(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Diadumenus. But the corollary which Chrysippus himself has given for a conclusion to his doctrines seems to free us from the trouble of saying any thing more about it. For there being, says he, in Nature some things good, some things bad, and some things between them both, which we call indifferent; there is no man but would rather have the good than the indifferent, and the indifferent than the bad. And of this we call the Gods to witness, begging of them by our prayers principally the possession of good things, and if that may not be, deliverance from evil; not desiring that which is neither good nor bad instead of good, but willing to have it instead of evil. But this man, changing Nature and inverting its order, removes the middle out of its own place into the last, and brings back the last into the middle,—not unlike to those tyrants who give the first place to the wicked,—and he gives us a law, first to seek the good, and secondly the evil, and lastly to judge that worst which is neither good nor evil; as if any one should place infernal things next to celestial, thrusting the earth and earthly things into Tartarus, Where very far from hence, deep under ground,
Lies a vast gulf.
Having therefore said in his Third Book of Nature, that it is more expedient for a fool to live than not, though he should never attain to wisdom, he adds these words: For such are the good things of men, that even evil things do in a manner precede other things that are in the middle place; not that these things themselves really precede, but reason, with which we should choose rather to live, though we were to be fools. Therefore also, though we were to be unjust, wicked, hated of the Gods, and unhappy; for none of these things are absent from those that live foolishly. Is it then convenient rather to live miserably than not to live miserably, and better to be hurt than not hurt, to be unjust than not unjust, to break the laws than not to break them? That is, is it convenient to do things that are not convenient, and a duty to live even against duty? Yes indeed, for it is worse to want sense and reason than to be a fool. What then ails them, that they will not confess that to be evil which is worse than evil? Why do they say that folly alone is to be avoided, if it is not less but rather more convenient to shun that disposition which is not capable of folly?
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
(ed.)’s notes (1)
- Il. VIII. 14.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἔοικε δʼ ἡμᾶς ἀπαλλάττειν τοῦ περὶ τούτων ἔτι πλείονα λέγειν ὁ κολοφὼν αὐτὸς, ὃν ὁ Χρύσιππος τοῖς δόγμασιν ἐπιτέθεικεν. ὄντων γὰρ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τῶν δὲ κακῶν τῶν δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ καὶ καλουμένων ἀδιαφόρων, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων, ὃς οὐ βούλεται τἀγαθὸν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδιάφορον καὶ τὸ ἀδιάφορον ἢ τὸ κακόν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δήπου ποιούμεθα μάρτυρας, αἰτούμενοι ταῖς εὐχαῖς παρʼ αὐτῶν μάλιστα μὲν κτῆσιν ἀγαθῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, κακῶν ἀποφυγήν, τὸ δὲ μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἀντὶ μὲν τἀγαθοῦ μὴ θέλοντες ἔχειν ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ θέλοντες. ὁ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐναλλάττων καὶ τὴν τάξιν ἀναστρέφων ἐκ τῆς μέσης χώρας τὸ μέσον εἰς τὴν ἐσχάτην μετατίθησι, τὸ δʼ ἔσχατον εἰς τὴν μέσην ἐπανάγει καὶ μετοικίζει, καθάπερ οἱ τύραννοι τοῖς κακοῖς προεδρίαν διδοὺς καὶ νομοθετῶν πρῶτον διώκειν τάγαθὸν δεύτερον δὲ τὸ κακόν, ἔσχατον δὲ καὶ χείριστον ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν· ὥσπερ εἴ τις μετὰ τὰ οὐράνια τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου τιθείη, τὴν δὲ γῆν καὶ τὰ περὶ γῆν εἰς τὸν τάρταρον ἀπώσειε τῆλε μάλʼ, ἧχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἔστι βέρεθρον. εἰπὼν οὖν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Φύσεως ὅτι λυσιτελεῖ ζῆν ἄφρονα ἢ μὴ βιοῦν, κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσειν ἐπιφέρει κατὰ λέξιν τοιαῦτα γὰρ τἀγαθά ἐστι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνὰ μέσον προτερεῖν· ἔστι δʼ οὐ ταῦτα προτεροῦντα, ἀλλʼ ὁ λόγος μεθʼ οὗ βιοῦν ἐπιβάλλει μᾶλλον, εἰ καὶ ἄφρονες; ἐσόμεθα δῆλον οὖν, εἰ καὶ ἄδικοι, καὶ παράνομοι καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθροὶ καὶ κακοδαίμονες· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄπεστι τούτων τοῖς ἀφρόνως βιοῦσιν. ἐπιβάλλει τοίνυν κακοδαιμονεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν καὶ βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ παρανομεῖν ἢ μὴ παρανομεῖν; τουτέστιν ἐπιβάλλει τὰ μὴ ἐπιβάλλοντα ποιεῖν καὶ καθήκει ζῆν καὶ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. ναί χεῖρον γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι τοῦ ἀφραίνειν εἶτα τί παθόντες οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι κακόν, ὃ τοῦ κακοῦ χεῖρόν ἐστι; διὰ τί φευκτὸν ἀποφαίνουσι μόνον τὴν ἀφροσύνην, εἰ οὐχ ἧττον ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιβάλλον ἐστὶ φεύγειν τὴν μὴ δεχομένην τὸ ἀφραίνειν διάθεσιν;
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA