(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Diadumenus. Nor is this the strangest thing you will find in their doctrine; but their being of opinion that virtue and happiness, when present, are frequently not perceived by him who enjoys them, nor does he discern that, having but a little before been most miserable and foolish, he is of a sudden become wise and happy. For it is not only childish to say that he who is possessed of wisdom is ignorant of this thing alone, that he is wise, and knows not that he is delivered from folly; but, to speak in general, they make goodness to have very little weight or strength, if it does not give so much as a feeling of it when it is present. For according even to them, it is not by nature imperceptible; nay, even Chrysippus in his books of the End expressly says that good is sensible, and demonstrates it also, as he thinks. It remains then, that by its weakness and littleness it flies the sense, when being present it is unknown and concealed from the possessors. It were moreover absurd to imagine that the sight, perceiving those things which are but a little whitish or inclining to white, should not discern such as are white in perfection; or that the touch, feeling those things which are but warm or moderately hot, should be insensible of those that are hot in the highest degree. And yet more absurd it is, that a man who perceives what is commonly according to Nature —as are health and good constitution of body—should yet be ignorant of virtue when it is present, which themselves hold to be most of all and in the highest degree according to Nature. For how can it but be against sense, to conceive the difference between health and sickness, and yet so little to comprehend that between wisdom and folly as to think the one to be present when it is gone, and possessing the other to be ignorant that one has it? Now because there is from the highest progress a change made to felicity and virtue, one of these two things must of necessity follow; either that this progress is not vice and infelicity, or that virtue is not far distant from vice, nor happiness from misery, but that the difference between good and evil is very small and not to be perceived by sense; for otherwise they who have the one for the other could not be ignorant of it.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἂν μάλιστα θαυμάσαις αὐτῶν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι, τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας παραγιγνομένης, πολλάκις οὐδʼ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν κτησάμενον οἴονται, διαλεληθέναι δʼ αὑτόν, ὅτι μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀθλιώτατος ὢν καὶ ἀφρονέστατος νῦν ὁμοῦ φρόνιμος καὶ μακάριος γέγονεν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἔχοντά τινα τὴν φρόνησιν τοῦτο μόνον μὴ φρονεῖν ὅτι φρονεῖ μηδὲ γιγνώσκειν ὅτι τὸ ἀγνοεῖν διαπέφευγεν εὐτράπελόν ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ὡς εἰπεῖν τάγαθὸν ἀρρεπὲς ποιοῦσι καὶ ἀμαυρόν, εἰ μηδʼ αἴσθησιν αὑτοῦ ποιεῖ παραγενόμενον. φύσει γὰρ ἀνεπαίσθητον οὐκ ἔστι κατʼ αὐτούς ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγει διαρρήδην Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς περὶ Τέλους αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τάγαθόν· ὡς δʼ οἴεται, καὶ ἀποδείκνυσι. λείπεται τοίνυν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ μικρότητι διαφεύγειν αὐτὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὁπόταν παρὸν ἀγνοῆται καὶ διαλανθάνῃ τοὺς ἔχοντας. ἔτι τοίνυν ἄτοπον μέν ἐστι τὴν τῶν ἀτρέμα λευκῶν καὶ μέσως αἰσθανομένην ὄψιν ἐκφεύγειν τὰ ἐπʼ ἄκρον λευκὰ καὶ τὴν τὰ μαλακῶς καὶ ἀνειμένως θερμὰ καταλαμβάνουσαν ἁφὴν ἀναισθητεῖν τῶν σφόδρα θερμῶν ἀτοπώτερον δέ, εἴ τις τὸ κοινῶς κατὰ φύσιν, οἷόν ἐστιν ὑγίεια καὶ εὐεξία, καταλαμβάνων, τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγνοεῖ παροῦσαν, ἣν μάλιστα καὶ ἄκρως κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τίθενται. πῶς γὰρ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου διαφορὰν καταλαμβάνειν, φρονήσεως δὲ μὴ καταλαμβάνειν καὶ ἀφροσύνης, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἀπηλλαγμένην οἴεσθαι παρεῖναι, τὴν δὲ κεκτημένον ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πάρεστιν; ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐκ τῆς ἄκρας προκοπῆς μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἀρετήν, δυεῖν ἀνάγκη θάτερον, ἢ τὴν προκοπὴν κακίαν μὴ εἶναι μηδὲ κακοδαιμονίαν, ἢ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς κακίας μὴ πολλῷ παραλλάττειν μηδὲ τῆς κακοδαιμονίας τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλὰ μικρὰν καὶ ἀνεπαίσθητον εἶναι τὴν πρὸς τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν διαφορὰν οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτοὺς διελάνθανον ἀντʼ ἐκείνων ταῦτ̓ ἔχοντες.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA