vine? It is impossible. It is inconceivable. Neither, therefore, is it possible for a human Creature intirely to lose human Affections. But even those who have undergone a Mutilation, cannot have their Inclinations also mutilated: and so Epicurus, when he had mutilated all the Offices of a Man, of a Master of a Family, of a Citizen, and of a Friend, did not mutilate the Inclinations of Humanity: for he could not, any more than the idle Academics can throw away, or blind their own Senses; though this be, of all others, the Point they labour most. What a Misfortune is it, when any one, after having received, from Nature, Standards and Rules for the Knowledge of Truth, doth not strive to add to these, and make up their Deficiencies; but, on the contrary, endeavours to take away, and destroy, whatever Truth may be known even by them? 4What say you, Philosopher? What do you think of Piety and Sanctity? If you please, I will prove, that they are good.——Pray do prove it; that our Citizens may be converted, and honour the Deity, and may no longer neglect what is of the highest Importance.——Have you the Proofs, then?——I have, and I thank you. Since you are so well pleased with this then, learn the contrary: That there are no Gods; or, if there are, that they take no Care of Mankind; neither have we any Concern with them: that this Piety and Sanctity, which is so much talked of by many, is only an Imposition of boasting and sophistical Men; or, perhaps, of Legislators, for a Terror and Restraint to Injustice.——Well done, Philosopher. Our Citizens are much the better for you. You have already brought back all the Youth, to a Contempt of the Deity.——What! doth not this please you, then? Learn next, that Justice is nothing: that Shame is Folly: that the paternal Relation is nothing; the filial, nothing.——Well said, Philosopher: persist; convince the Youth: that we may have many more, to think and talk like you. By such Doctrines as these, have our well-governed States flourished? Upon these was Sparta founded! Lycurgus, by his Laws, and Method of Education, introduced such Persuasions as these; That it is just as honourable, as it is dishonourable, to be Slaves; and just as dishonourable, as honourable, to be free! They who died at Thermopylæ, died from such Principles as these! And from what other Doctrines did the Athenians leave their City? 5And yet, they who talk thus, marry, and produce Children; and engage in public Affairs, and get themselves made Priests and Prophets (of whom? Of Gods that have no Existence); and consult the Pythian Priestess, only to hear Falshoods, and interpret the Oracles to others. What monstrous Impudence and Imposture! 6What are you doing, Man? You contradict yourself every Day; and yet you will not give up these paultry Cavils. When you eat, where do you carry your Hand? To your Mouth, or to your Eye? When you bathe, where do you go? Do you ever call a Kettle, a Dish; or a Spoon, a Spit? If I were a Servant to one of these Gentlemen, were it at the Hazard of being flayed every Day, I would plague him. "Throw some Oil into the Bath, Boy." I would take Pickle, and pour upon his Head. "What is this?" Really, Sir, an Appearance struck me so perfectly alike, as not to be distinguished from Oil. "Give me the Soup." I would carry him a Dish full of Vinegar. "Did not I ask for the Soup?"——Yes, Sir, this is the Soup.——"Is not this Vinegar?" Why so, more than Soup? "Take it and smell to it, take it and taste it." "How do you know then, but our Senses deceive us?" If I had three or four Fellow-servants to join with me, I would make him either choke with Passion, and burst, or change his Opinions. But now they insult us, by making use of the Gifts of Nature, while in Words, they destroy them. Grateful and modest Men, truly! Who, if there were nothing else in the Case, while they are eating their daily Bread, dare to say, "We do not know, whether there be any Ceres, or Proserpine, or Pluto." Not to mention, that while they enjoy the Night and Day, the Seasons of the Year, the Stars, the Earth and Sea, they are not the least affected by any of these Things; but only study to throw out some idle Problem; and, when they have, cleared their Stomachs, go and bathe but take not the least Care what they say; nor on what Subjects; nor to whom; nor what may be the Consequence of their Talk: whether any well-disposed young Man, by hearing such Doctrines, may not be affected by them, and so affected as intirely to lose the Seeds of his good Disposition: whether they may not furnish an Adulterer with Occasions of growing shameless in his Guilt whether a public Plunderer may not find Excuses from these Doctrines: whether he, who neglects his Parents, may not gain an additional Confidence from them——"What then, in your Opinion, is good and evil, fair and base; such Things, or such Things?"——Why should one say any more against such Creatures as these, or give them any Account, or receive any from them, or endeavour to convince them? By Jupiter, one might sooner hope to convince the most unnatural Debauchees, than those, who are thus deaf and blind to their own Evils.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Carter’s notes (7)
- A New Testament Word.
- When the Athenians found themselves unable to resist the Forces of the Persians, they left their City; and, having removed their Wives and Children, and their moveable Effects, to Trœzen and Salamis, went on board their Ships, and defended the Liberty of Greece by their Fleet. Upton from Cicero, &c.
- What follows is against the Academics, who denied the Evidence of the Senses.
- By these Terms, the Stoics meant intelligent Powers, joining, to bring the Fruits of the Earth to Maturity, and to carry on the Course of Nature.
- These seem to be the Words of the Academic, desirous of begining a Dispute with Epictetus, to revenge himself, by puzzling him, for the severe Things which he had been saying against that Sect. But Epictetus refuses to enter into it; and gives his Reason.
- I have followed Mr. Upton's Addition of αισχρον; but, perhaps, even καλον may be an Addition, first arising from writing η καλον twice over.
- This resembles what our Saviour saith to the Jewish Rulers; Verily I say unto you, that the Publicans and the Harlots go into the Kingdom of God before you. Matt. xxi. 31.
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Concerning the Epicureans and Academics.
Things true and evident must, of necessity, be recognized even by those who would contradict them. And perhaps one of the strongest proofs that there is such a thing as evidence is the necessity which compels even those who contradict it to make use of it. If a person, for instance, should deny that anything is universally true, he will be obliged to assert the contrary, that nothing is universally true. Foolish man, not so. For what is this but an universal statement? Again, suppose any one should come and say, Know that there is nothing to be known; but all things are uncertain; or another, Believe me, for your good, that no man ought to be believed in anything; or a third, Learn from me that nothing is to be learned; I tell you this, and will teach the proof of it, if you please. Now what difference is there between such as these, and those who call themselves Academics,—who say to us, Be convinced that no one ever is convinced; believe us, that nobody believes anybody?
Thus also, when Epicurus would destroy the natural tie between mankind, he makes use of the very thing he is destroying. For what says he? Be not deceived; be not seduced and mistaken. There is no natural tie between reasonable beings. Believe me. Those who say otherwise mislead and impose upon you. Why are you concerned for us then? Let us be deceived. You will fare never the worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that there is a natural tie between mankind, and that it is by all means to be preserved. Nay, it will be much safer and better. Why do you give yourself any trouble about us, sir? Why do you break your rest for us? Why do you light your lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you compose so many volumes? Is it that none of us should be deceived concerning the gods, as if they took any care of men; or that we may not suppose the essence of good consists in anything but in pleasure? For if these things be so, lie down and sleep, and lead the life of which you judge yourself worthy,—that of a mere worm. Eat, drink, debauch, snore. What is it to you, whether others think rightly or wrongly about these things? For what have you to do with us? You take care of sheep, because they afford their milk, their wool, and at last their flesh. And would it not be a desirable thing that men might be so lulled and enchanted by the Stoics as to give themselves up to be milked and fleeced by you, and such as you? Should not these doctrines be taught to your brother Epicureans only, and concealed from the rest of the world; who should by all means, above all things, be persuaded that we have a natural tie with each other, and that self-command is a good thing, in order that all may be kept safe for you? Or is this tie to be preserved towards some and not towards others? Towards whom, then, is it to be preserved,—towards such as mutually preserve, or such as violate it? And who violate it more than you, who teach such doctrines?
What was it, then, that waked Epicurus from his sleep, and compelled him to write what he did; what else, but that which is of all influences the most powerful among mankind, Nature; which draws every one, however unwilling and reluctant, to its own purposes. For since, she says, you think that there is no tie between mankind, write out this doctrine, and leave it for the use of others; and break your sleep upon that account; and by your own practice confute your own principles. Do we say that Orestes was roused from sleep because driven by the furies; and was not Epicurus waked by sterner furies and avengers, which would not suffer him to rest, but compelled him to utter his own ills, as wine and madness do the priests of Cybele? So strong and unconquerable a thing is human nature! For how can a vine have the properties not of a vine, but of an olivetree; or an olive-tree not those of an olive-tree, but of a vine? It is impossible. It is inconceivable. Neither, therefore, is it possible for a human creature entirely to lose human affections. But even those who have undergone a mutilation cannot have their inclinations also mutilated; and so Epicurus, when he had mutilated all the offices of a man, of a master of a family, of a citizen, and of a friend, did not mutilate the inclinations of humanity; for this he could not do, any more than the idle Academics can throw away or blind their own senses, though this be the point they chiefly labor. What a misfortune is it, when any one, after having received from Nature standards and rules for the knowledge of truth, does not strive to add to these, and make up their deficiencies; but, on the contrary, endeavors to take away and destroy whatever truth may be known even by them.
What say you, philosopher? What do you think of piety and sanctity? If you please, I will prove that they are good. Pray do prove it; that our citizens may be converted, and honor the Deity, and may no longer neglect what is of the highest importance. Do you accept these demonstrations, then? I have, and I thank you. Since you are so well pleased with this, then, learn these contrary propositions: that there are no gods, or, if there are, that they take no care of mankind, neither have we any concern with them; that this piety and sanctity, so much talked of by many, are only an imposition of boasting and sophistical men, or perhaps of legislators, for a terror and restraint to injustice. Well done, philosopher. Our citizens are much the better for you. You have already brought back all the youth to a contempt of the Deity. What! does not this please you, then? Learn next, that justice is nothing; that shame is folly; that the paternal relation is nothing; the filial, nothing. Well said, philosopher; persist, convince the youth; that we may have many more to think and talk like you. By such doctrines as these, no doubt, have our well-governed states flourished! Upon these was Sparta founded! Lycurgus, by his laws and method of education, introduced such persuasions as these: that it is not base to be slaves, rather than honorable; nor honorable to be free, rather than base! They who died at Thermopylae, died from such principles as these! And from what other doctrines did the Athenians leave their city?
And yet they who talk thus marry, and produce children, and engage in public affairs, and get themselves made priests and prophets. Of whom? Of gods that have no existence. And they consult the Pythian priestess, only to hear falsehoods, and interpret the oracles to others. Oh, monstrous impudence and imposture!
What are you doing, man? You contradict yourself every day; and you will not give up these paltry cavils. When you eat, where do you put your hand,—to your mouth, or to your eye? When you bathe, where do you go? Do you ever call a kettle a dish, or a spoon a spit? If I were a servant to one of these gentlemen, were it at the hazard of being flayed every day, I would plague him. Throw some oil into the bath, boy. I would take pickle, and pour upon his head. What is this? Really, sir, I was impressed by a certain semblance so like oil as not to be distinguished from it. Give me the soup. I would carry him a dish full of vinegar. Did I not ask for the soup? Yes, sir; this is the soup. Is not this vinegar? Why so, more than soup? Take it and smell it, take it and taste it. How do you know, then, but our senses deceive us? If I had three or four fellow-servants to join with me, I would make him either choke with passion and burst, or change his opinions. But now they insult us by making use of the gifts of nature, while in words they destroy them. Those must be grateful and modest men, at least, who, while eating their daily bread, dare to say, We do not know whether there be any such beings as Demeter, or Core, or Pluto. Not to mention that while they possess the blessings of night and day, of the annual seasons, of the stars, the earth, and the sea, they are not the last affected by any of these things; but only study to give out some idle problem, and when they have thus relieved themselves, go and bathe; but take not the least care what they say, nor on what subjects, nor to whom, nor what may be the consequence of their talk,—whether any well-disposed young man, on hearing such doctrines, may not be affected by them, and so affected as entirely to lose the seeds of his good disposition; whether they may not furnish an adulterer with occasions of growing shameless in his guilt; whether a public plunderer may not find excuses from these doctrines; whether he, who neglects his parents, may not gain an additional confidence from them.
What things, then, in your opinion, are good and evil, fair and base,—such things, or such things? But why should one argue any more with such as these, or interchange opinions, or endeavor to convince them? By Zeus! one might sooner hope to convince the most unnatural debauchees, than those who are thus deaf and blind to their own ills.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Higginson’s notes (3)
- Translation conjectural.—H.
- When the Athenians found themselves unable to resist the forces of the Persians, they left their city; and having removed their wives and children, and their movable effects, to Troezen and Salamis , went on board their ships, and defended the liberty of Greece by their fleet.—C.
- What follows is against the Academics, who denied the evidence of the senses.—C.
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Against the Epicureans and Academics.
The propositions which are true and evident are of necessity used even by those who contradict them: and a man might perhaps consider it to be the greatest proof of a thing being evident that it is found to be necessary even for him who denies it to make use of it at the same time. For instance, if a man should deny that there is anything universally true, it is plain that he must make the contradictory negation, that nothing is universally true. What, wretch, do you not admit even this? For what else is this than to affirm that whatever is universally affirmed is false? Again if a man should come forward and say: Know that there is nothing that can be known, but all things are incapable of sure evidence; or if another say, Believe me and you will be the better for it, that a man ought not to believe any thing; or again, if another should say, Learn from me, man, that it is not possible to learn any thing; I tell you this and will teach you, if you choose. Now in what respect do these differ from those? Whom shall I name? Those who call themselves Academics? Men, agree [with us] that no man agrees [with another]: believe us that no man believes anybody.
Thus Epicurus also, when he designs to destroy the natural fellowship of mankind, at the same time makes use of that which he destroys. For what does he say? Be not deceived, men, nor be led astray, nor be mistaken: there is no natural fellowship among rational animals; believe me. But those who say otherwise, deceive you and seduce you by false reasons.—What is this to you? Permit us to be deceived. Will you fare worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that there is a natural fellowship among us, and that it ought by all means to be preserved? Nay, it will be much better and safer for you. Man, why do you trouble yourself about us? Why do you keep awake for us? Why do you light your lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you write so many books, that no one of us may be deceived about the gods and believe that they take care of men; or that no one may suppose the nature of good to be other than pleasure? For if this is so, lie down and sleep, and lead the life of a worm, of which you judged yourself worthy: eat and drink, and enjoy women, and ease yourself, and snore. And what is it to you, how the rest shall think about these things, whether right or wrong? For what have we to do with you? You take care of sheep because they supply us with wool and milk, and last of all with their flesh. Would it not be a desirable thing if men could be lulled and enchanted by the Stoics, and sleep and present themselves to you and to those like you to be shorn and milked? For this you ought to say to your brother Epicureans: but ought you not to conceal it from others, and particularly before every thing to persuade them, that we are by nature adapted for fellowship, that temperance is a good thing; in order that all things may be secured for you? Or ought we to maintain this fellowship with some and not with others? With whom then ought we to maintain it? With such as on their part also maintain it, or with such as violate this fellowship? And who violate it more than you who establish such doctrines?
What then was it that waked Epicurus from his sleepiness, and compelled him to write what he did write? What else was it than that which is the strongest thing in men, nature, which draws a man to her own will though he be unwilling and complaining? For since, she says, you think that there is no community among mankind, write this opinion and leave it for others, and break your sleep to do this, and by your own practice condemn your own opinions. Shall we then say that Orestes was agitated by the Erinyes (Furies) and roused from his deep sleep, and did not more savage Erinyes and Pains rouse Epicurus from his sleep and not allow him to rest, but compelled him to make known his own evils, as madness and wine did the Galli (the priests of Cybele)? So strong and invincible is man’s nature, For how can a vine be moved not in the manner of a vine, but in the manner of an olive tree? or on the other hand how can an olive tree be moved not in the manner of an olive tree, but in the manner of a vine? It is impossible: it cannot be conceived. Neither then is it possible for a man completely to lose the movements (affects) of a man; and even those who are deprived of their genital members are not able to deprive themselves of man’s desires. Thus Epicurus also mutilated all the offices of a man, and of a father of a family, and of a citizen and of a friend, but he did not mutilate human desires, for he could not; not more than the lazy Academics can cast away or blind their own senses, though they have tried with all their might to do it. What a shame is this? when a man has received from nature measures and rules for the knowing of truth, and does not strive to add to these measures and rules and to improve them, but just the contrary, endeavours to take away and destroy whatever enables us to discern the truth?
What say you philosopher? piety and sanctity, what do you think that they are? If you like, I will demonstrate that they are good things. Well, demonstrate it that our citizens may be turned and honour the deity and may no longer be negligent about things of the highest value. Have you then the demonstrations?—I have, and I am thankful.—Since then you are well pleased with them, hear the contrary: That there are no Gods, and, if there are, they take no care of men, nor is there any fellowship between us and them; and that this piety and sanctity which is talked of among most men is the lying of boasters and sophists, or certainly of legislators for the purpose of terrifying and checking wrong doers.—Well done, philosopher, you have done something for our citizens, you have brought back all the young men to contempt of things divine.—What then, does not this satisfy you? Learn now, that justice is nothing, that modesty is folly, that a father is nothing, a son nothing.—Well done, philosopher, persist, persuade the young men, that we may have more with the same opinions as you and who say the same as you. From such principles as these have grown our well constituted states; by these was Sparta founded: Lycurgus fixed these opinions in the Spartans by his laws and education, that neither is the servile condition more base than honourable, nor the condition of free men more honourable than base, and that those who died at Thermopylae died from these opinions; and through what other opinions did the Athenians leave their city? Then those who talk thus, marry and beget children, and employ themselves in public affairs and make themselves priests and interpreters. Of whom? of gods who do not exist: and they consult the Pythian priestess that they may hear lies, and they report the oracles to others. Monstrous impudence and imposture.
Man what are you doing? are you refuting yourself every day; and will you not give up these frigid attempts? When you eat, where do you carry your hand to? to your mouth or to your eye? when you wash yourself, what do you go into? do you ever call a pot a dish, or a ladle a spit? If I were a slave of any of these men, even if I must be flayed by him daily, I would rack him. If he said, Boy, throw some olive oil into the bath, I would take pickle sauce and pour it down on his head. What is this? he would say—An appearance was presented to me, I swear by your genius, which could not be distinguished from oil and was exactly like it—Here give me the barley-drink (tisane), he says—I would fill and carry him a dish of sharp sauce—Did I not ask for the barley drink? Yes, mister: this is the barley drink? Take it and smell; take it and taste. How do you know then if our senses deceive us?—If I had three or four fellow—slaves of the same opinion, I should force him to hang himself through passion or to change his mind. But now they mock us by using all the things which nature gives, and in words destroying them.
Grateful indeed are men and modest, who, if they do nothing else, are daily eating bread and yet are shameless enough to say, we do not know if there is a Demeter or her daughter Persephone or a Pluto; not to mention that they are enjoying the night and the day, the seasons of the year, and the stars, and the sea and the land and the co—operation of mankind, and yet they are not moved in any degree by these things to turn their attention to them; but they only seek to belch out their little problem (matter for discussion), and when they have exercised their stomach to go off to the bath. But what they shall say, and about what things or to what persons, and what their hearers shall learn from this talk, they care not even in the least degree, nor do they care if any generous youth after hearing such talk should suffer any harm from it, nor after he has suffered harm should lose all the seeds of his generous nature; nor if we should give an adulterer help towards being shameless in his acts; nor if a public peculator should lay hold of some cunning excuse from these doctrines; nor if another who neglects his parents should be confirmed in his audacity by this teaching.—What then in your opinion is good or bad? This or that?— Why then should a man say any more in reply to such persons as these, or give them any reason or listen to any reason from them, or try to convince them? By Zeus one might much sooner expect to make catamites change their mind than those who are become so deaf and blind to their own evils.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (13)
- Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod soiri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset. Sic omnia latere censebat in occulto, neque ease quidquam quod oerni aut intelligi possit. Quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione adprobare. Cicero, Academ. Post. 1. 12, Diog. Laert. ix. 90 of the Pyrrhonists.
- Cicero, de Fin. ii. 30. 31, speaking of the letter, which Epicurus wrote to Hermarchus when he was dying, says that the actions of Epicurus were inconsistent with his sayings, and his writings were confuted by his probity and morality.
- Paul says, Cor. i. 15. 32: If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus , what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. The words let us eat and drink, etc. are said to be a quotation from the Thais of Menander. The meaning seems to be, that if I do not believe in the resurrection of the dead, why should I not enjoy the sensual pleasures of life only? This is not the doctrine of Epictetus, as we see in the text.
- It would give security to the Epicureans, that they would enjoy all that they value, if other men should be persuaded that we are all made for fellowship, and that temperance is a good thing.
- See Upton’s note.
- I have followed Schweighaeuser who suggests προσεξεργάσασθαι in place of the MSS. προσεργάσασθαι .
- Polybius (vi. 56), when he is speaking of the Roman state, commends the men of old time, who established in the minds of the multitude the opinions about the gods and Hades, wherein, he says, they acted more wisely than those in his time who would destroy suck opinions.
- Epictetus alludes to the Spartans who fought at Thermopylae B. C. 480 against Xerxes and his army. Herodotus (vii. 228) has recorded the inscription placed over the Spartans:— Stranger, go tell the Spartans, Here we lie Obedient to those who bade us die. The inscription is translated by Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 42.
- When Xerxes was advancing on Athens , the Athenians left the city and embarked on their vessels before the battle of Salamis , B. C. 480 . See Cicero, De Officiis, iii. 11.
- He is now attacking the Academics, who asserted that we can know nothing.
- Epictetus is speaking according to the popular notions. To deny Demeter and to eat the bread which she gives is the same thing in the common notions of the Greeks, as it would be for Epictetus to deny the existence of God and to eat the bread which he gives.
- The MSS. have παράσχωμεν. Παράσχωσι would be in conformity with the rest of the passage. But this change of persons is common in Epictetus.
- This resembles what our Saviour said to the Jewish rulers: Verily I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you. Matthew, xxi. 31. Mrs. Carter. To an Academic who said he comprehended nothing, the Stoic Ariston replied, Do you not see even the person who is sitting near you? When the Academic denied it, Ariston said, Who made you blind? who stole your power of sight. (Diog. Laert. vii. 163. Upton.)
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1τοῖς ὑγιέσι καὶ ἐναργέσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες προσχρῶνται. καὶ σχεδὸν τοῦτο μέγιστον ἄν τις ποιήσαιτο τεκμήριον τοῦ ἐναργές τι εἶναι, τὸ ἐπάναγκες εὑρίσκεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἀντιλέγοντι συγχρήσασθαι αὐτῷ· 2οἷον εἴ τις ἀντιλέγοι τῷ εἶναί τι καθολικὸν ἀληθές, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἐναντίαν ἀπόφασιν οὗτος ὀφείλει ποιήσασθαι· οὐδέν ἐστι καθολικὸν ἀληθές. ἀνδράποδον, οὐδὲ τοῦτο. 3τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἢ οἷον εἴ τι ἔστι καθολικόν, ψεῦδός ἐστιν; 4πάλιν ἄν τις παρελθὼν λέγῃ γίγνωσκε, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι γνωστόν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀτέκμαρτα ἢ ἄλλος ὅτι πίστευσόν μοι καὶ ὠφεληθήσῃ· οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀνθρώπῳ πιστεύειν ἢ πάλιν ἄλλος μάθε παρʼ ἐμοῦ, ἄνθρωπε, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται μαθεῖν· ἐγώ σοι λέγω τοῦτο καὶ διδάξω σε, ἐὰν θέλῃς· 5τίνι οὖν τούτων διαφέρουσιν οὗτοι — τίνες ποτέ; — οἱ Ἀκαδημαικοὺς αὑτοὺς λέγοντες; ὦ ἄνθρωποι, συγκατάθεσθε ὅτι οὐδεὶς συγκατατίθεται· πιστεύσατε ἡμῖν ὅτι οὐδεὶς πιστεύει οὐδενί. 6οὕτως καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, ὅταν ἀναιρεῖν θέλῃ τὴν φυσικὴν κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, αὐτῷ τῷ ἀναιρουμένῳ συγχρῆται. 7τί γὰρ λέγει; μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθε, ἄνθρωποι, μηδὲ παράγεσθε μηδὲ διαπίπτετε· οὐκ ἔστι φυσικὴ κοινωνία τοῖς λογικοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους· πιστεύσατέ μοι. οἱ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ παραλογίζονται. 8τί οὖν σοι μέλει; ἄφες ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατηθῆναι. μή τι χεῖρον ἀπαλλάξεις, ἂν πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι πεισθῶμεν, ὅτι φυσική ἐστιν ἡμῖν κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ταύτην δεῖ παντὶ τρόπῳ φυλάσσειν; καὶ πολὺ κρεῖσσον καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον. 9ἄνθρωπε, τί ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν φροντίζεις, τί διʼ ἡμᾶς ἀγρυπνεῖς, τί λύχνον ἅπτεις, τί ἐπανίστασαι, τί τηλικαῦτα βιβλία συγγράφεις; μή τις ἡμῶν ἐξαπατηθῇ περὶ θεῶν ὡς ἐπιμελουμένων ἀνθρώπων ἢ μή τις ἄλλην οὐσίαν ὑπολάβῃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἡδονήν; 10εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ταῦτα ἔχει, βαλὼν κάθευδε καὶ τὰ τοῦ σκώληκος ποίει, ὧν ἄξιον ἔκρινας σεαυτόν· ἔσθιε καὶ πῖνε καὶ συνουσίαζε καὶ ἀφόδευε καὶ ῥέγκε. 11τί δὲ σοὶ μέλει, πῶς οἱ ἄλλοι ὑπολήψονται περὶ τούτων, πότερον ὑγιῶς ἢ οὐχ ὑγιῶς; τί γὰρ σοὶ καὶ ἡμῖν; τῶν γὰρ προβάτων σοι μέλει, ὅτι παρέχει ἡμῖν αὑτὰ καρησόμενα καὶ ἀμελχθησόμενα καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον κατακοπησόμενα; 12οὐχὶ δʼ εὐκταῖον ἦν, εἰ ἐδύναντο οἱ ἄνθρωποι κατακηληθέντες καὶ ἐπᾳσθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Στωικῶν ἀπονυστάζειν καὶ παρέχειν σοι καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις καρησομένους καὶ ἀμελχθησομένους ἑαυτούς; 13πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς Συνεπικουρείους ἔδει σε ταῦτα λέγειν, οὐχὶ δὲ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, πολὺ μάλιστʼ ἐκείνους πρὸ πάντων ἀναπείθειν, ὅτι φύσει κοινωνικοὶ γεγόναμεν, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἐγκράτεια, ἵνα σοι πάντα τηρῆται; 14ἢ πρός τινας μὲν δεῖ φυλάττειν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν, πρός τινας δʼ οὔ; πρὸς τίνας οὖν δεῖ τηρεῖν; πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιτηροῦντας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς παραβατικῶς αὐτῆς ἔχοντας; καὶ τίνες παραβατικώτερον αὐτῆς ἔχουσιν ὑμῶν τῶν ταῦτα διειληφότων; 15τί οὖν ἦν τὸ ἐγεῖρον αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων καὶ ἀναγκάζον γράφειν ἃ ἔγραφεν; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ τὸ πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἰσχυρότατον, ἡ φύσις ἕλκουσα ἐπὶ τὸ αὑτῆς βούλημα ἄκοντα καὶ στένοντα; 16ὅτι γὰρ δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα τὰ ἀκοινώνητα, γράψον αὐτὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀπόλιπε καὶ ἀγρύπνησον διʼ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργῳ κατήγορος γενοῦ τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων. 17εἶτα Ὀρέστην μὲν ὑπὸ Ἐρινύων ἐλαυνόμενον φῶμεν ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων ἐξεγείρεσθαι· τούτῳ δʼ οὐ χαλεπώτεραι αἱ Ἐρινύες καὶ Ποιναί; ἐξήγειρον καθεύδοντα καὶ οὐκ εἴων ἠρεμεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἠνάγκαζον ἐξαγγέλλειν τὰ αὑτοῦ κακὰ ὥσπερ τοὺς Γάλλους ἡ μανία καὶ ὁ οἶνος. 18οὕτως ἰσχυρόν τι καὶ ἀνίκητόν ἐστιν ἡ φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη. πῶς γὰρ δύναται ἄμπελος μὴ ἀμπελικῶς κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐλαικῶς, ἢ ἐλαία πάλιν μὴ ἐλαικῶς, ἀλλʼ ἀμπελικῶς; ἀμήχανον, ἀδιανόητον. 19οὐ τοίνυν οὐδʼ ἄνθρωπον οἷόν τε παντελῶς ἀπολέσαι τὰς κινήσεις τὰς ἀνθρωπικὰς καὶ οἱ ἀποκοπτόμενοι τάς γε προθυμίας τὰς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀποκόψασθαι οὐ δύνανται. 20οὕτως καὶ Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν ἀνδρὸς πάντʼ ἀπεκόψατο καὶ τὰ οἰκοδεσπότου καὶ πολίτου καὶ φίλου, τὰς δὲ προθυμίας τὰς ἀνθρωπικὰς οὐκ ἀπεκόψατο· οὐ γὰρ ἠδύνατο, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ ἀταλαίπωροι Ἀκαδημαικοὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις τὰς αὑτῶν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ ἀποτυφλῶσαι δύνανται καίτοι τοῦτο μάλιστα πάντων ἐσπουδακότες. 21τίς ἢ ἀτυχίας; λαβών τις παρὰ τῆς φύσεως μέτρα καὶ κανόνας εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ προσφιλοτεχνεῖ τούτοις προσθεῖναι καὶ προσεξεργάσασθαι τὰ λείποντα, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον, εἴ τι καὶ ἔχει γνωριστικὸν τῆς ἀληθείας, ἐξαιρεῖν πειρᾶται καὶ ἀπολλύειν. 22τί λέγεις, φιλόσοφε; τὸ εὐσεβὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ποῖόν τί σοι φαίνεται; ἂν θέλῃς, κατασκευάσω ὅτι ἀγαθόν. ναὶ κατασκεύασον, ἵνʼ οἱ πολῖται ἡμῶν ἐπιστραφέντες τιμῶσι τὸ θεῖον καὶ παύσωνταί ποτε ῥᾳθυμοῦντες περὶ τὰ μέγιστα. ἔχεις οὖν τὰς κατασκευάς; ἔχω καὶ χάριν οἶδα. 23ἐπεὶ οὖν ταῦτά σοι λίαν ἀρέσκει, λάβε τὰ ἐναντία· ὅτι θεοὶ οὔτʼ εἰσίν, εἴ τε καὶ εἰσίν, οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ κοινόν τι ἡμῖν ἐστι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τό τʼ εὐσεβὲς τοῦτο καὶ ὅσιον παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις λαλούμενον κατάψευσμά ἐστιν ἀλαζόνων ἀνθρώπων καὶ σοφιστῶν ἢ νὴ Δία νομοθετῶν εἰς φόβον καὶ ἐπίσχεσιν τῶν ἀδικούντων. 24εὖ, φιλόσοφε· ὠφέλησας ἡμῶν τοὺς πολίτας, ἀνεκτήσω τοὺς νέους ῥέποντας ἤδη πρὸς καταφρόνησιν τῶν θείων. 25τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀρέσκει σοι ταῦτα; λάβε νῦν, πῶς ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐδέν ἐστιν, πῶς ἡ αἰδὼς μωρία ἐστίν, πῶς πατὴρ οὐδέν ἐστιν, πῶς ὁ υἱὸς οὐδέν ἐστιν. 26εὖ, φιλόσοφε· ἐπίμενε, πεῖθε τοὺς νέους, ἵνα πλείονας ἔχωμεν ταὐτά σοι πεπονθότας καὶ λέγοντας. ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων ηὐξήθησαν ἡμῖν αἱ εὐνομούμεναι πόλεις, Λακεδαίμων διὰ τούτους τοὺς λόγους ἐγένετο, Λυκοῦργος ταῦτα τὰ πείσματα ἐνεποίησεν αὐτοῖς διὰ τῶν νόμων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς παιδείας, ὅτι οὔτε τὸ δουλεύειν αἰσχρόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ἢ καλὸν οὔτε τὸ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καλὸν μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχρόν, οἱ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις ἀποθανόντες διὰ ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα ἀπέθανον, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τὴν πόλιν διὰ ποίους ἄλλους λόγους ἀπέλιπον; 27εἶτα οἱ λέγοντες ταῦτα γαμοῦσι καὶ παιδοποιοῦνται καὶ πολιτεύονται καὶ ἱερεῖς καθιστᾶσιν αὑτοὺς καὶ προφήτας. τίνων; τῶν οὐκ ὄντων· καὶ τὴν Πυθίαν ἀνακρίνουσιν αὐτοί, ἵνα τὰ ψευδῆ πύθωνται, καὶ ἄλλοις τοὺς χρησμοὺς ἐξηγοῦνται. ὦ μεγάλης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ γοητείας. 28ἄνθρωπε, τί ποιεῖς; αὐτὸς σεαυτὸν ἐξελέγχεις καθʼ ἡμέραν καὶ οὐ θέλεις ἀφεῖναι τὰ ψυχρὰ ταῦτα ἐπιχειρήματα; ἐσθίων ποῦ φέρεις τὴν χεῖρα; εἰς τὸ στόμα ἢ εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμόν; λουόμενος ποῦ ἐμβαίνεις; πότε τὴν χύτραν εἶπες λο[υ]πάδα ἢ τὴν τορύνην ὀβελίσκον; 29εἴ τινος αὐτῶν δοῦλος ἤμην, εἰ καὶ ἔδει με καθʼ ἡμέραν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ ἐκδέρεσθαι, ἐγὼ ἂν αὐτὸν ἐστρέβλουν. βάλε ἐλάδιον, παιδάριον, εἰς τὸ βαλανεῖον. ἔβαλον ἂν γάριον καὶ ἀπελθὼν κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτοῦ κατέχεον. τί τοῦτο; φαντασία μοι ἐγένετο ἐλαίου ἀδιάκριτος, ὁμοιοτάτη, νὴ τὴν σὴν τύχην. 30δὸς ὧδε τὴν πτισάνην. ἤνεγκα ἂν αὐτῷ γεμίσας παροψίδα ὀξογάρου. οὐκ ᾔτησα τὴν πτισάνην; ναὶ κύριε· τοῦτο πτισάνη ἐστίν. τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ὀξόγαρον; τί μᾶλλον ἢ πτισάνη; λάβε καὶ ὀσφράνθητι, λάβε καὶ γεῦσαι. πόθεν οὖν οἶδας, εἰ αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἡμᾶς ψεύδονται; 31τρεῖς, τέσσαρας τῶν συνδούλων εἰ ἔσχον ὁμονοοῦντας, ἀπάγξασθαι ἂν αὐτὸν ἐποίησα ῥηγνύμενον ἢ μεταθέσθαι. νῦν δʼ ἐντρυφῶσιν ἡμῖν τοῖς μὲν παρὰ τῆς φύσεως διδομένοις πᾶσι χρώμενοι, λόγῳ δʼ αὐτὰ ἀναιροῦντες. 32εὐχάριστοί γʼ ἄνθρωποι καὶ αἰδήμονες. εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο καθʼ ἡμέραν ἄρτους ἐσθίοντες τολμῶσι λέγειν ὅτι οὐκ οἴδαμεν, εἰ ἔστι τις Δημήτηρ ἢ Κόρη ἢ Πλούτων· 33ἵνα μὴ λέγω, ὅτι νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἀπολαύοντες καὶ μεταβολῶν τοῦ ἔτους καὶ ἄστρων καὶ θαλάσσης καὶ γῆς καὶ τῆς παρʼ ἀνθρώπων συνεργ[ε]ίας ὑπʼ οὐδενὸς τούτων οὐδὲ κατὰ ποσὸν ἐπιστρέφονται, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐξεμέσαι τὸ προβλημάτιον ζητοῦσι καὶ τὸν στόμαχον γυμνάσαντες ἀπελθεῖν εἰς βαλανεῖον. 34τί δʼ ἐροῦσι καὶ περὶ τίνων ἢ πρὸς τίνας καὶ τί ἔσται αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν λόγων τούτων, οὐδὲ κατὰ βραχὺ πεφροντίκασι· μή τι νέος εὐγενὴς ἀκούσας τῶν λόγων τούτων πάθῃ τι ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἢ καὶ παθὼν πάντʼ ἀπολέσῃ τὰ τῆς εὐγενείας σπέρματα· 35μή τινι μοιχεύοντι ἀφορμὰς παράσχωμεν τοῦ ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα· μή τις τῶν νοσφιζομένων τὰ δημόσια εὑρεσιλογίας τινὸς ἐπιλάβηται ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων τούτων· μή τις τῶν αὑτοῦ γονέων ἀμελῶν θράσος τι καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων προσλάβῃ. 36τί οὖν κατὰ σὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλόν; ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα; τί οὖν; ἔτι τούτων τις ἀντιλέγει τινὶ ἢ λόγον δίδωσιν ἢ λαμβάνει ἢ μεταπείθειν πειρᾶται; 37πολὺ νὴ Δία μᾶλλον τοὺς κιναίδους ἐλπίσαι τις ἂν μεταπείσειν ἢ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀποκεκωφωμένους καὶ ἀποτετυφλωμένους τῶν περὶ αὑτοὺς κακῶν.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA