Hicks · trans. R. D. Hicks (1925)
Further, arguments may be divided into true and false. The former draw their conclusions by means of true premisses; e.g. If virtue does good, vice does harm; but virtue does good, therefore vice does harm. Those are false which have error in the premisses or are inconclusive; e.g. If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore Dion is alive. Arguments may also be divided into possible and impossible, necessary and not necessary. Further, there are statements which are indemonstrable because they do not need demonstration; they are employed in the construction of every argument. As to the number of these, authorities differ; Chrysippus makes them five. These are assumed alike in reasoning specifically conclusive and in syllogisms both categorical and hypothetical.
trans. R. D. Hicks (1925) · CC BY-SA
Hicks’s notes (1)
- The example is badly chosen, confusing contrary with contradictory.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1925
Ἔτι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς. ἀληθεῖς μὲν οὖν εἰσι λόγοι οἱ διʼ ἀληθῶν συνάγοντες, οἷον εἰ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ, ἡ κακία βλάπτει· 〈ἀλλὰ μὴν ὠφελεῖ ἡ ἀρετή· ἡ κακία ἄρα βλάπτει〉. ψευδεῖς δέ εἰσιν οἱ τῶν λημμάτων ἔχοντές τι ψεῦδος ἢ ἀπέραντοι ὄντες, οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστιν· ἡμέρα δέ ἐστι· ζῇ ἄρα Δίων. καὶ δυνατοὶ δʼ εἰσὶ λόγοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καὶ ἀναγκαῖοι καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖοι· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἀναπόδεικτοί τινες, τῷ μὴ χρῄζειν ἀποδείξεως, ἄλλοι μὲν παρʼ ἄλλοις, παρὰ δὲ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ πέντε, διʼ ὧν πᾶς λόγος πλέκεται· οἵτινες λαμβάνονται ἐπὶ τῶν περαντικῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τροπικῶν.
Greek text, ed. 1925 · CC BY-SA