Gummere · trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)
“One man’s opinion,” you say, “is not enough to create glory or reputation.” In the former case, one judgment is a universal judgment, because all, if they were asked, would hold one opinion; in the other case, however, men of dissimilar character give divergent judgments. You will find perplexing emotions—everything doubtful, inconstant, untrustworthy. And can you suppose that all men are able to hold one opinion? Even an individual does not hold to a single opinion. With the good man it is truth that causes belief, and truth has but one function and one likeness; while among the second class of which I spoke, the ideas with which they agree are unsound. Moreover, those who are false are never steadfast: they are irregular and discordant.
trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)
Gummere’s notes (1)
- i.e., of the unus vir bonus, as contrasted with the many.
Latin · Latin text, ed. 1917
Ad gloriam aut famam non est satis unius opinio. Illic idem potest una sententia, quod omnium, quia omnium, si perrogetur, una erit; hic diversa dissimilium iudicia sunt. Difficiles adfectus, dubia omnia invenies, levia, suspecta. Putas tu posse unam omnium esse sententiam? Non est unius una sententia. Illi placet verum, veritatis una vis, una facies est; apud hos falsa sunt, quibus adsentiuntur. Numquam autem falsis constantia est: variantur et dissident.
Latin text, ed. 1917 · CC BY-SA