Gummere · trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)
But I now return to the subject which I promised to discuss for you, namely, how it is that Plato divides all existing things in six different ways. The first class of “that which exists” cannot be grasped by the sight or by the touch, or by any of the senses; but it can be grasped by the thought. Any generic conception, such as the generic idea “man,” does not come within the range of the eyes; but “man” in particular does; as, for example, Cicero, Cato. The term “animal” is not seen; it is grasped by thought alone. A particular animal, however, is seen, for example, a horse, a dog.
trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)
Gummere’s notes (1)
- Cf. § 8. Plato’s usual division was threefold,—αἰσθητά, μαθηματικά, εἴδη (sensibilia, mathematica, ideae),—a division which is often quoted by Aristotle.
Latin · Latin text, ed. 1917
Nunc ad id, quod tibi promisi, revertor, quomodo quaecumque sunt, in sex modos Plato partiatur. Primum illud quod est nec visu nec tactu nec ullo sensu conprenditur; cogitabile est. Quod generaliter est, tamquam homo generalis, sub oculos non venit; sed specialis venit, ut Cicero et Cato. Animal non videtur; cogitatur. Videtur autem species eius, equus et canis.
Latin text, ed. 1917 · CC BY-SA