Gummere · trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)
For the refuter himself proposed a counter-syllogism, based upon the proposition that we regard death as “indifferent,”—one of the things which the Greeks call ἀδιάφορα. “Nothing,” he says, “that is indifferent can be glorious; death is glorious; therefore death is not indifferent.” You comprehend the tricky fallacy which is contained in this syllogism: mere death is, in fact, not glorious; but a brave death is glorious. And when you say: “Nothing that is indifferent is glorious,” I grant you this much, and declare that nothing is glorious except as it deals with indifferent things. I classify as “indifferent,”—that is, neither good nor evil—sickness, pain, poverty, exile, death.
trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)
Gummere’s notes (1)
- Defined by the Greeks as “things which have no direct connexion either with happiness or unhappiness.” See Cicero, De Finibus, iii. 50 ff.
Latin · Latin text, ed. 1917
Nam et ipse interrogationem contrariam opposuit ex eo natam, quod mortem inter indifferentia ponimus, quae ἀδιάφορα Graeci vocant. Nihil, inquit, indifferens gloriosum est; mors autem gloriosum est; ergo mors non est indifferens. Haec interrogatio vides ubi obrepat: mors non est gloriosa, sed fortiter mori gloriosum est. Et cum dicis: indifferens nihil gloriosum est, concedo tibi ita, ut dicam nihil gloriosum esse nisi circa indifferentia. Tamquam indifferentia esse dico, id est nec bona nec mala, morbum, dolorem, paupertatem, exilium, mortem.
Latin text, ed. 1917 · CC BY-SA