Gummere · trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)
I will first state what we Stoics usually reply to these objectors, and then will add what additional answer should, in my opinion, be given.
The situation is entirely different in the case of goods whose loss entails some hardship substituted in their place; for example, when good health is impaired there is a change to ill-health; when the eye is put out, we are visited with blindness; we not only lose our speed when our leg-muscles are cut, but infirmity takes the place of speed. But no such danger is involved in the case of the goods to which we referred a moment ago. And why? If I have lost a good friend, I have no false friend whom I must endure in his place; nor if I have buried a dutiful son, must I face in exchange unfilial conduct.
trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)
Gummere’s notes (1)
- See Ep. lxvi. 6. The Stoics, unlike the Academics and the Peripatetics, maintained that the good must have “an unconditional value” (Zeller).
Latin · Latin text, ed. 1917
Quid adversus hos pro nobis responderi soleat, ponam; deinde tunc adiciam, quid praeterea respondendum putem.
Alia condicio est in iis, quae ablata in locum suum aliquid incommodi substituunt; tamquam bona valitudo vitiata in malam transfertur; acies oculorum exstincta caecitate nos adficit; non tantum velocitas perit poplitibus incisis, sed debilitas pro illa subit. Hoc non est periculum in iis, quae paulo ante rettulimus. Quare? Si amicum bonum amisi, non est mihi pro illo perfidia patienda, nec si bonos liberos extuli, in illorum locum impietas succedit.
Latin text, ed. 1917 · CC BY-SA
Editor’s notes (1)
- officit later MSS.; adfecit VPb.