Hicks · trans. R. D. Hicks (1925)
Again, of things preferred some are preferred for their own sake, some for the sake of something else, and others again both for their own sake and for the sake of something else. To the first of these classes belong natural ability, moral improvement, and the like; to the second wealth, noble birth, and the like; to the last strength, perfect faculties, soundness of bodily organs. Things are preferred for their own sake because they accord with nature; not for their own sake, but for the sake of something else, because they secure not a few utilities. And similarly with the class of things rejected under the contrary heads.
Furthermore, the term Duty is applied to that for which, when done, a reasonable defence can be adduced, e.g. harmony in the tenor of life’s process, which indeed pervades the growth of plants and animals. For even in plants and animals, they hold, you may discern fitness of behaviour.
trans. R. D. Hicks (1925) · CC BY-SA
Hicks’s notes (1)
- The reading πραχθέν is now accepted in place of προαχθέν. Duty, it should be noted, is a very inadequate rendering of καθῆκον, which in the present passage applies to the proper behaviour of plants and animals no less than to that of human beings. Cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 85. 13 ὂ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει; Sext. Emp. vii. 158.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1925
Ἔτι τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν διʼ αὑτὰ προῆκται, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ καὶ διʼ αὑτὰ καὶ διʼ ἕτερα. διʼ αὑτὰ μὲν εὐφυΐα, προκοπὴ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· διʼ ἕτερα δὲ πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· διʼ αὑτὰ δὲ καὶ διʼ ἕτερα ἰσχύς, εὐαισθησία, ἀρτιότης. διʼ αὑτὰ μέν, ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστί· διʼ ἕτερα δέ, ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας. ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀποπροηγμένον κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον.
Ἔτι δὲ καθῆκόν φασιν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν [τε] ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν, οἷον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῇ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα διατείνει· ὁρᾶσθαι γὰρ κἀπὶ τούτων καθήκοντα.
Greek text, ed. 1925 · CC BY-SA