(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Diadumenus. Now, since we are fallen upon this discourse, any thing may rather be said to agree with common sense, than that those who have neither received nor have any conception of good do nevertheless desire and pursue it. For you see how Chrysippus drives Ariston into this difficulty, that he should understand an indifference in things inclining neither to good nor to bad, before either good or bad is itself understood; for so indifference will appear to have subsisted even before itself, if the understanding of it cannot be perceived unless good be first understood, while the good is nothing else than this very indifference. Understand now and consider this indifference which the Stoa denies and calls consent, whence and in what manner it gives us the knowledge of good. For if without good the indifference to that which is not good cannot be understood, much less does the knowledge of good things give any intelligence of itself to those who had not before some notion of the good. But as there can be no knowledge of the art of things wholesome and unwholesome in those who have not first some knowledge of the things themselves; so they cannot conceive any notion of the science of good and evil who have not some fore-knowledge of good and evil.
LAMPRIAS. What then is good?
DIADUMENUS. Nothing but prudence.
LAMPRIAS. And what is prudence?
DIADUMENUS. Nothing but the science of good.
LAMPRIAS. There is much then of Jupiter’s Corinth (that is, much reasoning in a circle) admitted into their arguments. For I would have you let alone the saying about the turning of the pestle, lest you should seem to mock them; although an accident like to that has insinuated itself into their discourse. For it seems that, to the understanding of good, one has need to understand prudence, and to seek for prudence in the understanding of good, being forced always to pursue the one by the other, and thus failing of both; since to the understanding of each we have need of that which cannot be known without the other be first understood.
DIADUMENUS. But there is yet another way, by which you may perceive not only the perversion but the eversion of their discourse, and the reduction of it entirely to nothing. They hold the essence of good to be the reasonable election of things according to Nature. Now the election is not reasonable which is not directed to some end, as has been said before. What then is this end? Nothing else, say they, but to reason rightly in the election of things according to Nature. First then, the conception of good is lost and gone. For to reason rightly in election is an operation proceeding from an habit of right reasoning; and therefore being constrained to learn this from the end, and the end not without this, we fail of understanding either of them. Besides, which is more, this reasonable election ought in strict justice to be a choice of things good and useful, and co-operating to the end; for how can it be reasonable to choose things which are neither convenient nor honorable nor at all eligible? For be it, as they say, a reasonable election of things having a fitness for the causing felicity; see then to what a beautiful and grave conclusion their discourse brings them. For the end is (it seems), according to them, to reason rightly in the choice of things which are of worth in causing us to reason rightly.
LAMPRIAS. When I hear these words, my friend, what is said seems to me strangely extravagant; and I farther want to know how this happens.
DIADUMENUS. You must then be more attentive; for it is not for every one to understand this riddle. Hear therefore and answer. Is not the end, according to them, to reason rightly in the election of things according to Nature.
LAMPRIAS. So they say.
DIADUMENUS. And are these things according to Nature chosen as good, or as having some fitness or preferences … either for this end or for something else?
LAMPRIAS. I think not for any thing else but for this end.
DIADUMENUS. Now then, having discovered the matter, see what befalls them. They hold that the end is to reason rightly in the choice of things which are of worth in causing us to reason rightly, for they say that we neither have nor understand any other essence either of good or of felicity but this precious rectitude of reasoning in the election of things that are of worth. But there are some who think that this is spoken against Antipater, and not against the whole sect; for that he, being pressed by Carneades, fell into these fooleries.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐνταῦθα λόγου γεγόναμεν, τί ἂν φαίης μᾶλλον εἶναι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἢ τὸ μὴ λαβόντας ἔννοιαν ἀγαθοῦ μηδὲ σχόντας, ἐφίεσθαι τἀγαθοῦ καὶ διώκειν; ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι καὶ Χρύσιππος εἰς ταύτην μᾶλλον συνελαύνει τὸν Ἀρίστωνα τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὡς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ διδόντων τὴν πρὸς τὸ μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἀδιαφορίαν ἐπινοῆσαι τἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ μὴ προεπινοηθέντων· οὕτω γὰρ αὑτῆς φανεῖσθαι τὴν ἀδιαφορίαν προϋφισταμένην, εἰ νόησιν μὲν αὐτῆς οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν, μὴ πρότερον τἀγαθοῦ νοηθέντος, ἄλλο δʼ οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ αὐτὴ μόνον τάγαθόν ἐστιν. ἴθι δὲ καὶ σκόπει τὴν ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς ταύτην ἀρνουμένην ἀδιαφορίαν καλουμένην δʼ ὁμολογίαν, ὅπως δὴ καὶ ὁπόθεν παρέσχεν αὑτὴν ἀγαθὸν νοηθῆναι. εἰ γὰρ τἀγαθοῦ χωρὶς οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὴν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἀδιαφορίαν, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φρόνησις ἐπίνοιαν αὑτῆς οὐ δίδωσι τοῖς ἀγαθὸν μὴ προεννοήσασιν. ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσερῶν τέχνης οὐ γίγνεται νόησις, οἷς μὴ πρότερον αὐτῶν ἐκείνων γέγονεν, οὕτως ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐπιστήμης οὐκ ἔστιν ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν μὴ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ προεννοήσαντας.
ΛΑΜΠΡ. τί οὖν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν;
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ φρόνησις.
ΛΑΜΠΡ. Τί δʼ ἡ φρόνησις;
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. . οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμη.
ΛΑΜΠΡ. Πολὺς οὖν ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν ἀφῖκται. τὴν γὰρ ὑπέρου περιτροπήν, ἵνα μὴ σκώπτειν δοκῇς, ἔασον· καίτοι τὸν γε λόγον αὐτῶν ὅμοιον ἐκείνῳ πάθος κατείληφε. φαίνεται γὰρ εἰς τὴν τἀγαθοῦ νόησιν αὐτὴν νοῆσαι δεόμενος φρόνησιν τὴν δʼ αὖ φρόνησιν ἐν τῇ περὶ τἀγαθὸν ζητῶν νοήσει, καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἑτέρας ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀεὶ τὴν ἑτέραν διώκειν, ἀπολειπόμενος δʼ ἑκατέρας τῷ τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς νοούμενον δεῖσθαι τοῦ χωρὶς νοηθῆναι μὴ δυναμένου.
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. . καὶ κατʼ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἔστι τὴν οὐκέτι διαστροφὴν ἀλλʼ ἐκστροφὴν αὐτῶν τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἀπαγωγὴν τελέως εἰς τὸ μηδὲν καταμαθεῖν. οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ τίθενται τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐκλογὴ δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν εὐλόγιστος ἡ μὴ πρός τι γενομένη τέλος, ὡς προείρηται. τί οὖν τοῦτʼ ἐστίν; οὐδὲν ἄλλο, φασίν, ἢ τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογαῖς. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οἴχεται καὶ διαπέφευγεν ἡ ἔννοια τἀγαθοῦ τὸ γὰρ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς σύμπτωμα δήπουθέν ἐστι, γιγνόμενον ἀπὸ ἕξεως τῆς εὐλογιστίας· διὸ ταύτην μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους, τὸ τέλος δʼ οὐκ ἄνευ ταύτης ἀναγκαζόμενοι νοεῖν, ἀπολειπόμεθα τῆς ἀμφοῖν νοήσεως. ἔπειτα, ὃ μεῖζὸν ἐστι, τῷ μὲν δικαιοτάτῳ λόγῳ τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν ἀγαθῶν ἔδει καὶ ὠφελίμων καὶ συνεργῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐκλογὴν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ μήτε συμφέροντα μήτε τίμια μήθʼ ὅλως αἱρετὰ πῶς εὐλόγιστόν ἐστιν; ἔστω γάρ, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, εὐλόγιστος; ἐκλογὴ τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅρα τοίνυν, ὡς εἰς πάγκαλόν τι καὶ σεμνὸν αὐτοῖς ὁ λόγος ἐξήκει κεφάλαιον. ἔστι γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τέλος κατʼ αὐτοὺς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ ἐκλογῇ τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν.
ΛΑΜΠΡ. Ἀλλʼ οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἀκούοντι τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀλλόκοτόν τι φαίνεται δεινῶς, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὸ φραζόμενον· ἔτι δὲ δέομαι μαθεῖν πῶς τοῦτο συμβαίνει.
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Προσεκτέον οὖν σοι μᾶλλον. οὐ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐστὶν αἴνιγμα συνιέναι ἄκουε δὴ καὶ ἀποκρίνου. ἆρʼ οὖν τέλος ἐστὶ κατʼ αὐτοὺς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς τῶν κατὰ φύσιν;
ΛΑΜΠΡ. Λέγουσιν οὕτως.
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν πότερον ὡς ἀγαθὰ ἐκλέγονται ἢ ὡς ἀξίας τινὰς ἔχοντα ἢ προαγωγὰς … τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἢ πρὸς ἕτερόν τι τῶν ὄντων;
ΛΑΜΠΡ. Οὐ νομίζω, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τέλος.
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. . ἤδη τοίνυν ἀποκαλύψας ὅρα τὸ συμβαῖνον αὐτοῖς, ὅτι τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν· ἄλλην γὰρ οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὔτʼ ἔχειν φασὶν οὔτε νοεῖν οἱ ἄνδρες ἢ τὴν πολυτίμητον εὐλογιστίαν ταύτην περὶ τὰς ἐκλογὰς τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσιν οἱ πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον οἰόμενοι λέγεσθαι μὴ πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν· ἐκεῖνον γὰρ ὑπὸ Καρνεάδου πιεζόμενον εἰς ταύτας καταδύεσθαι τὰς εὑρησιλογίας.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA