(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Diadumenus. These men’s conception therefore of time is not unlike the grasping of water, which, the harder it is held, all the more slides and runs away. As to actions and motions, all evidence is utterly confounded. For if now is divided into past and future, it is of necessity that what is now moved partly has been moved and partly shall be moved, that the end and beginning of motion have been taken away, that nothing of any work has been done first, nor shall any thing be last, the actions being distributed with time. For as they say that of present time, part is past and part to come; so of that which is doing, it will be said that part is done and part shall be done. When therefore had to dine, to write, to walk, a beginning, and when shall they have an end, if every one who is dining has dined and shall dine, and every one who is walking has walked and shall walk? But this is, as it is said, of all absurdities the most absurd, that if he who now lives has already lived and shall live, then to live neither had beginning nor shall have end; but every one of us, as it seems, was born without beginning to live, and shall die without ceasing to live. For if there is no last part, but he who lives has something of the present still remaining for the future, to say Socrates shall live will never be false so long as it shall be true to say Socrates lives; and so long also will be false to say Socrates is dead. So that, if Socrates shall live is true in infinite parts of time, it will in no part of time be true to say Socrates is dead. And verily what end will there be of a work, and where will you terminate an action, if, as often as it is true to say This is doing, it is likewise true to say This shall be doing? For he will lie who shall say, there will be an end of Plato’s writing and disputing; since Plato will never give over writing and disputing, if it is never false to say of him who disputes that he shall dispute, and of him who writes that he shall write. Moreover, there will be no part of that which now is, but either has been or is to be, and is either past or future; but of what has been and is to be, of past and future, there is no sense; wherefore there is absolutely no sense of any thing. For we neither see what is past and future, nor do we hear or have any other sense of what has been or is to be. Nothing then, even what is present, is to be perceived by sense, if of the present, part is always future and part past,—if part has been and part is to be.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ χρόνου νόησις αὐτοῖς οἷον ὕδατος περίδραξις, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον πιέζεται, διαρρέοντος καὶ διολισθάνοντος· τὰ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ κινήσεων τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχει σύγχυσιν τῆς ἐναργείας ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ τοῦ νῦν τὸ μὲν εἰς τὸ παρῳχημένον τὸ δʼ εἰς τὸ μέλλον διαιρεῖται, καὶ τοῦ κινουμένου κατὰ τὸ νῦν τὸ μὲν κεκινῆσθαι τὸ δὲ κινήσεσθαι πέρας δὲ κινήσεως ἀνῃρῆσθαι καὶ ἀρχὴν μηδενὸς δʼ ἔργου πρῶτον γεγονέναι μηδʼ ἔσχατον ἔσεσθαι μηδέν, τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πράξεων συνδιανεμομένων. ὡς γὰρ τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος χρόνου τὸ μὲν παρῳχῆσθαι τὸ δὲ μέλλειν λέγουσιν, οὕτω τοῦ πραττομένου τὸ μὲν πεπρᾶχθαι τὸ δὲ πραχθήσεσθαι. πότε τοίνυν ἔσχεν ἀρχὴν πότε δʼ ἕξει τελευτὴν τὸ ἀριστᾶν τὸ γράφειν τὸ βαδίζειν, εἰ πᾶς μὲν ὁ ἀριστῶν ἠρίστησε καὶ ἀριστήσει πᾶς δʼ ὁ βαδίζων ἐβάδιζε καὶ βαδιεῖται; τὸ δὲ δεινῶν, φασί, δεινότατον, εἰ τῷ ζῶντι τὸ ἐζηκέναι καὶ ζήσεσθαι συμβέβηκεν, οὔτʼ ἀρχὴν ἔσχε τὸ ζῆν οὔθʼ ἕξει πέρας· ἀλλʼ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ὡς ἔοικε γέγονε μὴ ἀρξάμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τεθνήξεται μὴ παυσάμενος. εἰ γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔσχατον μέρος ἀλλʼ ἀεί τι τῷ ζῶντι τοῦ παρόντος εἰς τὸ μέλλον περίεστιν, οὐδέποτε γίγνεται ψεῦδος τὸ ζήσεσθαι Σωκράτη· ἀλλʼ ὁσάκις ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ ζῇ Σωκράτης , ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ψεῦδος τὸ τέθνηκε Σωκράτης ὥστʼ, εἰ τὸ ζήσεται Σωκράτης ἀληθές ἐστιν ἐν ἀπείροις χρόνου μέρεσιν, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνου μέρει τὸ τέθνηκε Σωκράτης ἀληθὲς ἔσται. καίτοι τί πέρας ἂν ἔργου γένοιτο; ποῦ δʼ ἂν λήξειε τὸ πραττόμενον, ἄν, ὁσάκις ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ πράττεται , τοσαυτάκις ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ πραχθήσεται; ψεύσεται γὰρ ὁ λέγων περὶ τοῦ γράφοντος καὶ διαλεγομένου Πλάτωνος, ὅτι παύσεταί ποτε Πλάτων διαλεγόμενος , εἰ μηδέποτε ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ διαλεχθήσεται περὶ τοῦ διαλεγομένου καὶ τὸ γράψει περὶ τοῦ γράφοντος. ἔτι τοίνυν τοῦ γιγνομένου μέρος οὐδὲν ἐστιν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἤτοι γεγονός ἐστιν ἢ γενησόμενον καὶ παρεληλυθὸς ἢ μέλλον· γεγονότος δὲ καὶ γεγενημένου καὶ παρῳχημένου καὶ μέλλοντος αἴσθησις οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδενὸς οὖν ἁπλῶς αἴσθησίς ἐστιν. οὔτε γὰρ ὁρῶμεν τὸ παρῳχημένον ἢ τὸ μέλλον οὔτʼ ἀκούομεν οὔτʼ ἄλλην τινὰ λαμβάνομεν αἴσθησιν τῶν γεγονότων ἢ γενησομένων· οὐδὲν οὖν, οὐδʼ ἂν παρῇ τι, αἰσθητόν ἐστιν, εἰ τοῦ παρόντος ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν μέλλει τὸ δὲ παρῴχηκε καὶ τὸ μὲν γεγονός ἐστι τὸ δὲ γενησόμενον.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA