Long · trans. George Long (1862)
[If any have offended against thee, consider first]: What is my relation to men, and that we are made for one another; and in another respect I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the flock or a bull over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles, from this. If all things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders all things: if this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake of the superior, and these for the sake of one another.
Second, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and so forth; and particularly, under what compulsions in respect of opinions they are; and as to their acts, consider with what pride they do what they do.
Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be displeased: but if they do not right, it is plain that they do so involuntarily and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power of behaving to each man according to his deserts. Accordingly men are pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word wrong-doers to their neighbors.
Fourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong, and that thou art a man like others; and even if thou dost abstain from certain faults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though either through cowardice, or concern about reputation, or some such mean motive, thou dost abstain from such faults.
Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are doing wrong or not, for many things are done with a certain reference to circumstances. And in short, a man must learn a great deal to enable him to pass a correct judgment on another man's acts.
Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man's life is only a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead.
Seventh, that it is not men's acts which disturb us, for those acts have their foundation in men's ruling principles, but it is our own opinions which disturb us. Take away these opinions then, and resolve to dismiss thy judgment about an act as if it were something grievous, and thy anger is gone. How then shall I take away these opinions? By reflecting that no wrongful act of another brings shame on thee: for unless that which is shameful is alone bad, thou also must of necessity do many things wrong, and become a robber and everything else.
Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger and vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which we are angry and vexed.
Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible if it be genuine, and not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most violent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind disposition towards him, and if, as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he is trying to do thee harm, saying, Not so, my child: we are constituted by nature for something else: I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art injuring thyself, my child.—And show him with gentle tact and by general principles that this is so, and that even bees do not do as he does, nor any animals which are formed by nature to be gregarious. And thou must do this neither with any double meaning nor in the way of reproach, but affectionately and without any rancor in thy soul; and not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may admire, but either when he is alone, and if others are present...
Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them as a gift from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou livest. But thou must equally avoid nattering men and being vexed at them, for both are unsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be present to thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is not manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to human nature, so also are they more manly; and he who possesses these qualities possesses strength, nerves, and courage, and not the man who is subject to fits of passion and discontent. For in the same degree in which a man's mind is nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same degree also is it nearer to strength: and as the sense of pain is a characteristic of weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to pain and he who yields to anger, both are wounded and both submit.
But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader of the Muses [Apollo], and it is this,—that to expect bad men not to do wrong is madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility. But to allow men to behave so to others, and to expect them not to do thee any wrong, is irrational and tyrannical.
trans. George Long (1862)
Long’s notes (9)
- It appears that there is a defect in the text here.
- Cross-reference: ii. 1; ix. 39; v. 16; iii. 4
- Cross-reference: viii. 14; ix. 34
- Cross-reference: vii. 62, 63; ii. 1; vii. 26; viii. 29
- Cross-reference: i. 17
- Cross-reference: ix. 38; iv. 51
- Cross-reference: vii. 58; iv. 48
- Cross-reference: v. 25; vii. 16
- Cross-reference: iv. 39, 49; vii. 24
Haines · trans. C. R. Haines (1916)
Firstly: Consider thy relation to mankind and that we came into the world for the sake of one another; and taking another point of view, that I have come into it to be set over men, as a ram over a flock or a bull over a herd. Start at the beginning from this premiss: If not atoms, then an all-controlling Nature. If the latter, then the lower are for the sake of the higher and the higher for one another.
Secondly: What sort of men they are at board and in bed and elsewhere. Above all how they are the self-made slaves of their principles, and how they pride themselves on the very acts in question.
Thirdly: That if they are acting rightly in this, there is no call for us to be angry. If not rightly, it is obviously against their will and through ignorance. For it is against his will that every soul is deprived, as of truth, so too of the power of dealing with each man as is his due. At any rate, such men resent being called unjust, unfeeling, avaricious, and in a word doers of wrong to their neighbours.
Fourthly: That thou too doest many a wrong thing thyself and art much as others are, and if thou dost refrain from certain wrong-doings, yet hast thou a disposition inclinable thereto even supposing that through cowardice or a regard for thy good name or some such base consideration thou dost not actually commit them.
Fifthly: That thou hast not even proved that they are doing wrong, for many things are done even 'by way of policy.' Speaking generally a man must know many things before he can pronounce an adequate opinion on the acts of another.
Sixthly: When thou art above measure angry or even out of patience, bethink thee that man's life is momentary, and in a little while we shall all have been laid out.
Seventhly: That in reality it is not the acts men do that vex us—for they belong to the domain of their ruling Reason—but the opinions we form of those acts. Eradicate these, be ready to discard thy conclusion that the act in question is a calamity, and thine anger is at an end. How then eradicate these opinions? By realizing that no act of another debases us. For unless that alone which debases is an evil, thou too must perforce do many a wrong thing and become a brigand or any sort of man.
Eighthly: Bethink thee how much more grievous are the consequences of our anger and vexation at such actions than are the acts themselves which arouse that anger and vexation.
Ninthly: That kindness is irresistible, be it but sincere and no mock smile or a mask assumed. For what can the most unconscionable of men do to thee, if thou persist in being kindly to him, and when a chance is given exhort him mildly and, at the very time when he is trying to do thee harm, quietly teach him a better way thus: Nay, my child, we have been made for other things. I shall be in no wise harmed, but thou art harming thyself, my child. Shew him delicately and without any personal reference that this is so, and that even honey-bees do not act thus nor any creatures of gregarious instincts. But thou must do this not in irony or by way of rebuke, but with kindly affection and without any bitterness at heart, not as from a master's chair, nor yet to impress the bystanders, but as if he were indeed alone even though others are present.
Bethink thee then of these nine heads, taking them as a gift from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while life is thine. But beware of flattering men no less than being angry with them. For both these are non-social and conducive of harm. In temptations to anger a precept ready to thy hand is this to be wroth is not manly, but a mild and gentle disposition, as it is more human, so it is more inasculine. Such a man, and not he who gives way to anger and discontent, is endowed with strength and sinews and manly courage. For the nearer such a mind attains to a passive calm, the nearer is the man to strength. As grief is a weakness, so also is anger. In both it is a case of a wound and a surrender.
But take if thou wilt as a tenth gift from Apollo, the Leader of the Muses, this, that to expect the bad not to do wrong is worthy of a madman; for that is to wish for impossibilities. But to acquiesce in their wronging others, while expecting them to refrain from wronging thee, is unfeeling and despotic.
trans. C. R. Haines (1916)
Haines’s notes (23)
- v. 16, 30; viii. 27.
- viii. 56, 59.
- Dio Chrys. Orat. ii. de Regno, 97 R, ὁ δὲ ταῦρος σαφῶς πρὸς βασιλέως εἰκόνα πεποίηται. Εpict. i. 2, § 30.
- iv. 3, § 2; viii. 17; ix. 39; x. 6.
- ii. 1; v. 16.
- viii. 14; x. 19.
- ii. 1; iv. 3; vii. 22, 63.
- vii. 70; x. 30.
- i. 17 ad init.
- Or, "with an eye to circumstances," "with some further end in view," knowledge of which would justify the action or shew its necessity.
- ix. 38.
- vii. 16; viii. 40; ix. 13; xi. 11, 16.
- vii. 16.
- x. 10.
- Sen. de Ben. vii. 31: vincit malos pertinax bonitas.
- v. 28; vi. 27; viii. 59; x. 4; xi. 13.
- ix. 4.
- xi. 13.
- cp. Dio 71. 3, § 4.
- iv. 31.
- The Stoic ἀπάθεια.
- v. 17; vii. 71; ix. 42.
- vi. 27; Sen. de Ira ii. 31. ἄγνωμον might also be translated senseless.
Greek · Greek text, ed. 1908
[Καὶ] Πρῶτον, τίς ἡ πρὸς αὐτούς μοι σχέσις καὶ ὅτι ἀλλήλων ἕνεκεν γεγόναμεν καὶ καθ’ ἕτερον λόγον προστησόμενος αὐτῶν γέγονα ὡς κριὸς ποίμνης ἢ ταῦρος ἀγέλης. ἄνωθεν δὲ ἔπιθι ἀπὸ τοῦ· εἰ μὴ ἄτομοι, φύσις ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα· εἰ τοῦτο, τὰ χείρονα τῶν κρειττόνων ἕνεκεν, ταῦτα δὲ ἀλλήλων. Δεύτερον δέ, ὁποῖοί τινές εἰσιν ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης, ὲν τῷ κλιναρίῳ, τἄλλα· μάλιστα δέ, οἵας ἀνάγκας δογμάτων κειμένας ἔχουσι· καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα, μεθ’ οἵου τύφου ποιοῦσιν.
Τρίτον, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὐ δεῖ δυσχεραίνειν· εἰ ὀ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, δηλονότι ἄκοντες καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες. πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ ἄκουσα στέρεται, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ προσφέρεσθαι. ἄχθονται γοῦν ἀκούοντες ἄδικοι καὶ ἀγνώμονες καὶ πλεονέκται καὶ καθάπαξ ἁμαρτητικοὶ περὶ τοὺς πλησίον. Τέταρτον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνεις καὶ ἄλλος τοιοῦτος εἷ· καὶ εἴ τινων δὲ ἁμαρτημάτων ἀπέχῃ, ἀλλὰ τήν γε ἕξιν ἐποιστικὴν ἔχεις, εἰ καὶ διὰ δειλίαν ἢ δοξοκοπίαν ἢ τοιοῦτό τι κακὸν ἀπέχῃ τῶν ὁμοίων ἁμαρτημάτων.
