(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Diadumenus. This also is against common sense, that it should be convenient for a man who has all good things, and wants nothing requisite to felicity and happiness, to make away himself; and much more this, that for him who neither has nor ever shall have any good thing, but who is and ever shall be accompanied with all adversities, difficulties, and mishaps, it should not be fitting to quit this life unless some of the indifferent things befall him. These laws are enacted in the Stoa; and by these they incite many wise men to kill themselves, as if they would be thereby more happy; and they restrain many foolish men, as if it were fitting for them to live on in wretchedness. Although the wise man is fortunate, blessed, every way happy, secure, and free from danger; but the vicious and foolish man is full, as I may say, of evils, so that there is not room to put them in; and yet they think that continuing in life is fit for the latter, and departing out of it for the former. And not without cause, says Chrysippus, for we are not to measure life by good things or evil, but by those that are according to Nature. In this manner do they maintain custom, and philosophize according to the common conceptions. What do you say?—that he who enters upon a deliberation of life and death has no right to consider What good or ill in his own house there is; or to weigh, as in a balance, what things have the greatest sign of serving to felicity or infelicity; but must argue whether he should live or die from those things which are neither profitable nor prejudicial, and follow such principles and sentences as command the choosing of a life full of all things to be avoided, and the shunning of one which wants nothing of all those things that are desirable? For though it is an absurd thing, friend Lamprias, to shun a life in which there is no evil, it is yet more absurd, if any one should leave what is good because he is not possessed of what is indifferent, as these men do who leave present felicity and virtue for want of riches and health which they have not. Saturnian Jove from Glaucus took his wits, when he went about to change his suit of golden armor for a brazen one, and to give what was worth a hundred oxen for that which was worth but nine. And yet the brazen armor was no less useful for fight than the golden; whereas beauty and health of body, as the Stoics say, contribute not the least advantage as regards happiness. And yet they seek health in exchange for wisdom. For they say, it would well enough have become Heraclitus and Pherecydes to have parted with their virtue and wisdom, if the one of them could have thereby been freed from his lousy disease, and the other from his dropsy; and if Circe had used two sorts of magical drinks, one to make wise men fools, and the other to make fools wise, Ulysses would rather have drunk that of folly, than have changed his shape for the form of a beast, though having with it wisdom, and consequently also happiness. And, they say, wisdom itself dictates to them these things, exhorting them thus: Let me go, and value not my being lost, if I must be carried about in the shape of an ass. But this, some will say, is an ass-like wisdom which teacheth thus; if indeed to be wise and enjoy felicity is good, and to wear the shape of an ass is indifferent. They say, there is a nation of the Ethiopians where a dog reigns, is called king, and has all regal honors and services done to him; but men execute the offices of magistrates and governors of cities. Do not the Stoics act in the very same manner? They give the name and appearance of good to virtue, saying that it alone is desirable, profitable, and available; but in the mean time they act these things, they philosophize, they live and die, as at the command of things indifferent. And yet none of the Ethiopians kill that dog; but he sits in state, and is revered by all. But these men destroy and corrupt their virtue, that they may obtain health and riches.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἔτι Παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπον, ᾧ πάντα τἀγαθὰ πάρεστι καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδεῖ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ μακάριον, τούτῳ καθήκειν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ᾧ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἔστι μηδʼ ἔσται, τὰ δεινὰ δὲ πάντα καὶ τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κακὰ πάρεστι καὶ παρέσται διὰ τέλους, τούτῳ μὴ καθήκειν ἀπολέγεσθαι τὸν βίον, ἂν μή τι νὴ Δία τῶν ἀδιαφόρων αὐτῷ προσγένηται. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐν τῇ Στοᾷ νομοθετεῖται, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἐξάγουσι τῶν σοφῶν ὡς ἄμεινον εὐδαιμονοῦντας πεπαῦσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ κατέχουσι τῶν φαύλων ὡς καθήκοντος αὐτοῖς ζῆν κακοδαιμονοῦντας. καίτοι ὁ μὲν σοφὸς ὄλβιος μακάριος πανευδαίμων ἀσφαλὴς ἀκίνδυνος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος καὶ ἀνόητος οἷος εἰπεῖν γέμων κακῶν δὴ κοὐκέτʼ ἔσθʼ ὅπου τεθῇ· ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτοις μονὴν οἴονται καθήκουσαν εἶναι κἀκείνοις ἐξαγωγήν. εἰκότως δέ φησὶ Χρύσιππος οὐ γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς δεῖ παραμετρεῖσθαι τὸν βίον ἀλλὰ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν. οὕτως ἄνθρωποι σῴζουσι τὴν συνήθειαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας φιλοσοφοῦσι. τί λέγεις; οὐ δεῖ σκοπεῖν ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τʼ ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται τὸν περὶ βίου καὶ θανάτου σκοπούμενον, οὐδʼ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν ἐξετάζειν ἐπιζήμια μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφέλιμα ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν μήτʼ ὠφελούντων μήτε βλαπτόντων τοὺς εἰ βιωτέον ἢ μὴ ποιεῖσθαι λογισμούς; οὐ μέλλει πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ὑποθέσεις καὶ ἀρχὰς καθηκόντως αἱρεῖσθαὶ τε τὸν βίον, ᾧ τῶν φευκτῶν οὐδὲν ἄπεστι, καὶ φεύγειν, πάντα τὰ αἱρετὰ πάρεστι; καίτοι παράλογον μέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ τὸ φεύγειν τὸν βίον ἐν μηδενὶ κακῷ γενομένους· παραλογώτερον δέ, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνων τις τοῦ ἀδιαφόρου τάγαθὸν ἀφίησιν· ὅπερ οὗτοι ποιοῦσι, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν προϊέμενοι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν παροῦσαν ἀνθʼ ὑγιείας καὶ ὁλοκληρίας, ὧν οὐ τυγχάνουσιν. ἔνθʼ αὖτε Γλαύκῳ Κρονίδης φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς, ὅτι χρύσεια χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοια ἐννεαβοίων ἔμελλε διαμείψεσθαι. καίτοι τὰ μὲν χάλκεα τῶν ὅπλων οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τὰ χρυσᾶ παρεῖχε χρείαν μαχομένοις, εὐπρέπεια δὲ σώματος καὶ ὑγίεια τοῖς Στωικοῖς οὔτε χρείαν οὔτʼ ὄνησίν τινα φέρει πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν· ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὗτοι τῆς φρονήσεως ἀντικαταλλάττονται τὴν ὑγίειαν. καὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτῳ φασὶ καὶ Φερεκύδῃ καθήκειν ἄν, εἴπερ ἠδύναντο, τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀφεῖναι καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν, ὥστε παύσασθαι φθειριῶντας καὶ ὑδρωπιῶντας· καὶ τῆς Κίρκης ἐγχεούσης δύο φάρμακα, τὸ μὲν ποιοῦν ἄφρονας ἐκ φρονίμων τὸ δʼ ὅνους φρονίμους ἑξ ἀφρόνων ἀνθρὡπων, οὐκ τὸν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πιεῖν τὸ τῆς ἀφροσύνης μᾶλλον ἢ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς θηρίου μορφὴν τὸ εἶδος, ἔχοντα τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ μετὰ τῆς φρονήσεως δηλονότι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; καὶ ταῦτά φασιν αὐτὴν ὑφηγεῖσθαι καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι τὴν φρόνησιν ἄφες με καὶ καταφρόνησον ἀπολλυμένης ἐμοῦ καὶ διαφθειρομένης εἰς ὄνου πρόσωπον. ἀλλʼ ὄνου γε, φήσει τις, ἡ τοιαῦτα παραγγέλλουσα φρόνησίς ἐστιν, εἰ τὸ μὲν φρονεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ δʼ ὄνου περιφέρειν πρόσωπον ἀδιάφορον. ἔθνος εἶναί φασιν Αἰθιόπων, ὅπου κύων βασιλεύει καὶ βασιλεὺς προσαγορεύεται καὶ γέρα καὶ τιμὰς ἔχει βασιλέως, ἄνδρες; δὲ πράσσουσιν ἅπερ ἡγεμόσι πόλεων προσήκει καὶ ἄρχουσιν. ἆῤ οὖν παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς ὁμοίως τὸ μὲν ὄνομα καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τἀγαθοῦ πάρεστι τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μόνην ταύτην αἱρετὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ συμφέρον καλοῦσι, πράττουσι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσι καὶ ζῶσι καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσιν, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ προστάγματος τῶν ἀδιαφόρων; καίτοι τὸν κύνα μὲν ἐκεῖνον οὐδεὶς Αἰθιόπων ἀποκτίννυσιν, ἀλλὰ σεμνῶς κάθηται προσκυνούμενος· οὗτοι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀπολλύουσιν ἑαυτῶν καὶ διαφθείρουσι, τῆς ὑγιείας περιεχόμενοι καὶ τῆς ἀπονίας.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA