Hicks · trans. R. D. Hicks (1925)
The fourth kind employs a disjunctive proposition and one of the two alternatives in the disjunction as premisses, and its conclusion is the contradictory of the other alternative; e.g. Either A or B; but A is, therefore B is not. The fifth kind is that in which the argument as a whole is constructed of a disjunctive proposition and the contradictory of one of the alternatives in the disjunction, its conclusion being the other alternative; e.g. Either it is day or it is night; but it is not night, therefore it is day.
From a truth a truth follows, according to the Stoics, as e.g. It is light from It is day; and from a falsehood a falsehood, as It is dark from It is night, if this latter be untrue. Also a truth may follow from a falsehood; e.g. from The earth flies will follow The earth exists; whereas from a truth no falsehood will follow, for from the existence of the earth it does not follow that the earth flies aloft.
trans. R. D. Hicks (1925) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1925
τέταρτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ διὰ διεζευγμένου καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν ἐν τῷ διεζευγμένῳ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ ἔχων συμπέρασμα, οἷον ἤτοι τὸ πρῶτον ἢ τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον. πέμπτος δέ ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ἐν ᾧ πᾶς λόγος συντάσσεται ἐκ διεζευγμένου καὶ ἑνὸς τῶν ἐν τῷ διεζευγμένῳ ἀντικειμένων καὶ ἐπιφέρει τὸ λοιπόν, οἷον ἤτοι ἡμέρα ἐστὶν ἢ νύξ ἐστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ νύξ ἐστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἐστίν.
Ἐπʼ ἀληθεῖδʼ ἀληθὲς ἕπεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικούς, ὡς τῷ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ τὸ φῶς ἐστι· καὶ ψεύδει ψεῦδος, ὡς τῷ νύξ ἐστι ψεύδει τὸ σκότος ἐστί· καὶ ψεύδει ἀληθές, ὡς τῷ ἵπτασθαι τὴν γῆν τὸ εἶναι τὴν γῆν. ἀληθεῖ μέντοι ψεῦδος οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ· τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὴν γῆν τὸ πέτεσθαι τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ.
Greek text, ed. 1925 · CC BY-SA