(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Diadumenus. Many things indeed are said; but at present we shall make use only of what is most necessary. In the first place, it is a folly to imagine that good and evil have their existence for the sake of prudence. For good and evil being already extant, prudence came afterwards; as the art of physic was invented, there being already things wholesome and unwholesome. For good and evil are not therefore extant that there may be prudence; but the faculty by which we judge good and evil that are already in being is named prudence. As sight is a sense distinguishing white from black; which colors were not therefore made that we might have sight, but we rather wanted sight to discern these things. Secondly, when the world shall be set on fire (as the Stoics will have it), there will then no evil be left, but all will then be prudent and wise. There is therefore prudence, though there is no evil; nor is it of necessity for evil to exist that prudence may have a being. But supposing that prudence must always be a knowledge of good and evil, what inconvenience would it be if, evil being taken away, prudence should no longer subsist; but instead of this we should have another virtue, not being the knowledge of good and evil, but of good only? So, if black should be wholly lost from among the colors, and any one should therefore contend that sight is also lost, for that there is no longer the sense of discerning black and white, what should hinder us from answering him: It is no prejudice to us, if we have not what you call sight, but in lieu of that have another sense and faculty, by which we apprehend colors that are white and not white. For I indeed think that neither our taste would be lost, if bitter things were wanting, nor our feeling, if pain were taken away, nor prudence, if evil had no being; but that these senses would remain, to apprehend things sweet and grateful and those that are not so, and prudence to be the science of things good and not good. But let those who think otherwise take the name to themselves, leaving us the thing.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μὲν λέγεται, τὰ δὲ νῦν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις χρηστέον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εὔηθες οἴεσθαι φρονήσεως ἕνεκα γένεσιν κακῶν ὑποστῆναι καὶ ἀγαθῶν. ὄντων γὰρ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐπιγίνεται φρόνησις, ὥσπερ ἰατρικὴ νοσερῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ ὑγιεινῶν. οὐ γὰρ τάγαθὸν ὑφίσταται καὶ τὸ κακόν, ἵνα γένηται φρόνησις, ἀλλʼ ᾗ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὄντα καὶ ὑφεστῶτα κρίνομεν, ὠνομάσθη φρόνησις· ὥσπερ ὄψις ἡ λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων, αἴσθησις, οὐ γενομένων ὅπως ἔχοιμεν ὄψιν ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸ,τὰ τοιαῦτα κρίνειν ὄψεως δεηθέντων. δεύτερον, ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δʼ ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν· ἔστι τοίνυν φρόνησις, οὐκ ὄντος κακοῦ· καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη κακὸν ὑπάρχειν, εἰ φρόνησις ἔνι. εἰ δὲ δὴ πάντως δεῖ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι καὶ κακῶν ἐπιστήμην, τί δεινόν, εἰ τῶν κακῶν ἀναιρεθέντων οὐκ ἔσται φρόνησις ἑτέραν τʼ ἀντʼ ἐκείνης ἀρετὴν ἕξομεν, οὐκ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἀλλʼ ἀγαθῶν μόνων ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν; ὥσπερ εἰ τῶν χρωμάτων τὸ μέλαν ἐξαπόλοιτο παντάπασιν, εἶτά τις βιάζοιτο καὶ τὴν ὄψιν ἀπολωλέναι, λευκῶν γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι καὶ μελάνων αἴσθησιν τί κωλύει φάναι πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι δεινὸν οὐδέν, εἰ τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένην ὄψιν οὐκ ἔχομεν, ἄλλη δὲ πάρεστιν ἀντʼ ἐκείνης αἴσθησις ἡμῖν καὶ δύναμις, λευκῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα καὶ μὴ λευκῶν χρωμάτων; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὔτε γεῦσιν οἶμαι φροῦδον ἂν γενέσθαι, πικρῶν ἐπιλιπόντων, οὔθʼ ἁφήν, ἀλγηδόνος ἀναιρεθείσης, οὔτε φρόνησιν, κακοῦ μὴ παρόντος· ἀλλʼ ἐκείνας τε μένειν αἰσθήσεις γλυκέων καὶ ἡδέων καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων ἀντιλαμβανομένας, ταύτην τε τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μὴ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν. οἷς δὲ μὴ δοκεῖ, τοὔνομα λαβόντες ἀπολιπέτωσαν ἡμῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA