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The Stoa
Translation

Seneca

Letters 113.14

Letter 113 · Section 14 · 1898 of 2141

Gummere · trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)

“The same soul, however,” they answer, “assumes the guise of Justice, or Bravery, or Restraint.” This would be possible if Bravery were absent when Justice was present, and if Restraint were absent when Bravery was present; as the case stands now, all the virtues exist at the same time. Hence, how can the separate virtues be living things, if you grant that there is one single soul, which cannot create more than one single living thing?

trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)

Gummere’s notes (1)
  1. The soul is “body,” “world-stuff” (not “matter” in the modern sense). It is therefore, according to the Stoics, a living entity, a unit; and Virtue is a διάθεσις ψυχῆς,—a “permanent disposition of the soul.”
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  • Gummere · trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)

    Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, trans. R. M. Gummere, Loeb Classical Library, 3 vols. (London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam, 1917, 1920, 1925)

    Public domain · Source file

    Transcription: Wikisource

  • Latin · Latin text, ed. 1917

    Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, ed. R. M. Gummere, Loeb Classical Library, 3 vols. (London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam, 1917–1925)

    CC BY-SA 4.0 · Source file

    Text: Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, ed. R. M. Gummere, Loeb Classical Library, 3 vols. (London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam, 1917–1925). Digital edition by the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University (https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/), urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.perseus-lat2, https://github.com/PerseusDL/canonical-latinLit/blob/8cef51623130f2412da410858e32c322eb796c0a/data/phi1017/phi015/phi1017.phi015.perseus-lat2.xml. Licensed CC BY-SA 4.0.

Moral Letters to Lucilius
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