Πέμπτον, ὅτι οὐδὲ εἰ ἁμαρτάνουσι κατείληφας· πολλὰ γὰρ κατ’ οἰκονομίαν γίνεται καὶ ὅλως πολλὰ δεῖ πρότερον μαθεῖν, ἵνα τις περὶ ἀλλοτρίας πράξεως καταληπτικῶς τι ἀποφήνηται. Ἕκτον, ὅτι, ὅταν λίαν ἀγανακτῇς ἢ καὶ δυσπαθῇς, ἀκαριαῖος ὁ ἀνθρώπειος βίος καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγον πάντες ἐξετάθημεν. Ἕβδομον, ὅτι οὐχ αἱ πράξεις αὐτῶν ἐνοχλοῦσιν ἡμῖν· ἐκεῖναι γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνων ἡγεμονικοῖς· ἀλλὰ αἱ ἡμέτεραι ὑπολήψεις. ἆρον γοῦν καὶ θέλησον ἀφεῖναι τὴν ὡς περὶ δεινοῦ κρίσιν καὶ ἀπῆλθεν ἡ ὀργή. πῶς οὖν ἀρεῖς; λογισάμενος ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρόν· ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ᾖ τὸ αἰσχρὸν κακόν, ἀνάγκη καὶ σὲ πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ λῃστὴν καὶ παντοῖον γενέσθαι.
Ὄγδοον, ὅσῳ χαλεπώτερα ἐπιφέρουσιν αἱ ὀργαὶ καὶ λῦπαι αἱ ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἤπερ αὐτά ἐστιν ἐφ’ οἷς ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ λυπούμεθα. Ἔνατον, ὅτι τὸ εὐμενὲς ἀνίκητον, ἐὰν γνήσιον ᾖ καὶ μὴ σεσηρὸς μηδὲ ὑπόκρισις. τί γάρ σοι ποιήσει ὁ ὑβριστικώτατος, ἐὰν διατελῇς εὐμενὴς αὐτῷ καί, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, πρᾴως παραινῇς καὶ μεταδιδάσκῃς εὐσχολῶν παρ’ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν ὅτε κακοποιεῖν σε ἐπιχειρεῖ· ʽμή, τέκνον· πρὸς ἄλλο πεφύκαμεν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ μὴ βλαβῶ, σὺ δὲ βλάπτῃ, τέκνον.ʼ καὶ δεικνύναι εὐαφῶς καὶ ὁλικῶς ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅτι οὐδὲ μέλισσαι αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν οὐδ’ ὅσα συναγελαστικὰ πέφυκε. δεῖ δὲ μήτε εἰρωνικῶς αὐτὸ ποιεῖν μήτε ὀνειδιστικῶς, ἀλλὰ φιλοστόργως καὶ ἀδήκτως τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐν σχολῇ μηδὲ ἵνα ἄλλος παραστὰς θαυμάσῃ, ἀλλ’ ἤτοι πρὸς μόνον καὶ ἐὰν ἄλλοι τινὲς περιεστήκωσι.
Τούτων τῶν ἐννέα κεφαλαίων μέμνησο ὡς παρὰ τῶν Μουσῶν δῶρα εἰληφὼς καὶ ἄρξαι ποτὲ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι, ἕως ζῇς. φυλακτέον δὲ ἐπίσης τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς τὸ κολακεύειν αὐτούς· ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἀκοινώνητα καὶ πρὸς βλάβην φέρει. πρόχειρον δὲ ἐν ταῖς ὀργαῖς ὅτι οὐχὶ τὸ θυμοῦσθαι ἀνδρικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾷον καὶ ἥμερον ὥσπερ ἀνθρωπικώτερον, οὕτως καὶ ἀρρενικώτερον καὶ ἰσχύος καὶ νεύρων καὶ ἀνδρείας τούτῳ μέτεστιν, οὐχὶ τῷ ἀγανακτοῦντι καὶ δυσαρεστοῦντι· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἀπαθείᾳ τοῦτο οἰκειότερον, τοσούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει. ὥσπερ τε ἡ λύπη ἀσθενοῦς, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ὀργή· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ τέτρωνται καὶ ἐνδεδώκασιν.
Εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ δέκατον παρὰ τοῦ Μουσηγέτου δῶρον λάβε, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἁμαρτάνειν τοὺς φαύλους μανικόν· ἀδυνάτου γὰρ ἐφίεται. τὸ δὲ συγχωρεῖν ἄλλοις μὲν εἶναι τοιούτους, ἀξιοῦν δὲ μὴ εἰς σὲ ἁμαρτάνειν, ἄγνωμον καὶ τυραννικόν.
Greek text, ed. 1908 · CC BY-SA