(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Diadumenus. But this is also yet against the common conceptions, that he who is a man should not rejoice when coming from the greatest evils to the greatest goods. Now their wise men suffer this. Being changed from extreme viciousness to the highest virtue, and at the same time escaping a most miserable life and attaining to a most happy one, he shows no sign of joy, nor does this so great change lift him up or yet move him, being delivered from all infelicity and vice, and coming to a certain sure and firm perfection of virtue. This also is repugnant to common sense, to maintain that the being immutable in one’s judgments and resolutions is the greatest of goods, and yet that he who has attained to the height wants not this, nor cares for it when he has it, nay, many times will not so much as stretch forth a finger for this security and constancy, which nevertheless themselves esteem the sovereign and perfect good. Nor do the Stoics say only these things, but they add also this to them,—that the continuance of time increases not any good thing; but if a man shall be wise but a minute of an hour, he will not be any way inferior in happiness to him who has all his time practised virtue and led his life happily in it. Yet, whilst they thus boldly affirm these things, they on the contrary also say, that a short-lived virtue is nothing worth; For what advantage would the attainment of wisdom be to him who is immediately to be swallowed up by the waves or tumbled down headlong from a precipice? What would it have benefited Lichas, if being thrown by Hercules, as from a sling into the sea, he had been on a sudden changed from vice to virtue? These therefore are the positions of men who not only philosophize against the common conceptions but also confound their own, if the having been but a little while endued with virtue is no way short of the highest felicity, and at the same time nothing worth.
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνο παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐστίν, ἄνθρωπον ὄντα μὴ χαίρειν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀγαθοῖς; γενόμενον τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθεν ὁ τούτων σοφός. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄκρας κακίας μεταβαλὼν εἰς τὴν ἄκραν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸν ἀθλιώτατον βίον διαφυγὼν ἅμα καὶ κτησάμενος τὸν μακαριώτατον οὐδὲν ἐπίδηλον εἰς χαρὰν ἔσχεν οὐδʼ ἐπῆρεν αὐτὸν οὐδʼ ἐκίνησεν ἡ τοσαύτη μεταβολή, κακοδαιμονίας ἀπαλλαγέντα καὶ μοχθηρίας ἁπάσης, εἰς δʼ ἀσφαλῆ τινα καὶ βεβαίαν παντέλειαν ἀγαθῶν ἐξικόμενον. ἔτι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ἀγαθῶν μὲν εἶναι μέγιστον τὸ ἀμετάπτωτον ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσι καὶ βέβαιον, δεῖσθαι δὲ τούτου τὸν ἐπʼ ἄκρον προκόπτοντα μηδὲ φροντίζειν παραγενομένου πολλάκις δὲ μηδὲ τὸν δάκτυλον προτεῖναι ταύτης γʼ ἕνεκα τῆς ἀσφαλείας καὶ βεβαιότητος, ἣν τέλειον ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα νομίζουσιν. οὐ μόνον οὖν ταῦτα λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνα πρὸς τούτοις, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὁ χρόνος οὐκ αὔξει προσγιγνόμενος, ἀλλά, κἂν ἀκαρές τις ὥρας γένηται φρόνιμος, οὐδενὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπολειφθήσεται τοῦ τὸν αἰῶνα χρωμένου τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μακαρίως ἐν αὐτῇ καταβιοῦντος. ταῦτα δʼ οὕτω νεανικῶς ἀπισχυρισάμενοι πάλιν οὐδὲν εἶναί φασιν ἀρετῆς ὄφελος ὀλιγοχρονίου τί γάρ, ἂν μέλλοντι ναυαγεῖν εὐθὺς ἢ κατακρημνίζεσθαι φρόνησις ἐπιγένηται; τί δʼ ἂν ὁ Λίχας, ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἀποσφενδονώμενος, εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐκ κακίας μεταβάλῃ ταῦτʼ οὖν οὐ μόνον παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐστὶ φιλοσοφούντων ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδίας κυκώντων, εἰ τὸ βραχὺν χρόνον κτήσασθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐθὲν ἀπολείπεσθαι τῆς ἄκρας εὐδαιμονίας ἅμα καὶ μηδενὸς ὅλως ἄξιον νομίζουσι.
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA