Gummere · trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)
Then the retort is: “What! Would you define reputation as the esteem of one individual, and ill-repute as the rancorous chatter of one man? Glory, too, we take to be more widespread, for it demands the agreement of many men.” But the position of the “many” is different from that of “the one.” And why? Because, if the good man thinks well of me, it practically amounts to my being thought well of by all good men; for they will all think the same, if they know me. Their judgment is alike and identical; the effect of truth on it is equal. They cannot disagree, which means that they would all hold the same view, being unable to hold different views.
trans. Richard M. Gummere (1917)
Latin · Latin text, ed. 1917
Quid ergo? inquit, et fama erit unius hominis existimatio et infamia unius malignus sermo? Gloriam quoque, inquit, latius fusam intellego, consensum enim multorum exigit. Diversa horum condicio est et illius. Quare? Quia, si de me bene vir bonus sentit, eodem loco sum, quo si omnes boni idem sentirent; omnes enim, si me cognoverint, idem sentient. Par illis idemque iudicium est, aeque vero inficiscitur. Dissidere non possunt; ita pro eo est, ac si omnes idem sentiant, quia aliud sentire non possunt.
Latin text, ed. 1917 · CC BY-SA