(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Diadumenus. It is also against common sense, that there should be a time future and past, but no time present; and that erewhile and lately subsist, but now is nothing at all. Yet this often befalls the Stoics, who admit not the least time between, nor will allow the present to be indivisible; but whatsoever any one thinks to take and understand as present, one part of that they say to be future, and the other part past; so that there is no part remaining or left of the present time: but of that which is said to be present, one part is distributed to the future, the other to the past. Therefore one of these two things follows: either that; holding there was a time and there will be a time, we must deny there is a time; or we must hold that there is a time present, part of which has already been and part will be, and say that of that which now is, one part is future and the other past; and that of now, one part is before and the other behind; and that now is that which is neither yet now nor any longer now; for that which is past is no longer now, and that which is to come is not yet now. And dividing thus the present, they must needs say of the year and of the day, that part of it was of the year or day past, and part will be of the year or day to come; and that of what is together, there is a part before and a part after. For no less are they perplexed, confounding together these terms, not yet and already and no longer and now and not now. But all other men suppose, esteem, and think erewhile and awhile hence to be different parts of time from now, which is followed by the one and preceded by the other. But Archedemus, saying that now is the beginning and juncture of that which is past and that which is near at hand, has (as it seems) without perceiving it thereby taken away all time. For if now is no time, but only a term or extremity of time, and if every part of time is such as now, all time seems to have no parts, but to be wholly dissolved into terms, joints, and beginnings. But Chrysippus, desiring to show more artifice in his division, in his book of Vacuity and some others, says, that the past and future time are not, but have subsisted (or will subsist), and that the present only is; but in his third, fourth, and fifth books concerning Parts, he asserts, that of the present time one part is past, the other to come. Thus it comes to pass, that he divides subsisting time into non-subsisting parts of a subsisting total, or rather leaves nothing at all of time subsisting, if the present has no part but what is either future or past.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι χρόνον εἶναι μέλλοντα καὶ παρῳχημένον, ἐνεστῶτα δὲ μὴ εἶναι χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄρτι καὶ τὸ πρῴην ὑφεστάναι, τὸ δὲ νῦν ὅλως μηδὲν εἶναι. καὶ μὴν τοῦτο συμβαίνει τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἐλάχιστον χρόνον μὴ ἀπολείπουσι μηδὲ τὸ νῦν ἀμερὲς εἶναι βουλομένοις, ἀλλʼ ὅ τι ἄν τις ὡς ἐνεστὼς οἴηται λαβὼν διανοεῖσθαι, τούτου τὸ μὲν μέλλον τὸ δὲ παρῳχημένον εἶναι φάσκουσιν ὥστε μηδὲν κατὰ τὸ νῦν ὑπομένειν μηδὲ λείπεσθαι μόριον χρόνου παρόντος, ἄν, ὃς λέγεται παρεῖναι, τούτου τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ μέλλοντα τὰ δʼ εἰς τὰ παρῳχημένα διανέμηται. δυεῖν οὖν συμβαίνει θάτερον, ἢ τὸ ἦν χρόνος καὶ ἔσται χρόνος τιθέντας ἀναιρεῖν τὸ ἔστι χρόνος · ἢ ἔστι χρόνος ἐνεστηκώς , οὗ τὸ μὲν ἐνειστήκει τὸ δʼ ἐνστήσεται καὶ λέγειν ὅτι τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος τὸ μὲν μέλλον ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ παρῳχημένον, καὶ τοῦ νῦν τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δʼ ὕστερον ὥστε νῦν εἶναι τὸ μηδέπω νῦν καὶ τὸ μηκέτι νῦν · οὐκέτι γὰρ νῦν τὸ παρῳχημένον καὶ οὐδέπω νῦν τὸ μέλλον. ἀνάγκη δʼ οὕτω διαιροῦσι λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ σήμερον τὸ μὲν ἐχθὲς τὸ δʼ αὔριον καὶ τοῦ τῆτες τὸ μὲν πέρυσι τὸ δʼ εἰς νέωτα, καὶ τοῦ ἅμα τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δʼ ὕστερον. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικέστερα τούτων κυκῶσι, ταὐτὰ ποιοῦντες τὸ μηδέπω καὶ τὸ ἤδη καὶ τὸ μηκέτι καὶ τὸ νῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ νῦν · οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὸ ἄρτι καὶ τὸ μετὰ μικρόν , ὡς ἕτερα τοῦ νῦν μόρια, καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ τὸ νῦν τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ νῦν τίθενται καὶ νοοῦσι καὶ νομίζουσι. τούτων Ἀρχέδημος μὲν ἀρχήν τινα καὶ συμβολὴν εἶναι λέγων τοῦ παρῳχημένου καὶ τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου τὸ νῦν λέληθεν αὑτὸν ὡς ἔοικε τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἀναιρῶν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ νῦν οὐ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ πέρας χρόνου πᾶν δὲ μόριον χρόνου τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ νῦν ἐστιν, οὐδὲν φαίνεται μέρος ἔχων ὁ σύμπας χρόνος ἀλλʼ εἰς πέρατα διόλου καὶ συμβολὰς καὶ ὁρμὰς ἀναλυόμενος. Χρύσιππος δὲ βουλόμενος φιλοτεχνεῖν περὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐν μὲν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Κενοῦ καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ ʼτὸ μὲν παρῳχημένον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐχ ὑπάρχειν ἀλλʼ ὑφεστηκέναι φησί, μόνον δʼ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἐνεστηκός ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ τετάρτῳ καὶ πέμπτῳ περὶ τῶν Μερῶν τίθησι τοῦ ἐνεστηκότος χρόνου τὸ μὲν μέλλον εἶναι τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθός. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸ ὑπάρχον αὐτῷ τοῦ χρόνου διαιρεῖν εἰς τὰ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος, μᾶλλον δʼ ὅλως τοῦ χρόνου μηδὲν ἀπολείπειν ὑπάρχον, εἰ τὸ ἐνεστηκὸς οὐδὲν ἔχει μέρος, ὃ μὴ μέλλον ἐστὶν ἢ παρῳχημένον.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA