Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)
The Adversary. Your instances are not to the purpose, for he
who cultivates my land, does not benefit the land, but me; he who
props my house so that it does not fall, does this service to me,
for the house itself is without feeling, and as it has none, it is
I who am indebted to him; and he who cultivates my land does so
because he wishes to oblige me, not to oblige the land. I should
say the same of a slave; he is a chattel owned by me; he is saved
for my advantage, therefore I am indebted for him. My son is
himself capable of receiving a benefit; so it is he who receives
it; I am gratified at a benefit which comes so near to myself, but
am not laid under any obligation.
Se. Still I should like you, who say that you are under no
obligation, to answer me this. The good health, the happiness, and
the inheritance of a son are connected with his father; his father
will be more happy if he keeps his son safe, and more unhappy if he
loses him. What follows, then? when a man is made happier by me and
is freed from the greatest danger of unhappiness, does he not
receive a benefit?
Ad. No, because there are some things which are bestowed upon
others, and yet flow from them so as to reach ourselves; yet we
must ask the person upon whom it was bestowed for repayment; as for
example, money must be sought from the man to whom it was lent,
although it may, by some means, have come into my hands. There is
no benefit whose advantages do not extend to the receiver's nearest
friends, and sometimes even to those less intimately connected with
him; yet we do not enquire whither the benefit has proceeded from
him to whom it was first given, but where it was first placed. You
must demand repayment from the defendant himself personally.
Se. Well, but I pray you, do you not say, "you have preserved my
son for me; had he perished, I could not have survived him?" Do you
not owe a benefit for the life of one whose safety you value above
your own? Moreover, should I save your son's life, you would fall
down before my knees, and would pay vows to heaven as though you
yourself had been saved; you would say, "It makes no difference
whether you have saved mine or me; you have saved us both, yet me
more than him." Why do you say this, if you do not receive a
benefit?
Ad. Because, if my son were to contract a loan, I should pay his
creditor, yet I should not, therefore, be indebted to him; or if my
son were taken in adultery, I should blush, yet I should not,
therefore, be an adulterer. I say that I am under an obligation to
you for saving my son, not because I really am, but because I am
willing to constitute myself your debtor of my own free will. On
the other hand I have derived from his safety the greatest possible
pleasure and advantage, and I have escaped that most dreadful blow,
the loss of my child. True, but we are not now discussing whether
you have done me any good or not, but whether you have bestowed a
benefit upon me; for animals, stones, and herbs can do one good,
but do not bestow benefits, which can only be given by one who
wishes well to the receiver. Now you do not wish well to the
father, but only to the son; and sometimes you do not even know the
father. So when you have said, "Have I not bestowed a benefit upon
the father by saving the son?" you ought to meet this with, "Have
I, then, bestowed a benefit upon a father whom I do not know, whom
I never thought of?" And what will you say when, as is sometimes the
case, you hate the father, and yet save his son? Can you be thought
to have bestowed a benefit upon one whom you hated most bitterly
while you were bestowing it?
However, if I were to lay aside the bickering of dialogue, and
answer you as a lawyer, I should say that you ought to consider the
intention of the giver, you must regard his benefit as bestowed
upon the person upon whom he meant to bestow it. If he did it in
honour of the father, then the father received the benefit; if he
thought only of the son, then the father is not laid under any
obligation: by the benefit which was conferred upon the son, even
though the father derives pleasure from it. Should he, however,
have an opportunity, he will himself wish to give you something,
yet not as though he were forced to repay a debt, but rather as if
he had grounds for beginning an exchange of favours. No return for
a benefit ought to be demanded from the father of the receiver; if
he does you any kindness in return for it, he should be regarded
as, a righteous man, but not as a grateful one. For there is no end
to it; if I bestow a benefit on the receiver's father, do I
likewise bestow it upon his mother, his grandfather, his maternal
uncle, his children, relations, friends, slaves, and country?
Where, then, does a benefit begin to stop? for there follows it
this endless chain of people, to whom it is hard to assign bounds,
because they join it by degrees, and are always creeping on towards
it.
trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)