(ed.) · trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874)
Diadumenus. First, this is altogether absurd and against sense, to say that is which is not, and things which are not are. But above all, that is most absurd which they say of the universe. For, putting round about the circumference of the world an infinite vacuum, they say that the universe is neither a body nor bodiless. It follows then from this that the universe has no being, since with them body only has a being. Since therefore it is the part of that which has a being both to do and suffer, and the universe has no being, it follows that the universe will neither do nor suffer. Neither will it be in a place; for that which takes up place is a body, and the universe is not a body, therefore the universe is nowhere. And since that only rests which continues in one and the same place, the universe rests not, because it takes not up place. Neither yet is it moved, for what is moved must have a place and space to move in. Moreover, what is moved either moves itself, or suffers motion from another. Now, that which is moved by itself has some bents and inclinations proceeding from its gravity or levity; and gravity and levity are either certain habits or faculties or differences of bodies. But the universe is not a body. It follows then of necessity, that the universe is neither heavy nor light, and consequently, that it has not in itself any principle of motion. Nor yet will the universe be moved by any other; for there is nothing else besides the universe. Thus are they necessitated to say as they do, that the universe neither rests nor is moved. Lastly, since according to their opinion it must not be said that the universe is a body, and yet the heaven, the earth, animals, plants, men, and stones are bodies, it follows that that which is no body will have bodies for its parts, and things which have existence will be parts of that which has no existence, and that which is not heavy will have parts that are heavy, and what is not light will have parts that are light;—than which there cannot be any dreams imagined more repugnant to the common conceptions.
DIADUMENUS. Moreover, there is nothing so evident or so agreeing to common sense as this, that what is not animate is inanimate, and what is not inanimate is animate. And yet they overthrow also this evidence, confessing the universe to be neither animate nor inanimate. Besides this, none thinks the universe, of which there is no part wanting, to be imperfect; but they deny the universe to be perfect, saying that what is perfect may be defined, but the universe because of its infiniteness cannot be defined. Therefore, according to them, there is something which is neither perfect nor imperfect. Moreover, the universe is neither a part, since there is nothing greater than it; nor the whole, for the whole (they say) is predicated only of that which is digested into order; but the universe is, through its infiniteness, undetermined and unordered. Moreover, there is no other thing which can be the cause of the universe, there being nothing besides the universe; nor is the universe the cause of other things or even of itself; for its nature suffers it not to act, and a cause is understood by its acting. Suppose now, one should ask all men what they imagine nothing to be, and what notion they have of it. Would they not answer, that it neither is a cause nor has a cause, that it is neither the whole nor a part, that it is neither perfect nor imperfect, that it is neither animate nor inanimate, that it neither is moved nor rests nor subsists, that it is neither corporeal nor incorporeal; and that this and no other thing is meant by nothing? Since then they alone predicate that of the universe which all others do of nothing, it seems plain that they make the universe and nothing to be the same. Time must then be said to be nothing; the same also must be said of predicate, axiom, connection, combination, which terms they use more than any of the other philosophers, yet they say that they have no being. But farther, to say that what is true has no being or subsistence but is comprehended, and that that is comprehensible and credible which no way partakes of the essence of being,—does not this exceed all absurdity?
trans. William W. Goodwin (ed.) (1874) · CC BY-SA
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1895
ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. καθόλου μὲν ἄτοπον καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιὰν ἐστιν εἶναι μέν τι μὴ ὂν δʼ εἶναι, καὶ εἶναι μὲν οὐκ ὄντα δʼ εἶναι, λεγόντων ἀτοπώτατόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς λεγόμενον. κενὸν γὰρ ἄπειρον ἔξωθεν τῷ κόσμῳ περιθέντες οὔτε σῶμα τὸ πᾶν οὔτʼ ἀσώματον εἶναι λέγουσιν. ἕπεται δὲ τούτῳ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν ὄντα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σώματα καλοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ ὄντος τὸ ποιεῖν τι καὶ πάσχειν, τὸ δὲ πᾶν οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν· ὥστε οὔτε τι ποιήσει οὔτε τι πείσεται τὸ πᾶν. ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἐν τόπῳ ἔσται· σῶμα γὰρ δήπου τὸ ἐπέχον τόπον, οὐ σῶμα δὲ τὸ πᾶν, ὥστʼ οὐδαμοῦ τὸ πᾶν. καὶ μὴν ᾧ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν τόπον συμβέβηκε, τοῦτο τὸ μένον· ὥστʼ οὐ μένει τὸ πᾶν οὐ γὰρ ἐπέχει τόπον. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ κινεῖται πρῶτον ὅτι καὶ τῷ κινουμένῳ τόπου δεῖ καὶ χώρας ὑποκειμένης, ἔπειθʼ ὅτι τὸ κινούμενον ἢ αὑτὸ κινεῖν ἢ ὑφʼ ἑτέρου πάσχειν πέφυκε· τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον ἔχει τινὰς νεύσεις ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ῥοπὰς κατὰ βάρος ἢ κουφότητα κουφότης δὲ καὶ βάρος ἤτοι σχέσεις τινὲς ἢ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν ἢ διαφοραὶ πάντως σώματος τὸ δὲ πᾶν οὐ σῶμά ἐστιν· ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη μήτε βαρὺ μήτε κοῦφον εἶναι τὸ πᾶν μηδʼ ἔχειν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεως ἀρχήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ὑφʼ ἑτέρου κινήσεται τὸ πᾶν· ἕτερον γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦ παντός· ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοῖς ὅπερ λέγουσι μήτε μένον εἶναι τὸ πᾶν μήτε κινούμενον. ὅλως δέ, ἐπεὶ τὸ λέγειν σῶμα τὸ πᾶν μηδʼ δέον ἐστὶ κατʼ αὐτούς, σῶμα δʼ οὐρανὸς καὶ γῆ καὶ ζῷα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ λίθοι τὸ μὴ ὂν σῶμα σώματα μέρη ἕξει καὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος μέρη ὄντα ἔσται καὶ τὸ μὴ βαρὺ χρήσεται βαρέσι μορίοις καὶ κούφοις τὸ μὴ κοῦφον ὧν οὐδʼ ὀνείρατα λαβεῖν μᾶλλον ἔστι παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας. καὶ μὴν οὕτως οὐδὲν ἐναργές ἐστι καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐχόμενον ἐννοιῶν ὡς τό, εἴ τι μὴ ἔμψυχόν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο ἄψυχον εἶναι· καὶ πάλιν, εἴ τι μὴ ἄψυχον, ἐκεῖνο ἔμψυχον εἶναι· καὶ ταύτην οὖν ἀνατρέπουσι τὴν ἐνάργειαν, οὕτω τὸ πᾶν ὁμολογοῦντες μήτʼ ἔμψυχον εἶναι μήτʼ ἄψυχον. ἄνευ δὲ τούτων, ἀτελὲς μὲν οὐδεὶς νοεῖ τὸ πᾶν, οὗ γε δὴ μηδὲν μέρος ἄπεστιν οὗτοι δὲ τέλειον οὔ φασιν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν· ὡρισμένον γάρ τι τὸ τέλειον, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ὑπʼ ἀπειρίας ἀόριστον· οὐκοῦν ἔστι τι κατʼ αὐτούς, ὃ μήτʼ ἀτελὲς; μήτε τέλειόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε μέρος ἐστὶ τὸ πᾶν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ μεῖζον· οὔτʼ ὅλον, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι· τεταγμένου γὰρ τὸ ὅλον κατηγορεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ πᾶν διʼ ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἀόριστον εἶναι καὶ ἄτακτον. αἴτιον τοίνυν οὔτε τοῦ παντὸς ἕτερόν ἐστι τῷ μηδὲν εἶναι παρὰ τὸ πᾶν ἕτερον, οὔτʼ ἄλλου τὸ πᾶν ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν γὰρ οὐ πέφυκε, τῷ δὲ ποιεῖν τὸ αἴτιον νοεῖται. φέρε τοίνυν πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐρωτᾶσθαι, τί νοοῦσι τὸ μηδὲν καί τίνα τοῦ ἐπίνοιαν λαμβάνουσιν ἆρʼ, οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν, ὡς τὸ μήτʼ, αἴτιον ὑπάρχον μήτʼ, αἴτιον ἔχον μήθʼ ὅλον μήτε μέρος μήτε τέλειον μήτʼ ἀτελὲς μήτʼ ἔμψυχον μήτʼ ἄψυχον μήτε κινούμενον μήτε μένον που μήθʼ ὑπάρχον μήτε σῶμα μήτʼ ἀσώματον; τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν. ὅταν οὖν ὅσα πάντες οἱ λοιποὶ τοῦ μηδενός, οὗτοι μόνοι τοῦ παντὸς κατηγοροῦσι, ταὐτὸν ὡς ἔοικε φαίνονται τῷ μηδενὶ τὸ πᾶν ποιοῦντες. οὐδὲν οὖν ἔτι δεῖ λέγειν τὸν χρόνον, τὸ κατηγόρημα, τὸ ἀξίωμα, τὸ συνημμένον, τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον οἷς χρῶνται μὲν μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὄντα δʼ οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι. καίτοι τὸ γʼ ἀληθὲς; ὂν μὴ εἶναι μηδʼ ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ καταληπτὸν εἶναι καὶ πιστὸν ᾧ τῆς οὐσίας; τοῦ ὄντος μὴ μέτεστι, πῶς οὖν οὐ πᾶσαν ἀτοπίαν ὑπερβέβληκεν;
Greek text, ed. 1895 · CC BY-SA