Carter · trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
CHAPTER XIII. · Concerning Such as readily discover their own Affairs.
1When any one appears to us to discourse frankly of his own Affairs, we too are some Way induced to discover our Secrets to him; and we suppose this to be acting with Frankness. First, because it seems unfair, that, when we have heard the Affairs of our Neighbour, we should not, in return, communicate ours to him; and, besides, we think, that we shall not appear of a frank Character in concealing what belongs to ourselves. Indeed it is often said, "I have told you all my Affairs; and will you tell me none of yours? Where do People act thus?" Lastly, it is supposed, that we may safely trust him who hath already trusted us: for we imagine, that he will never discover our Affairs, for fear we, in our Turn, should discover his. It is thus that the Inconsiderate are caught by the Soldiers at Rome. A Soldier sits by you, in a common Dress, and begins to speak ill of Cæsar. Then you, as if you had received a Pledge of his Fidelity, by his first beginning the Abuse, say likewise what you think; and so you are led away in Chains to Execution. 2Something like this is the Case with us in general. But when one hath safely intrusted his Secrets to me, shall I, in Imitation of him, trust mine to any one who comes in my Way? The Case is different. I indeed hold my Tongue, (supposing me to be of such a Disposition) but he goes, and discovers them to every body: and then, when I come to find it out, if I happen to be like him, from a Desire of Revenge, I discover his; and asperse, and am aspersed. But, if I remember, that one Man doth not hurt another, but that every one is hurt and profited by his own Actions, I indeed keep to this, not to do any thing like him: yet, by my own talkative Folly, I suffer what I do suffer. 3"Ay: but it is unfair, when you have heard the Secrets of your Neighbour, not to communicate any thing to him, in return."——Why, did I ask you to do it, Sir? Did you tell me your Affairs, upon Condition that I should tell you mine, in return? If you are a Blab, and believe all you meet to be Friends, would you have me too become like you? But, what if the Case be this: that you did right in trusting your Affairs to me, but it is not right that I should trust you? Would you have me run headlong, and fall? This is just as if I had a sound Barrel, and you a leaky one: and you should come and deposite your Wine with me to put it into my Barrel; and then should take it ill, that, in my Turn, I did not trust you with my Wine. No. You have a leaky Barrel. How then are we any longer upon equal Terms? You have deposited your Affairs with an honest Man, and a Man of Honour; one who esteems his own Actions alone, and nothing external, to be either hurtful or profitable. Would you have me deposite mine with you; a Man who have dishonoured your own Faculty of Choice, and who would get a paultry Sum, or a Post of Power or Preferment at Court, even if, for the Sake of it, you were to kill your own Children, like Medea? Where is the Equality of this? But show me, that you are faithful; a Man of Honour, steady; show me, that you have friendly Principles; show me, that your Vessel is not leaky; and you shall see, that I will not stay till you have trusted your Affairs to me; but I will come and intreat you to hear an Account of mine. For who would not make use of a good Vessel? Who despises a benevolent and friendly Adviser? Who will not gladly receive one to share the Burden, as it were, of his Difficulties; and, by sharing, to make it lighter?——"Well: "but I trust you, and you do not trust me."——In the first place, you do not really trust me; but you are a Blab, and therefore can keep nothing in. For, if the former be the Case, trust only me. But now, whomever you see at leisure, you sit down by him, and say, "My dear Friend, there is not a Man in the World that wishes me better, or hath more Kindness for me, than you; I intreat you to hear my Affairs." And this you do to those, with whom you have not the least Acquaintance. But, if you do [really] trust me, it is plainly as [thinking me] a Man of Fidelity and Honour; and not because I have told you my Affairs. Let me alone then, till I too am of this Opinion [with regard to You]. Show me, that, if a Person hath told his Affairs to any one, it is a Proof of his being a Man of Fidelity and Honour. For, if this was the Case, I would go about and tell my Affairs to the whole World; if, upon that Account, I should become a Man of Fidelity and Honour. But that is no such Matter; but requires a Person to have no ordinary Principles. 4If then you see any one taking Pains for Things that belong to others, and subjecting his Choice to them, be assured, that this Man hath a thousand Things to compell and restrain him. He hath no Need of burning Pitch, or the torturing
Wheel, to make him tell what he knows; but the
Nod of a Girl, for Instance, will shake his Purpose; the Good-will of a Courtier, the Desire of a
public Post, of an Inheritance; ten thousand other
Things of that Sort. It must therefore be remembered in general, that secret Discourses require Fidelity, and a certain Sort of Principles. And where
at this Time, are these easily to be found? Pray
let any one show me a Person of such a Disposition
as to say, I trouble myself only with those Things
which are my own, incapable of Restraint, by Nature free. This I esteem the Essence of Good. Let
the rest be as it may happen. It makes no Difference to me. End of the Discourses.
trans. Elizabeth Carter (1758)
Higginson · trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865)
Concerning such as are too communicative
When any one appears to us to discourse frankly of his own affairs, we too are somehow tempted to disclose our secrets to him; and we consider this to be acting with frankness,—first, because it seems unfair that when we have heard the affairs of our neighbor, we should not in return communicate ours to him; and besides, we think that we shall not appear of a frank character, in concealing what belongs to ourselves. Indeed it is often said, have told you all my affairs; and will you tell me none of yours? How happens this? Lastly, it is supposed that we may safely trust him who has already trusted us; for we imagine that he will never discover our affairs, for fear we should in turn discover his. It is thus that the inconsiderate are caught by the soldiers at Rome. A soldier sits by you in a civilian’s dress, and begins to speak ill of Caesar. Then you, as if you had received a pledge of his fidelity, by his first beginning the abuse, say likewise what you think; and so you are led away in chains to execution.
Something like this is the case with us in general. But when one has safely intrusted his secrets to me, shall I, in imitation of him, trust mine to any one who comes in my way? The case is different. I indeed hold my tongue (supposing me to be of such a disposition); but he goes and discovers them to everybody; and then, when I come to find it out, if I happen to be like him, from a desire of revenge, I discover his, and asperse and am aspersed. But if I remember that one man does not hurt another, but that every one is hurt or profited by his own actions, I may indeed keep to this, not to do anything like him; yet, by my own talkative folly, I suffer what I do suffer.
Ay; but it is unfair, when you have heard the secrets of your neighbor, not to communicate anything to him in return. Why, did I ask you to do it, sir? Did you tell me your affairs upon condition that I should tell you mine in return? If you are a gossip, and take all you meet for friends, would you have me too become like you? But what if the case be this; that you did right in trusting your affairs to me, but it is not right that I should trust you? Would you have me run headlong, and fall? This is just as if I had a sound barrel, and you a leaky one; and you should come and deposit your wine with me, to be put into my barrel; and then should take it ill that, in my turn, I did not trust you with my wine. No. You have a leaky barrel. How, then, are we any longer upon equal terms? You have intrusted your affairs to an honest man, and a man of honor; one who finds his help or harm in his own actions alone, and in nothing external. Would you have me intrust mine to you, who have dishonored your own will, and who would get a paltry sum, or a post of power or preferment at court, even if it required you to kill your own children, like Medea? Where is the fairness in this? But show me that you are faithful, honorable, steady; show me that you have principles conducive to friendship; show me that your vessel is not leaky, and you shall see that I will not wait for you to intrust your affairs to me, but I will come and entreat you to hear mine. For who would not make use of a good vessel? Who despises a benevolent and friendly adviser? Who will not gladly receive one to share the burden, as it were, of his difficulties; and by sharing, to make it lighter? Well, but I trust you, and you do not trust me. In the first place, you do not really trust me; but you are a gossip, and therefore can keep nothing in. For if the former be the case, trust only me. But now, whenever you see a man at leisure, you sit down by him and say: My dear friend, there is not a man in the world who wishes me better, or has more kindness for me, than you; I entreat you to hear my affairs. And this you do to those with whom you have not the least acquaintance. But if you do trust me, it is plainly as a man of fidelity and honor, and not because I have told you my affairs. Let me alone, then, till I reciprocate this opinion. Convince me that if a person has told his affairs to any one, it is a proof of his being a man of fidelity and honor. For if this were the case, I would go about and tell my affairs to the whole world, if I could thus become a man of fidelity and honor. But that is no such matter; for it demands of a man to have no ordinary principles.
If, then, you see any one taking pains for things that belong to others, and subjecting his will to them, be assured that this man has a thousand things to compel and restrain him. He has no need of burning pitch, or the torturing wheel, to make him tell what he knows; but the nod of a girl, for instance, will shake his purpose; the good-will of a courtier; the desire of an office, of an inheritance; ten thousand other things of that sort. It must therefore be remembered, in general, that confidential discourses require fidelity and a certain sort of principles. And where, at this time, are these easily to be found? Pray let any one show me a person of such a disposition as to say, I concern myself only for those things which are my own, incapable of restraint, and by nature free. This I esteem the essence of good. Let the rest be as it may happen; it makes no difference to me.
trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1865) · CC BY-SA
Long · trans. George Long (1877)
Against or to those who readily tell their own affairs.
When a man has seemed to us to have talked with simplicity candour) about his own affairs, how is it that at last we are ourselves also induced to discover to himour own secrets and we think this to be candid behaviour? In the first place because it seems unfair for a man to have listened to the affairs of his neighbour, and not to communicate to him also in turn our own affairs: next, because we think that we shall not present to them the appearance of candid men when we are silent about our own affairs. Indeed men are often accustomed to say, I have told you all my affairs, will you tell me nothing of your own? where is this done?—Besides, we have also this opinion that we can safely trust him who has already told us his own affairs; for the notion rises in our mind that this man could never divulge our affairs because he would be cautious that we also should not divulge his. In this way also the incautious are caught by the soldiers at Rome. A soldier sits by you in a common dress and begins to speak ill of Caesar; then you, as if you had received a pledge of his fidelity by his having begun the abuse, utter yourself also what you think, and then you are carried off in chains.
Something of this kind happens to us also generally. Now as this man has confidently intrusted his affairs to me, shall I also do so to any man whom I meet? (No), for when I have heard, I keep silence, if I am of such a disposition; but he goes forth and tells all men what he has heard. Then if I hear what has been done, if I be a man like him, I resolve to be revenged, I divulge what he has told me; I both disturb others and am disturbed myself. But if I remember that one man does not injure another, and that every man’s acts injure and profit him, I secure this, that I do not any thing like him, but still I suffer what I do suffer through my own silly talk.
True: but it is unfair when you have heard the secrets of your neighbour for you in your turn to communicate nothing to him.—Did I ask you for your secrets, my man? did you communicate your affairs on certain terms, that you should in return hear mine also? If you are a babbler and think that all who meet you are friends, do you wish me also to be like you? But why, if you did well in intrusting your affairs to me, and it is not well for me to intrust mine to you, do you wish me to be so rash? It is just the same as if I had a cask which is water-tight, and you one with a hole in it, and you should come and deposit with me your wine that I might put it into my cask, and then should complain that I also did not intrust my wine to you, for you have a cask with a hole in it. How then is there any equality here? You intrusted your affairs to a man who is faithful, and modest, to a man who thinks that his own actions alone are injurious and (or) useful, and that nothing external is. Would you have me intrust mine to you, a man who has dishonoured his own faculty of will, and who wishes to gain some small bit of money or some office or promotion in the court (emperor’s palace), even if you should be going to murder your own children, like Medea? Where (in what) is this equality (fairness)? But show yourself to me to be faithful, modest, and steady: show me that you have friendly opinions; show that your cask has no hole in it; and you will see how I shall not wait for you to trust me with your affairs, but I myself shall come to you and ask you to hear mine. For who does not choose to make use of a good vessel? Who does not value a benevolent and faithful adviser? who will not willingly receive a man who is ready to bear a share, as we may say, of the difficulty of his circumstances, and by this very act to ease the burden, by taking a part of it.
True: but I trust you; you do not trust me.—In the first place, not even do you trust me, but you are a babbler, and for this reason you cannot hold any thing; for indeed, if it is true that you trust me, trust your affairs to me only; but now whenever you see a man at leisure, you seat yourself by him and say: Brother, I have no friend more benevolent than you nor dearer; I request you to listen to my affairs. And you do this even to those who are not known to you at all. But if you really trust me, it is plain that you trust me because I am faithful and modest, not because I have told my affairs to you. Allow me then to have the same opinion about you. Show me that if one man tells his affairs to another, he who tells them is faithful and modest. For if this were so, I would go about and tell my affairs to every man, if that would make me faithful and modest. But the thing is not so, and it requires no common opinions (principles). If then you see a man who is busy about things not dependent on his will and subjecting his will to them, you must know that this man has ten thousand persons to compel and hinder him. He has no need of pitch or the wheel to compel him to declare what he knows: but a little girl’s nod, if it should so happen, will move him, the blandishment of one who belongs to Caesar’s court, desire of a magistracy or of an inheritance, and things without end of that sort. You must remember then among general principles that secret discourses (discourses about secret matters) require fidelity and corresponding opinions. But where can we now find these easily? Or if you cannot answer that question, let some one point out to me a man who can say: I care only about the things which are my own, the things which are not subject to hindrance, the things which are by nature free. This I hold to be the nature of the good: but let all other things be as they are allowed; I do not concern myself.
trans. George Long (1877) · CC BY-SA
Long’s notes (3)
- Schweig. Writes πῶς ποτε , etc., and translates excitamur quodammodo et ipsi, etc. He gives the meaning, but the πῶς ποτε is properly a question.
- The man, whether a soldier or not, was an informer, one of those vile men who carried on this shameful business under the empire. He was what Juvenal names a delator. Upton, who refers to the life of Hadrian by Aelius Spartianus, speaks even of this emperor employing soldiers named Frumentarii for the purpose of discovering what was said and done in private houses. John the Baptist (Luke iii. 14) in answer to the question of the soldiers, And what shall we do. said unto them Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with your wages. Upton.
- The wheel and pitch were instruments of torture to extract confessions. See ii 6, 18, and Schweig.’s note there.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1916
1ὅταν τις ἡμῖν ἁπλῶς δόξῃ διειλέχθαι περὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πραγμάτων, πώς ποτε ἐξαγόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐκφέρειν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἀπόρρητα καὶ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν οἰόμεθα εἶναι· 2πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἄνισον εἶναι δοκεῖ αὐτὸν μὲν ἀκηκοέναι τὰ τοῦ πλησίον, μὴ μέντοι μεταδιδόναι κἀκείνῳ ἐν τῷ μέρει τῶν ἡμετέρων. εἶθʼ ὅτι οἰόμεθα οὐχ ἁπλῶν ἀνθρώπων παρέξειν αὐτοῖς φαντασίαν σιωπῶντες τὰ ἴδια. 3ἀμέλει πολλάκις εἰώθασιν λέγειν ἐγώ σοι πάντα τἀμαυτοῦ εἴρηκα, σύ μοι οὐδὲν τῶν σῶν εἰπεῖν θέλεις; ποῦ γίνεται τοῦτο; 4πρόσεστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀσφαλῶς πιστεύειν τῷ ἤδη τὰ αὑτοῦ πεπιστευκότι· ὑπέρχεται γὰρ ἡμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὗτος ἐξείποι τὰ ἡμέτερα εὐλαβούμενος, μήποτε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐξείπωμεν τὰ ἐκείνου. 5οὕτως καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐν Ῥώμῃ οἱ προπετεῖς λαμβάνονται. παρακεκάθικέ σοι στρατιώτης ἐν σχήματι ἰδιωτικῷ καὶ ἀρξάμενος κακῶς λέγει τὸν Καίσαρα, εἶτα σὺ ὥσπερ ἐνέχυρον παρʼ αὐτοῦ λαβὼν τῆς πίστεως τὸ αὐτὸν τῆς λοιδορίας κατῆρχθαι λέγεις καὶ αὐτὸς ὅσα φρονεῖς, εἶτα δεθεὶς ἀπάγῃ. 6τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐν τῷ καθόλου πάσχομεν. οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖνος ἀσφαλῶς πεπίστευκεν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, οὕτως κἀγὼ τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι· 7ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ μὲν ἀκούσας σιωπῶ, ἄν γε ὦ τοιοῦτος, ὁ δʼ ἐξελθὼν ἐκφέρει πρὸς πάντας. εἶτʼ ἂν γνῶ τὸ γενόμενον, ἂν μὲν ὦ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκείνῳ ὅμοιος, ἀμύνασθαι θέλων ἐκφέρω τὰ ἐκείνου καὶ φύρω καὶ φύρομαι. 8ἂν δὲ μνημονεύω, ὅτι ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐ βλάπτει, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἔργα ἕκαστον καὶ βλάπτει καὶ ὠφελεῖ, τούτου μὲν κρατῶ τοῦ μὴ ὅμοιόν τι ποιῆσαι ἐκείνῳ, ὅμως δʼ ὑπὸ φλυαρίας τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ πέπονθα ἃ πέπονθα. 9ναί· ἀλλʼ ἄνισόν ἐστιν ἀκούσαντα τὰ τοῦ πλησίον ἀπόρρητα αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ μέρει μηδενὸς μεταδιδόναι αὐτῷ. 10— μὴ γάρ σε παρεκάλουν, ἄνθρωπε; μὴ γὰρ ἐπὶ συνθήκαις τισὶν ἐξήνεγκας τὰ σαυτοῦ, ἵνʼ ἀκούσῃς ἐν τῷ μέρει καὶ τὰ ἐμά; 11εἰ σὺ φλύαρος εἶ καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἀπαντήσαντας φίλους εἶναι δοκεῖς, θέλεις καὶ ἐμὲ ὅμοιόν σοι γενέσθαι; τί δʼ, εἰ σὺ καλῶς μοι πεπίστευκας τὰ σαυτοῦ, σοὶ δʼ οὐκ ἔστι καλῶς πιστεῦσαι, θέλεις με προ[σ]πεσεῖν; 12οἷον εἰ πίθον εἶχον ἐγὼ μὲν στεγνόν, σὺ δὲ τετρυπημένον καὶ ἐλθὼν παρακατέθου μοι τὸν σαυτοῦ οἶνον, ἵνα βάλω εἰς τὸν ἐμὸν πίθον, εἶτʼ ἠγανάκτεις ὅτι μὴ κἀγὼ σοὶ πιστεύω τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ οἶνον· σὺ γὰρ τετρυπημένον ἔχεις τὸν πίθον. 13πῶς οὖν ἔτι ἴσον γίνεται; σὺ πιστῷ παρακατέθου, σὺ αἰδήμονι, τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργείας μόνας βλαβερὰς ἡγουμένῳ καὶ ὠφελίμους, τῶν δʼ ἐκτὸς οὐδέν· 14ἐγὼ σοὶ θέλεις παρακαταθῶμαι, ἀνθρώπῳ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἠτιμακότι, θέλοντι δὲ κερματίου τυχεῖν ἢ ἀρχῆς τινος ἢ προαγωγῆς ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ, κἂν μέλλῃς τὰ τέκνα σου κατασφάζειν, ὡς ἡ Μήδεια; 15ποῦ τοῦτο ἴσον ἐστίν; ἀλλὰ δεῖξόν μοι σαυτὸν πιστόν, αἰδήμονα, βέβαιον, δεῖξον, ὅτι δόγματα ἔχεις φιλικά, δεῖξόν σου τὸ ἀγγεῖον ὅτι οὐ τέτρηται καὶ ὄψει, πῶς οὐκ ἀναμένω ἵνα μοι σὺ πιστεύσῃς τὰ σαυτοῦ, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ἐλθὼν σὲ παρακαλῶ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν ἐμῶν. 16τίς γὰρ οὐ θέλει χρήσασθαι ἀγγείῳ καλῷ, τίς ἀτιμάζει σύμβουλον εὔνουν καὶ πιστόν, τίς οὐκ ἄσμενος δέξηται τὸν ὥσπερ φορτίου μεταληψόμενον τῶν αὐτοῦ περιστάσεων καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ κουφιοῦντα αὐτὸν τῷ μεταλαβεῖν; 17ναί· ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ σοὶ πιστεύω, σὺ ἐμοὶ οὐ πιστεύεις. — πρῶτον μὲν οὐδὲ σὺ ἐμοὶ πιστεύεις, ἀλλὰ φλύαρος εἶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν δύνασαι κατασχεῖν. ἐπεί τοι εἰ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐμοὶ μόνῳ αὐτὰ πίστευσον· 18νῦν δʼ ὃν ἂν εὐσχολοῦντα ἴδῃς, παρακαθίσας αὐτῷ λέγεις ἀδελφέ, οὐδένα σου ἔχω εὐνούστ[οτ]ερον οὐδὲ φίλτερον, παρακαλῶ σε ἀκοῦσαι τὰ ἐμά· καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τοὺς οὐδέ τι ὀλίγον ἐγνωσμένους ποιεῖς. 19εἰ δὲ καὶ πιστεύεις ἐμοί, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πιστῷ καὶ αἰδήμονι, οὐχ ὅτι σοὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐξεῖπον. 20ἄφες οὖν, ἵνα κἀγὼ ταὐτὰ ὑπολάβω. δεῖξόν μοι, ὅτι, ἄν τις τινὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἐξείπῃ, ἐκεῖνος πιστός ἐστι καὶ αἰδήμων. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἦν, ἐγὼ περιερχόμενος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ ἂν ἔλεγον, εἰ τούτου ἕνεκα ἔμελλον πιστὸς καὶ αἰδήμων ἔσεσθαι. τὸ δʼ ἐστὶν οὐ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ δογμάτων δεῖ οὐχ ὧν ἔτυχεν. 21ἂν γοῦν τινα ἴδῃς περὶ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα ἐσπουδακότα καὶ τούτοις ὑποτεταχότα τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν, ἴσθι ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος μυρίους ἔχει τοὺς ἀναγκάζοντας, τοὺς κωλύοντας. 22οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ χρεία πίσσης ἢ τροχοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἐξειπεῖν ἃ οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ παιδισκαρίου νευμάτιον, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, ἐκσείσει αὐτόν, Καισαριανοῦ φιλοφροσύνη, ἀρχῆς ἐπιθυμία, κληρονομίας, ἄλλα τούτοις ὅμοια τρισμύρια. 23μεμνῆσθαι οὖν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου, ὅτι οἱ ἀπόρρητοι λόγοι πίστεως χρείαν ἔχουσι καὶ δογμάτων τοιούτων· ταῦτα δὲ ποῦ νῦν εὑρεῖν ῥᾳδίως; 24ἢ δειξάτω μοί τις τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ὥστε λέγειν ἐμοὶ μόνων μέλει τῶν ἐμῶν, τῶν ἀκωλύτων, τῶν φύσει ἐλευθέρων. ταύτην οὐσίαν ἔχω τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα γινέσθω ὡς ἂν διδῶται· οὐ διαφέρομαι.
Greek text, ed. 1916 · CC BY-SA