Gummere · trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)
“The same soul, however,” they answer, “assumes the guise of Justice, or Bravery, or Restraint.” This would be possible if Bravery were absent when Justice was present, and if Restraint were absent when Bravery was present; as the case stands now, all the virtues exist at the same time. Hence, how can the separate virtues be living things, if you grant that there is one single soul, which cannot create more than one single living thing?
trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)
Gummere’s notes (1)
- The soul is “body,” “world-stuff” (not “matter” in the modern sense). It is therefore, according to the Stoics, a living entity, a unit; and Virtue is a διάθεσις ψυχῆς,—a “permanent disposition of the soul.”
Latin · Latin text, ed. 1917
Sed idem animus, inquit, iustitiae habitum induit et fortitudinis et temperantiae. Hoc fieri posset, si quo tempore iustitia esset, fortitudo non esset, quo tempore fortitudo esset, temperantia non esset; nunc vero omnes virtutes simul sunt. Ita quomodo singulae erunt animalia, cum unus animus sit, qui plus quam unum animal non potest facere?
Latin text, ed. 1917 · CC BY-SA
Editor’s notes (1)
- induit later MSS.; inbuit BA.