(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Diadumenus. But let us see what manner of thing he shows vice to be who says that it was not brought forth unprofitably, and of what use and what a possession he makes it to be to those who have it, writing in his book of right actions, that a wicked man wants nothing, has need of nothing, nothing is useful to him, nothing proper, nothing fit for him. How then is vice useful, with which neither health nor abundance of riches nor advancement in virtue is profitable? Who then does not want these things, of which some are preferable and acceptable, and therefore highly useful, and others are according to Nature, as themselves term them? But (they say) no one has need of them, unless he become wise. Therefore the vicious man does not even stand in need of being made wise. Nor are men hungry and thirsty before they become wise. When thirsty, therefore, they have no need of water, nor when hungry, of bread. Be like to courteous guests, and him
Who only fire and shelter asks:
does this man now not need entertainment? Nor had he need of a cloak, who said, Give Hipponax a cloak, for I’m stiff with cold. But will you speak a paradox indeed, both extravagant and singular? Say then that a wise man has need of nothing, that he wants nothing, he is fortunate, he is free from want, he is self-sufficient, blessed, perfect. Now what madness is this, that he to whom nothing is wanting has need of the goods he has, but that the vicious indeed wants many things, and stands in need of nothing. For thus indeed says Chrysippus, that the vicious wants but stands not in need; removing the common notions, like chessmen, backwards and forwards. For all men think that having need precedes wanting, esteeming him who stands in need of things that are not at hand or easy to be got, to want them. For no man wants horns or wings, because no man has need of them. But we say that those want arms and money and clothes who are destitute of them, when they have occasion for them. But these men are so desirous of seeming always to say something against the common notions, that for the love of novelty they often depart from their own opinions, as they do here.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ὁ τοίνυν λέγων οὐκ ἀχρήστως γεγονέναι τὴν κακίαν, ὅρα πάλιν οἷον αὐτὴν ἀποδείκνυσι χρῆμα καὶ κτῆμα τοῖς ἔχουσι, γράφων ἐν τοῖς περὶ Κατορθωμάτων ὡς ὁ φαῦλος οὐδενὸς· δεῖται, οὐδενὸς ἔχει χρείαν· οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτῷ χρήσιμον, οὐδὲν οἰκεῖον, οὐδὲν ἁρμόττον. πῶς οὖν εὔχρηστος ἡ κακία, μεθʼ ἧς οὐδʼ ὑγίεια χρήσιμον οὐδὲ πλῆθος χρημάτων οὐδὲ προκοπή; οὐ δεῖται δέ τις ὧν· τὰ μὲν προηγμένα· καὶ ληπτὰ καὶ νὴ Δίʼ εὔχρηστα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς αὐτοὶ καλοῦσιν; εἶτα τούτων οὐδεὶς ἔχει χρείαν, ἂν μὴ γένηται σοφός. οὐδὲ τοῦ σοφὸς οὖν γενέσθαι χρείαν ἔχει ὁ φαῦλος. οὐδὲ διψῶσιν οὐδὲ πεινῶσιν ἄνθρωποι, πρὶν σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· διψῶντες οὖν ὕδατος οὐκ ἔχουσι χρείαν οὐδʼ ἄρτου πεινῶντες. ἔστε ξένοισι μειλίχοις ἐοικότες
στέγης τε μοῦνον καὶ πυρὸς κεχρημένοις·
οὗτος οὐκ εἶχε χρείαν ὑποδοχῆς; οὐδὲ χλαίνης ἐκεῖνος ὁ λέγων δὸς χλαῖναν Ἱππώνακτι κάρτα γὰρ ῥιγῶ; ἀλλὰ βούλει παράδοξον εἰπεῖν τι καὶ περιττὸν καὶ ἴδιον; λέγε τὸν σοφὸν μηδενὸς ἔχειν χρείαν μηδὲ δεῖσθαί τινος, ἐκεῖνος ὄλβιος, ἐκεῖνος ἀπροσδεής, ἐκεῖνος αὐτάρκης μακάριος τέλειος. νυνὶ δὲ τίς ὁ ἴλιγγος οὗτος τὸν μὲν ἀνενδεᾶ δεῖσθαι ὧν ἔχει ἀγαθῶν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἐνδεᾶ μὲν εἶναι πολλῶν δεῖσθαι δὲ μηδενός; τουτὶ γὰρ λέγει Χρύσιππος, ὡς οὐ δέονται μὲν ἐνδέονται δʼ οἱ φαῦλοι, πεττῶν δίκην δεῦρο κἀκεῖ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας μετατιθείς. πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὸ δεῖσθαι πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ ἐνδεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν, ἡγούμενοι τὸν οὐχ ἑτοίμων οὐδʼ εὐπορίστων δεόμενον ἐνδεῖσθαι. κεράτων γοῦν καὶ πτερῶν οὐδεὶς ἐνδεὴς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὅτι μηδὲ δεῖται τούτων· ἀλλʼ ὅπλων ἐνδεεῖς, λέγομεν καὶ χρημάτων καὶ ἱματίων, ὅταν ἐν χρείᾳ γενόμενοι μὴ τυγχάνωσι μηδʼ ἔχωσιν. οἱ δʼ οὕτως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀεί τι παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας φαίνεσθαι λέγοντες, ὥστε πολλάκις ἐξίστασθαι καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιθυμίᾳ καινολογίας, ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA