Hicks · trans. R. D. Hicks (1925)
Good in general is that from which some advantage comes, and more particularly what is either identical with or not distinct from benefit. Whence it follows that virtue itself and whatever partakes of virtue is called good in these three senses—viz. as being (1) the source from which benefit results; or (2) that in respect of which benefit results, e.g. the virtuous act; or (3) that by the agency of which benefit results, e.g. the good man who partakes in virtue.
Another particular definition of good which they give is the natural perfection of a rational being qua rational. To this answers virtue and, as being partakers in virtue, virtuous acts and good men; as also its supervening accessories, joy and gladness and the like.
trans. R. D. Hicks (1925) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1925
Ἀγαθὸν δὲ κοινῶς μὲν τὸ 〈οὗ〉 τι ὄφελος, ἰδίως δʼ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας. ὅθεν αὐτήν τε τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μετέχον αὐτῆς ἀγαθὸν τριχῶς οὕτω λέγεσθαι· οἷον τὸ 〈μὲν〉 ἀγαθὸν ἀφʼ οὗ συμβαίνει 〈ὠφελεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ καθʼ ὃ συμβαίνει〉, ὡς τὴν πρᾶξιν τὴν κατʼ ἀρετήν· ὑφʼ οὗ δέ, ὡς τὸν σπουδαῖον τὸν μετέχοντα τῆς ἀρετῆς.
Ἄλλως δʼ οὕτως ἰδίως ὁρίζονται τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν λογικοῦ ὡς λογικοῦ. τοιοῦτον δʼ εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, ὥς τε μετέχοντα τάς τε πράξεις τὰς κατʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους εἶναι· ἐπιγεννήματα δὲ τήν τε χαρὰν καὶ τὴν εὐφροσύνην καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια.
Greek text, ed. 1925 · CC BY-SA
Editor’s notes (1)
- ὤστε Arn.: ἧς τὰ coni. Reiske.