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The Stoa
Translation

On Benefits

Book V

25 chapters

1

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

IN the preceding books I seem to have accomplished the object which
I proposed to myself, since in them I have discussed how a benefit
ought to be bestowed, and how it ought to be received. These are
the limits of this action; when I dwell upon it further I am not
obeying the orders, but the caprices of my subject which ought to
be followed whither it leads, not whither it allures us to wander;
for now and then something will arise, which, although it is all
but unconnected with the subject, instead of being a necessary part
of it, still thrills the mind with a certain charm. However, since
you wish it to be so, let us go on, after having completed our
discussion of the heads of the subject itself, to investigate those
matters which, if you wish for truth, I must call adjacent to it,
not actually connected with it; to examine which carefully is not
one worth one's while, and yet is not labour in vain. No praise,
however, which I can give to benefits does justice to you, Æbutius
Liberalis, a man of excellent disposition and naturally inclined to
bestow them. Never have I seen any one esteem even the most
trifling services more kindly; indeed, your good-nature goes so far
as to regard whatever benefit is bestowed upon anyone as bestowed
upon yourself; you are prepared to pay even what is owed by the
ungrateful, that no one may regret having bestowed benefits. You
yourself are so far from any boastfulness, you are so eager at once
to free those whom you serve from any feeling of obligation to you,
that you like, when giving anything to any one, to seem not so much
to be giving a present as returning one; and therefore what you
give in this manner will all the more fully he repaid to you: for,
as a rule, benefits come to one who does not demand repayment of
them; and just as glory follows those who avoid it, so men receive
a more plentiful harvest in return for benefits bestowed upon those
who had it in their power to be ungrateful. With you there is no
reason why those who have received benefits from you should not ask
for fresh ones; nor would you refuse to bestow others, to overlook
and conceal what you have given, and to add to it more and greater
gifts, since it is the aim of all the best men and the noblest
dispositions to bear with an ungrateful man until you make him
grateful. Be not deceived in pursuing this plan; vice, if you do
not too soon begin to hate it, will yield to virtue.

2

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Thus it is that you are especially pleased with what you think
the grandly-sounding phrase, "It is disgraceful to be worsted in a
contest of benefits." Whether this be true or not deserves to be
investigated, and it means something quite different from what you
imagine; for it is never disgraceful to be worsted in any
honourable contest, provided that you do not throw down your arms,
and that even when conquered you wish to conquer. All men do not
strive for a good object with the same strength, resources, and
good fortune, upon which depend at all events the issues of the
most admirable projects, though we ought to praise the will itself
which makes an effort in the right direction. Even though another
passes it by with swifter pace, yet the palm of victory does not,
as in publicly-exhibited races, declare which is the better man;
though even in the games chance frequently brings an inferior man
to the front. As far as loyalty of feeling goes, which each man
wishes to be possessed in the fullest measure on his own side, if
one of the two be the more powerful, if he have at his disposal all
the resources which he wishes to use, and be favoured by fortune in
his most ambitious efforts, while the other, although equally
willing, can only return less than he receives, or perhaps can make
no return at all, but still wishes to do so and is entirely devoted
to this object; then the latter is no more conquered than he who
dies in arms, whom the enemy found it easier to slay than to turn
back. To be conquered, which you consider disgraceful, cannot
happen to a good man; for he will never surrender, never give up
the contest, to the last day of his life he will stand prepared and
in that posture he will die, testifying that though he has received
much, yet that he had the will to repay as much as he had received.

3

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

The Lacedaemonians forbid their young men to contend in the
pancratium, or with the caestus, in which games the defeated party
has to acknowledge himself beaten. The winner of a race is he who
first reaches the goal; he outstrips the others in swiftness, but
not in courage. The wrestler who has been thrown three times loses
the palm of victory, but does not yield it up. Since the
Lacedaemonians thought it of great importance that their countrymen
should be invincible, they kept them away from those contests in
which victory is assigned, not by the judge, or by the issue of the
contest itself, but by the voice of the vanquished begging the
victor to spare him as he falls. This attribute of never being
conquered, which they so jealously guard among their citizens, can
be attained by all men through virtue and goodwill, because even
when all else is vanquished, the mind remains unconquered. For this
cause no one speaks of the three hundred Fabii as conquered, but
slaughtered. Regulus was taken captive by the Carthaginians, not
conquered; and so were all other men who have not yielded in spirit
when overwhelmed by the strength and weight of angry fortune.

So is it with benefits. A man may have received more than he gave,
more valuable ones, more frequently bestowed; yet is he not
vanquished. It may be that, if you compare the benefits with one
another, those which he has received will outweigh those which he
has bestowed; but if you compare the giver and the receiver, whose
intentions also ought to be considered apart, neither will prove
the victor. It often happens that even when one combatant is
pierced with many wounds, while the other is only slightly injured,
yet they are said to have fought a drawn battle, although the
former may appear to be the worse man.

4

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

No one, therefore, can be conquered in a contest of benefits,
if he knows how to owe a debt, if he wishes to make a return for
what he has received, and raises himself to the same level with his
friend in spirit, though he cannot do so in material gifts. As long
as he remains in this temper of mind, as long as he has the wish to
declare by proofs that he has a grateful mind, what difference does
it make upon which side we can count the greater number of
presents? You are able to give much; I can do nothing but receive.
Fortune abides with you, goodwill alone with me; yet I am as much
on an equality with you as naked or lightly armed men are with a
large body armed to the teeth. No one, therefore, is worsted by
benefits, because each man's gratitude is to be measured by his
will. If it be disgraceful to be worsted in a contest of benefits,
you ought not to receive a benefit from very powerful men whose
kindness you cannot return, I mean such as princes and kings, whom
fortune has placed in such a station that they can give away much,
and can only receive very little and quite inadequate returns for
what they give. I have spoken of kings and princes, who alone can
cause works to be accomplished, and whose superlative power depends
upon the obedience and services of inferiors; but some there are,
free from all earthly lusts, who are scarcely affected by any human
objects of desire, upon whom fortune herself could bestow nothing.
I must be worsted in a contest of benefits with Socrates, or with
Diogenes, who walked naked through the treasures of Macedonia,
treading the king's wealth under his feet. In good sooth, he must
then rightly have seemed, both to himself and to all others whose
eyes were keen enough to perceive the real truth, to be superior
even to him at whose feet all the world lay. He was far more
powerful, far richer even than Alexander, who then possessed
everything; for there was more that Diogenes could refuse to
receive than that Alexander was able to give.

5

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

It is not disgraceful to be worsted by these men, for I am not
the less brave because you pit me against an invulnerable enemy,
nor does fire not burn because you throw into it something over
which flames have no power, nor does iron lose its power of
cutting, though you may wish to cut up a stone which is hard,
impervious to blows, and of such a nature that hard tools are
blunted upon it. I give you the same answer about gratitude. A man
is not disgracefully worsted in a contest of benefits if he lays
himself under an obligation to such persons as these, whose
enormous wealth or admirable virtue shut out all possibility of
their benefits being returned. As a rule we are worsted by our
parents; for while we have them with us, we regard them as severe,
and do not understand what they do for us. When our age begins to
bring us a little sense, and we gradually perceive that they
deserve our love for those very things which used to prevent our
loving them, their advice, their punishments, and the careful watch
which they used to keep over our youthful recklessness, they are
taken from us. Few live to reap any real fruit from children; most
men feel their sons only as a burden. Yet there is no disgrace in
being worsted by one's parent in bestowing benefits; how should
there be, seeing that there is no disgrace in being worsted by
anyone. We are equal to some men, and yet not equal; equal in
intention, which is all that they care for, which is all that we
promise to be, but unequal in fortune. And if fortune prevents any
one from repaying a kindness, he need not, therefore, blush, as
though he were vanquished; there is no disgrace in failing to reach
your object, provided you attempt to reach it. It often is
necessary, that before making any return for the benefits which we
have received, we should ask for new ones; yet, if so, we shall not
refrain from asking for them, nor shall we do so as though
disgraced by so doing, because, even if we do not repay the debt,
we shall owe it; because, even if something from without befalls us
to prevent our repaying it, it will not be our fault if we are not
grateful. We can neither be conquered in intention, nor can we be
disgraced by yielding to what is beyond our strength to contend
with.

6

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Alexander, the king of the Macedonians, used to boast that he
had never been worsted by anybody in a contest of benefits. If so,
it was no reason why, in the fulness of his pride, he should
despise the Macedonians, Greeks, Carians, Persians, and other
tribes of whom his army was composed, nor need he imagine that it
was this that gave him an empire reaching from a corner of Thrace
to the shore of the unknown sea. Socrates could make the same
boast, and so could Diogenes, by whom Alexander was certainly
surpassed; for was he not surpassed on the day when, swelling as he
was beyond the limits of merely human pride, he beheld one to whom
he could give nothing, from whom he could take nothing? King
Archelaus invited Socrates to come to him. Socrates is reported to
have answered that he should be sorry to go to one who would bestow
benefits upon him, since he should not be able to make him an
adequate return for them. In the first place, Socrates was at
liberty not to receive them; next, Socrates himself would have been
the first to bestow a benefit, for he would have come when invited,
and would have given to Archelaus that for which Archelaus could
have made no return to Socrates. Even if Archelaus were to give
Socrates gold and silver, if he learned in return for them to
despise gold and silver, would not Socrates be able to repay
Archelaus? Could Socrates receive from him as much value as he
gave, in displaying to him a man skilled in the knowledge of life
and of death, comprehending the true purpose of each? Suppose that
he had found this king, as it were, groping his way in the clear
sunlight, and had taught him the secrets of nature, of which he was
so ignorant, that when there was an eclipse of the sun, he up his
palace, and shaved his son's head, which men are wont to do
in times of mourning and distress. What a benefit it would have
been if he had dragged the terror-stricken king out of his hiding-
place, and bidden him be of good cheer, saying, "This is not a
disappearance of the sun, but a conjunction of two heavenly bodies;
for the moon, which proceeds along a lower path, has placed her
disk beneath the sun, and hidden it by the interposition of her own
mass. Sometimes she only hides a small portion of the sun's disk,
because she only grazes it in passing; sometimes she hides more, by
placing more of herself before it; and sometimes she shuts it out
from our sight altogether, if she passes in an exactly even course
between the sun and the earth. Soon, however, their own swift
motion will draw these two bodies apart; soon the earth will
receive back again the light of day. And this system will continue
throughout centuries, having certain days, known beforehand, upon
which the sun cannot display all rays, because of the intervention
of the moon. Wait only for a short time; he will soon emerge, he
will soon leave that seeming cloud, and freely shed abroad his
light without any hindrances." Could Socrates not have made an
adequate return to Archelaus, if he had taught him to reign? as
though Socrates would not benefit him sufficiently, merely by
enabling him to bestow a benefit upon Socrates. Why, then, did
Socrates say this? Being a joker and a speaker in parables--a man
who turned all, especially the great, into ridicule--he preferred
giving him a satirical refusal, rather than an obstinate or haughty
one, and therefore said that he did not wish to receive benefits
from one to whom he could not return as much as he received. He
feared, perhaps, that he might be forced to receive something which
he did not wish, he feared that it might be something unfit for
Socrates to receive. Some one may say, "He ought to have said that
he did not wish to go." But by so doing he would have excited
against himself the anger of an arrogant king, who wished
everything connected with himself to be highly valued. It makes no
difference to a king whether you be unwilling to give anything to
him or to accept anything from him; he is equally incensed at
either rebuff, and to be treated with disdain is more bitter to a
proud spirit than not to be feared. Do you wish to know what
Socrates really meant? He, whose freedom of speech could not be
borne even by a free state, was not willing of his own choice to
become a slave.

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. Gertz very reasonably conjectures that he shaved his own head which reading would require a very trifling alteration of the text.
7

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

I think that we have sufficiently discussed this part of the
subject, whether it be disgraceful to be worsted in a contest of
benefits. Whoever asks this question must know that men are not
wont to bestow benefits upon themselves, for evidently it could not
be disgraceful to be worsted by oneself. Yet some of the Stoics
debate this question, whether any one can confer a benefit upon
himself, and whether one ought to return one's own kindness to
oneself. This discussion has been raised in consequence of our
habit of saying, "I am thankful to myself," "I can complain of no
one but myself," "I am angry with myself," "I will punish myself,"
"I hate myself," and many other phrases of the same sort, in which
one speaks of oneself as one would of some other person. "If," they
argue, "I can injure myself, why should I not be able also to
bestow a benefit upon myself? Besides this, why are those things
not called benefits when I bestow them upon myself which would be
called benefits if I bestowed them upon another? If to receive a
certain thing from another would lay me under an obligation to him,
how is it that if I give it to myself, I do not contract an
obligation to myself? why should I be ungrateful to my own self,
which is no less disgraceful than it is to be mean to oneself, or
hard and cruel to oneself, or neglectful of oneself? The procurer
is equally odious whether he prostitutes others or himself. We
blame a flatterer, and one who imitates another man's mode of
speech, or is prepared to give praise whether it be deserved or
not; we ought equally to blame one who humours himself and looks up
to himself, and so to speak is his own flatterer. Vices are not
only hateful when outwardly practised, but also when they are
repressed within the mind. Whom would you admire more than he who
governs himself and has himself under command? It is easier to rule
savage nations, impatient of foreign control, than to restrain
one's own mind and keep it under one's own control. Plato, it is
argued, was grateful to Socrates for having been taught by him; why
should not Socrates be grateful to himself for having taught
himself? Marcus Cato said, "Borrow from yourself whatever you
lack;" why, then, if I can lend myself anything, should I be unable
to give myself anything? The instances in which usage divides us
into two persons are innumerable; we are wont to say, "Let me
converse with myself," and, "I will give myself a twitch of the
ear;" and if it be true that
one can do so, then a man ought to be grateful to himself, just as
he is angry with himself; as he blames himself, SO he ought to
praise himself; since he can impoverish himself, he can also enrich
himself. Injuries and benefits are the converse of one another: if
we say of a man, 'he has done himself an injury,' we can also say
'he has bestowed upon himself a benefit?'

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. See book iv. ch. xxxvi.
8

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

It is natural that a man should first incur an obligation,
and then that he should return gratitude for it; a debtor cannot
exist without a creditor, any more than a husband without a wife,
or a son without a father; someone must give in order that some one
may receive. Just as no one carries himself, although he moves his
body and transports it from place to place; as no one, though he
may have made a speech in his own defence, is said to have stood by
himself, or erects a statue to himself as his own patron; as no
sick man, when by his own care he has regained his health, asks
himself for a fee; so in no transaction, even when a man does what
is useful to himself, need he return thanks to himself, because
there is no one to whom he can return them. Though I grant that a
man can bestow a benefit upon himself, yet at the same time that he
gives it, he also receives it; though I grant that a man may
receive a benefit from himself, yet he receives it at the same time
that he gives it. The exchange takes place within doors, as they
say, and the transfer is made at once, as though the debt were a
fictitious one; for he who gives is not a different person to he
who receives, but one and the same. The word "to owe" has no
meaning except as between two persons; how then can it apply to one
man who incurs an obligation, and by the same act frees himself
from it? In a disk or a ball there is no top or bottom, no
beginning or end, because the relation of the parts is changed when
it moves, what was behind coming before, and what went down on one
side coming up on the other, so that all the parts, in whatever
direction they may move, come back to the same position. Imagine
that the same thing takes place in a man; into however many pieces
you may divide him, he remains one. If he strikes himself, he has
no one to call to account for the insult; if he binds himself and
locks himself up, he cannot demand damages; if he bestows a benefit
upon himself, he straightway returns it to the giver. It is said
that there is no waste in nature, because everything which is taken
from nature returns to her again, and nothing can perish, because
it cannot fall out of nature, but goes round again to the point
from whence it started. You ask, "What connection has this
illustration with the subject?" I will tell you. Imagine yourself
to be ungrateful, the benefit bestowed upon you is not lost, he who
gave it has it; suppose that you are unwilling to receive it, it
still belongs to you before it is returned. You cannot lose
anything, because what you take away from yourself, you
nevertheless gain yourself. The matter revolves in a circle within
yourself; by receiving you give, by giving you receive.

9

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"It is our duty," argues our adversary, "to bestow benefits
upon ourselves, therefore we ought also to be grateful to
ourselves." The original axiom, upon which the inference depends,
is untrue, for no one bestows benefits upon himself, but obeys the
dictates of his nature, which disposes him to affection for
himself, and which makes him take the greatest pains to avoid
hurtful things, and to follow after those things which are
profitable to him. Consequently, the man who gives to himself is
not generous, nor is he who pardons himself forgiving, nor is he
who is touched by his own misfortunes tender-hearted; it is natural
to do those things to oneself which when done to others become
generosity, clemency, and tenderness of heart. A benefit is a
voluntary act, but to do good to oneself is an instinctive one. The
more benefits a man bestows, the more beneficent he is, yet who
ever was praised for having been of service to himself? or for
having rescued himself from brigands? No one bestows a benefit upon
himself any more than he bestows hospitality upon himself; no one
gives himself anything, any more than he lends himself anything. If
each man bestows benefits upon himself, is always bestowing them,
and bestows them without any cessation, then it is impossible for
him to make any calculation of the number of his benefits; when
then can he show his gratitude, seeing that by the very act of
doing so he would bestow a benefit? for what distinction can you
draw between giving himself a benefit or receiving a benefit for
himself, when the whole transaction takes place in the mind of the
same man? Suppose that I have freed myself from danger, then I have
bestowed a benefit upon myself; suppose I free myself a second
time, by so doing do I bestow or repay a benefit? In the next
place, even if I grant the primary axiom, that we can bestow
benefits upon ourselves, I do not admit that which follows; for
even if we can do so, we ought not to do so. Wherefore? Because we
receive a return for them at once. It is right for me to receive a
benefit, then to lie under an obligation, then to repay it; now
here there is no time for remaining under an obligation, because we
receive the return without any delay. No one really gives except to
another, no one owes except to another, no one repays except to
another. An act which always requires two persons cannot take place
within the mind of one.

10

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

A benefit means the affording of something useful, and the word
affording implies other persons. Would not a man be thought mad if
he said that he had sold something to himself, because selling
means alienation, and the transferring of a thing and of one's
rights in that thing to another person? Yet giving, like selling
anything, consists in making it pass away from you, handing over
what you yourself once owned into the keeping of some one else.

If this be so, no one ever gave himself a benefit, because no one
gives to himself; if not, two opposites coalesce, so that it
becomes the same thing to give and to receive. Yet there is a great
difference between giving and receiving; how should there not be,
seeing that these words are the converse of one another? Still, if
any one can give himself a benefit, there can be no difference
between giving and receiving. I said a little before that some
words apply only to other persons, and are so constituted that
their whole meaning lies apart from ourselves; for instance, I am a
brother, but a brother of some other man, for no one is his own
brother; I am an equal, but equal to somebody else, for who is
equal to himself? A thing which is compared to another thing is
unintelligible without that other thing; a thing which is joined to
something else does not exist apart from it; so that which is given
does not exist without the other person, nor can a benefit have any
existence without another person. This is clear from the very
phrase which describes it, 'to do good,' yet no one does good to
himself, any more than he favours himself or is on his own side. I
might enlarge further upon this subject and give many examples. Why
should benefits not be included among those acts which require two
persons to perform them? Many honourable, most admirable and highly
virtuous acts cannot take place without a second person. Fidelity
is praised and held to be one of the chief blessings known among
men, yet was any one ever on that account said to have kept faith
with himself?

11

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

I come now to the last part of this subject. The
man who returns a kindness ought to expend something, just as he
who repays expends money; but the man who returns a kindness to
himself expends nothing, just as he who receives a benefit from
himself gains nothing. A benefit and gratitude for it must pass to
and fro between two persons; their interchange cannot take place
within one man. He who returns a kindness does good in his turn to
him from whom he has received something; but the man who returns
his own kindness, to whom does he do good? To himself? Is there any
one who does not regard the returning of a kindness, and the
bestowal of a benefit, as distinct acts? 'He who returns a kindness
to himself does good to himself.' Was any man ever unwilling to do
this, even though he were ungrateful? nay, who ever was ungrateful
from any other motive than this? "If," it is argued, "we are right
in thanking ourselves, we ought to return our own kindness;" yet we
say, "I am thankful to myself for having refused to marry that
woman," or "for having refused to join a partnership with that
man." When we speak thus, we are really praising ourselves, and
make use of the language of those who return thanks to approve our
own acts. A benefit is something which, when given, may or may not
be returned. Now, he who gives a benefit to himself must needs
receive what he gives; therefore, this is not a benefit. A benefit
is received at one time, and is returned at another; (but when a
man bestows a benefit upon himself, he both receives it and returns
it at the same time). In a benefit, too, what we commend and admire
is, that a man has for the time being forgotten his own interests,
in order that he may do good to another; that he has deprived
himself of something, in order to bestow it upon another. Now, he
who bestows a benefit upon himself does not do this. The bestowal
of a benefit is an act of companionship--it wins some man's
friendship, and lays some man under an obligation; but to bestow it
upon oneself is no act of companionship--it wins no man's
friendship, lays no man under an obligation, raises no man's hopes,
or leads him to say, "This man must be courted; he bestowed a
benefit upon that person, perhaps he will bestow one upon me also."
A benefit is a thing which one gives not for one's own sake, but
for the sake of him to whom it is given; but he who bestows a
benefit upon himself, does so for his own sake; therefore, it is
not a benefit.

12

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Now I seem to you not to have made good what I said at the
beginning of this book. You say that I am far from doing what is
worth any one's while; nay, that in real fact I have thrown away
all my trouble. Wait, and soon you will be able to say this more
truly, for I shall lead you into covert lurking-places, from which
when you have escaped, you will have gained nothing except that you
will have freed yourself from difficulties with which you need
never have hampered yourself. What is the use of laboriously
untying knots which you yourself have tied, in order that you might
untie them? Yet, just as some knots are tied in fun and for
amusement, so that a tyro may find difficulty in untying them,
which knots he who tied them can loose without any trouble, because
he knows the joinings and the difficulties of them, and these
nevertheless afford us some pleasure, because they test the
sharpness of our wits, and engross, our attention; so also these
questions, which seem subtle and tricky, prevent our intellects
becoming careless and lazy, for they ought at one time to have a
field given them to level, in order that they may wander about it,
and at another to have some dark and rough passage thrown in their
way for them to creep through, and make their way with caution. It
is said by our opponent that no one is ungrateful; and this is
supported by the following arguments: "A benefit is that which does
good; but, as you Stoics say, no one can do good to a bad man;
therefore, a bad man does not receive a benefit. (If he does not
receive it, he need not return it; therefore, no bad man is
ungrateful.) Furthermore, a benefit is an honourable and
commendable thing. No honourable or commendable thing can find any
place with a bad man; therefore, neither can a benefit. If he
cannot receive one, he need not repay one; therefore, he does not
become ungrateful. Moreover, as you say, a good man does everything
rightly; if he does everything rightly, he cannot be ungrateful. A
good man returns a benefit, a bad man does not receive one. If this
be so, no man, good or bad, can be ungrateful. Therefore, there is
no such thing in nature as an ungrateful man: the word is
meaningless." We Stoics have only one kind of good, that which is
honourable. This cannot come to a bad man, for he would cease to be
bad if virtue entered into him; but as long as he is bad, no one
can bestow a benefit upon him, because good and bad are contraries,
and cannot exist together. Therefore, no one can do good to such a
man, because whatever he receives is corrupted by his vicious way
of using it. Just as the stomach, when disordered by disease and
secreting bile, changes all the food which it receives, and turns
every kind of sustenance into a source of pain, so whatever you
entrust to an ill-regulated mind becomes to it a burden, an
annoyance, and a source of misery. Thus the most prosperous and the
richest men have the most trouble; and the more property they have
to perplex them, the less likely they are to find out what they
really are. Nothing, therefore, can reach bad men which would do
them good; nay, nothing which would not do them harm. They change
whatever falls to their lot into their own evil nature; and things
which elsewhere would, if given to better men, be both beautiful
and profitable, are ruinous to them. They cannot, therefore, bestow
benefits, because no one can give what he does not possess, and,
therefore, they lack the pleasure of doing good to others.

13

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

But, though this be so, yet even a bad man can receive some
things which resemble benefits, and he will be ungrateful if he
does not return them. There are good things belonging to the mind,
to the body, and to fortune. A fool or a bad man is debarred from
the first--those, that is, of the mind; but he is admitted to a
share in the two latter, and, if he does not return them, he is
ungrateful. Nor does this follow from our (Stoic) system alone the
Peripatetics, also, who widely extend the boundaries of human
happiness, declare that trifling benefits reach bad men, and that
he who does not return them is ungrateful. We therefore do not
agree that things which do not tend to improve the mind should be
called benefits, yet do not deny that these things are convenient
and desirable. Such things as these a bad man may bestow upon a
good man, or may receive from him--such, for example, as money,
clothes, public office, or life; and, if he makes no return for
these, he will come under the denomination of ungrateful. "But how
can you call a man ungrateful for not returning that which you say
is not a benefit?" Some things, on account of their similarity, are
included under the same designation, although they do not really
deserve it. Thus we speak of a silver or golden box; thus we call a
man illiterate, although he may not be utterly ignorant, but only
not acquainted with the higher branches of literature; thus, seeing
a badly-dressed ragged man we say that we have seen a naked man.
These things of which we spoke are not benefits, but they possess
the appearance of benefits. "Then, just as they are quasi-benefits,
so your man is quasi-ungrateful, not really ungrateful." This is
untrue, because both he who gives and he who receives them speaks
of them as benefits; so he who fails to return the semblance of a
real benefit is as much an ungrateful man as he who mixes a
sleeping draught, believing it to be poison, is a poisoner.

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. "The original word is 'pyx,' which means a box made of box-wood."
14

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Cleanthes speaks more impetuously than this. "Granted," says
he, "that what he received was not a benefit, yet he is ungrateful,
because he would not have returned a benefit if he had received
one." So he who carries deadly weapons and has intentions of
robbing and murdering, is a brigand even before he has dipped his
hands in blood; his wickedness consists and is shown in action, but
does not begin thereby. Men are punished for sacrilege, although no
one's hands can reach to the gods. "How," asks our opponent, "can
any one be ungrateful to a bad man, since a bad man cannot bestow a
benefit?" In the same way, I answer, because that which he received
was not a benefit, but was called one; if any one receives from a
bad man any of those things which are valued by the ignorant, and
of which bad men often possess great store, it becomes his duty to
make a return in the same kind, and to give back as though they
were truly good those things which he received as though they were
truly good. A man is said to be in debt, whether he owes gold
pieces or leather marked with a state stamp, such as the
Lacedaemonians used, which passes for coined money. Pay your debts
in that kind in which you incurred them. You have nothing to do
with the definition of benefits, or with the question whether so
great and noble a name ought to be degraded by applying it to such
vulgar and mean matters as these, nor do we seek for truth that we
may use it to the disadvantage of others; do you adjust your minds
to the semblance of truth, and while you are learning what is
really honourable, respect everything to which the name of honour
is applied.

15

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"In the same way," argues our adversary, "that your school
proves that no one is ungrateful, you afterwards prove that all men
are ungrateful. For, as you say, all fools are bad men; he who has
one vice has all vices; all men are both fools and bad men;
therefore all men are ungrateful." Well, what then? Are they not?
Is not this the universal reproach of the human race? is there not
a general complaint that benefits are thrown away, and that there
are very few men who do not requite their benefactors with the
basest ingratitude? Nor need you suppose that what we say is merely
the grumbling of men who think every act wicked and depraved which
falls short of an ideal standard of righteousness. Listen! I know
not who it is who speaks, yet the voice with which he condemns
mankind proceeds, not from the schools of philosophers, but from
the midst of the crowd:

"Host is not safe from guest;
Father-in-law from son; but seldom love
Exists 'twixt brothers; wives long to destroy
Their husbands; husbands long to slay their wives."

This goes even further: according to this, crimes take the place of
benefits, and men do not shrink from shedding the blood of those
for whom they ought to shed their own; we requite benefits by steel
and poison. We call laying violent hands upon our own country, and
putting down its resistance by the fasces of its own lictors,
gaining power and great place; every man thinks himself to be in a
mean and degraded position if he has not raised himself above the
constitution; the armies which are received from the state are
turned against her, and a general now says to his men, "Fight
against your wives, fight against your children, march in arms
against your altars, your hearths and homes!" Yes, you, who even when
about to triumph ought not to enter the city at the command of the
senate, and who have often, when bringing home a victorious army,
been given an audience outside the walls, you now, after
slaughtering your countrymen, stained with the blood of your
kindred, march into the city with standards erect. "Let liberty,"
say you, "be silent amidst the ensigns of war, and now that wars
are driven far away and no ground for terror remains, let that
people which conquered and civilized all nations be beleaguered
within its own walls, and shudder at the sight of its own eagles."

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. I believe, in spite of Gertz, that this is part of the speech of the Roman general, and that the conjecture of Muretus, "without the command of the senate," gives better sense.
16

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Coriolanus was ungrateful, and became dutiful late, and after
repenting of his crime; he did indeed lay down his arms, but only
in the midst of his unnatural warfare. Catilina was ungrateful; he
was not satisfied with taking his country captive without
overturning it, without despatching the hosts of the Allobroges
against it, without bringing an enemy from beyond the Alps to glut
his old inborn hatred, and to offer Roman generals as sacrifices
which had been long owing to the tombs of the Gaulish dead. Caius
Marius was ungrateful, when, after being raised from the ranks to
the consulship, he felt that he would not have wreaked his
vengeance upon fortune, and would sink to his original obscurity,
unless he slaughtered Romans as freely as he had slaughtered the
Cimbri, and not merely gave the signal, but was himself the signal
for civil disasters and butcheries. Lucius Sulla was ungrateful,
for he saved his country by using remedies worse than the perils
with which it was threatened, when he marched through human blood
all the way from the citadel of Praeneste to the Colline Gate,
fought more battles and caused more slaughter afterwards within the
city, and most cruelly after the victory was won, most wickedly
after quarter had been promised them, drove two legions into a
corner and put them to the sword, and, great gods! invented a
proscription by which he who slew a Roman citizen received
indemnity, a sum of money, everything but a civic crown! Cnaeus
Pompeius was ungrateful, for the return which he made to his
country for three consulships, three triumphs, and the innumerable
public offices into most of which he thrust himself when under age,
was to lead others also to lay hands upon her under the pretext of
thus rendering his own power less odious; as though what no one
ought to do became right if more than one person did it. Whilst he
was coveting extraordinary commands, arranging the provinces so as
to have his own choice of them, and dividing the whole state with a
third person, in such a manner as to leave
two-thirds of it in the possession of his own family, he
reduced the Roman people to such a condition that they could only
save themselves by submitting to slavery. The foe and conqueror
of Pompeius was himself ungrateful;
he brought war from Gaul and Germany to Rome, and he, the friend of
the populace, the champion of the commons, pitched his camp in the
Circus Flaminus, nearer to the city than Porsena's camp had been.
He did, indeed, use the cruel privileges of victory with
moderation; as was said at the time, he protected his countrymen,
and put to death no man who was not in arms. Yet what credit is
there in this? Others used their arms more cruelly, but flung them
away when glutted with blood, while he, though he soon sheathed the
sword, never laid it aside. Antonius was ungrateful to his
dictator, who he declared was rightly slain, and whose murderers he
allowed to depart to their commands in the provinces; as for his
country, after it had been torn to pieces by so many proscriptions,
invasions, and civil wars, he intended to subject it to kings, not
even of Roman birth, and to force that very state to pay tribute to
eunuchs, which had itself restored
sovereign rights, autonomy, and immunities, to the Achaeans, the
Rhodians, and the people of many other famous cities.

Stewart’s notes (4)
  1. Crassus.
  2. Pompey was married to Caesar's daughter. Cf. Virg., "Aen.," vi., 831, sq., and Lucan's beautiful verses, "Phars.," i., 114.
  3. Seneca is careful to avoid the mention of Caesar's name, which might have given offence to the emperors under whom he lived, who used the name as a title.
  4. The allusion is to Antonius's connection with Cleopatra. Cf. Virg. "Aen.," viii., 688.
17

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

The day would not be long enough for me to enumerate those
who have pushed their ingratitude so far as to ruin their native
land. It would be as vast a task to mention how often the state has
been ungrateful to its best and most devoted lovers, although it
has done no less wrong than it has suffered. It sent Camillus and
Scipio into exile; even after the death of Catiline it exiled
Cicero, destroyed his house, plundered his property, and did
everything which Catiline would have done if victorious; Rutilius
found his virtue rewarded with a hiding-place in Asia; to Cato the
Roman people refused the praetorship, and persisted in refusing the
consulship. We are ungrateful in public matters; and if every man
asks himself, you will find that there is no one who has not some
private ingratitude to complain of. Yet it is impossible that all
men should complain, unless all were deserving of complaint,
therefore all men are ungrateful. Are they ungrateful alone? nay,
they are also all covetous, all spiteful, and all cowardly,
especially those who appear daring; and, besides this, all men fawn
upon the great, and all are impious. Yet you need not be angry with
them; pardon them, for they are all mad. I do not wish to recall
you to what is not proved, or to say, "See how ungrateful is youth!
what young man, even if of innocent life, does not long for his
father's death? even if moderate in his desires, does not look
forward to it? even if dutiful, does not think about it? How few
there are who fear the death even of the best of wives, who do not
even calculate the probabilities of it. Pray, what litigant, after
having been successfully defended, retains any remembrance of so
great a benefit for more than a few days?" All agree that no one
dies without complaining. Who on his last day dares to say,

"I've lived, I've done the task which Fortune set me."

Who does not leave the world with reluctance, and with
lamentations? Yet it is the part of an ungrateful man not to be
satisfied with the past. Your days will always be few if you count
them. Reflect that length of time is not the greatest of blessings;
make the best of your time, however short it may be; even if the
day of your death be postponed, your happiness will not be
increased, for life is merely made longer, not pleasanter, by
delay. How much better is it to be thankful for the pleasures which
one has received, not to reckon up the years of others, but to set
a high value upon one's own, and score them to one's credit,
saying, "God thought me worthy of this; I am satisfied with it; he
might have given me more, but this, too, is a benefit." Let us be
grateful towards both gods and men, grateful to those who have
given us anything, and grateful even to those who have given
anything to our relatives.

18

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"You render me liable to an infinite debt of gratitude,"
says our opponent, "when you say 'even to those who have given any
thing to our relations,' so fix some limit. He who bestows a
benefit upon the son, according to you, bestows it likewise upon
the father: this is the first question I wish to raise. In the next
place I should like to have a clear definition of whether a
benefit, if it be bestowed upon your friend's father as well as
upon himself, is bestowed also upon his brother? or upon his uncle?
or his grandfather? or his wife and his father-in-law? tell me
where I am to stop, how far I am to follow out the pedigree of the
family?"

Seneca. If I cultivate your land, I bestow a benefit upon you; if I
extinguish your house when burning, or prop it so as to save it
from falling, I shall bestow a benefit upon you; if I heal your
slave, I shall charge it to you; if I save your son's life, will
you not thereby receive a benefit from me?

19

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

The Adversary. Your instances are not to the purpose, for he
who cultivates my land, does not benefit the land, but me; he who
props my house so that it does not fall, does this service to me,
for the house itself is without feeling, and as it has none, it is
I who am indebted to him; and he who cultivates my land does so
because he wishes to oblige me, not to oblige the land. I should
say the same of a slave; he is a chattel owned by me; he is saved
for my advantage, therefore I am indebted for him. My son is
himself capable of receiving a benefit; so it is he who receives
it; I am gratified at a benefit which comes so near to myself, but
am not laid under any obligation.

Se. Still I should like you, who say that you are under no
obligation, to answer me this. The good health, the happiness, and
the inheritance of a son are connected with his father; his father
will be more happy if he keeps his son safe, and more unhappy if he
loses him. What follows, then? when a man is made happier by me and
is freed from the greatest danger of unhappiness, does he not
receive a benefit?

Ad. No, because there are some things which are bestowed upon
others, and yet flow from them so as to reach ourselves; yet we
must ask the person upon whom it was bestowed for repayment; as for
example, money must be sought from the man to whom it was lent,
although it may, by some means, have come into my hands. There is
no benefit whose advantages do not extend to the receiver's nearest
friends, and sometimes even to those less intimately connected with
him; yet we do not enquire whither the benefit has proceeded from
him to whom it was first given, but where it was first placed. You
must demand repayment from the defendant himself personally.

Se. Well, but I pray you, do you not say, "you have preserved my
son for me; had he perished, I could not have survived him?" Do you
not owe a benefit for the life of one whose safety you value above
your own? Moreover, should I save your son's life, you would fall
down before my knees, and would pay vows to heaven as though you
yourself had been saved; you would say, "It makes no difference
whether you have saved mine or me; you have saved us both, yet me
more than him." Why do you say this, if you do not receive a
benefit?

Ad. Because, if my son were to contract a loan, I should pay his
creditor, yet I should not, therefore, be indebted to him; or if my
son were taken in adultery, I should blush, yet I should not,
therefore, be an adulterer. I say that I am under an obligation to
you for saving my son, not because I really am, but because I am
willing to constitute myself your debtor of my own free will. On
the other hand I have derived from his safety the greatest possible
pleasure and advantage, and I have escaped that most dreadful blow,
the loss of my child. True, but we are not now discussing whether
you have done me any good or not, but whether you have bestowed a
benefit upon me; for animals, stones, and herbs can do one good,
but do not bestow benefits, which can only be given by one who
wishes well to the receiver. Now you do not wish well to the
father, but only to the son; and sometimes you do not even know the
father. So when you have said, "Have I not bestowed a benefit upon
the father by saving the son?" you ought to meet this with, "Have
I, then, bestowed a benefit upon a father whom I do not know, whom
I never thought of?" And what will you say when, as is sometimes the
case, you hate the father, and yet save his son? Can you be thought
to have bestowed a benefit upon one whom you hated most bitterly
while you were bestowing it?

However, if I were to lay aside the bickering of dialogue, and
answer you as a lawyer, I should say that you ought to consider the
intention of the giver, you must regard his benefit as bestowed
upon the person upon whom he meant to bestow it. If he did it in
honour of the father, then the father received the benefit; if he
thought only of the son, then the father is not laid under any
obligation: by the benefit which was conferred upon the son, even
though the father derives pleasure from it. Should he, however,
have an opportunity, he will himself wish to give you something,
yet not as though he were forced to repay a debt, but rather as if
he had grounds for beginning an exchange of favours. No return for
a benefit ought to be demanded from the father of the receiver; if
he does you any kindness in return for it, he should be regarded
as, a righteous man, but not as a grateful one. For there is no end
to it; if I bestow a benefit on the receiver's father, do I
likewise bestow it upon his mother, his grandfather, his maternal
uncle, his children, relations, friends, slaves, and country?
Where, then, does a benefit begin to stop? for there follows it
this endless chain of people, to whom it is hard to assign bounds,
because they join it by degrees, and are always creeping on towards
it.

20

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

A common question is, "Two brothers are at variance. If I save
the life of one, do I confer a benefit upon the other, who will be
sorry that his hated brother did not perish?" There can be no doubt
that it is a benefit to do good to a man, even against that man's
will, just as he, who against his own will does a man good, does
not bestow a benefit upon him. "Do you," asks our adversary, "call
that by which he is displeased and hurt a benefit?" Yes; many
benefits have a harsh and forbidding appearance, such as cutting or
burning to cure disease, or confining with chains. We must not
consider whether a man is grieved at receiving a benefit, but
whether he ought to rejoice: a coin is not bad because it is
refused by a savage who is unacquainted with its proper stamp. A
man receives a benefit even though he hates what is done, provided
that it does him good, and that the giver bestowed it in order to
do him good. It makes no difference if he receives a good thing in
a bad spirit. Consider the converse of this. Suppose that a man
hates his brother, though it is to his advantage to have a brother,
and I kill this brother, this is not a benefit, though he may say
that it is, and be glad of it. Our most artful enemies are those
whom we thank for the wrongs which they do us.

"I understand; a thing which does good is a benefit, a thing which
does harm is not a benefit. Now I will suggest to you an act which
neither does good nor harm, and yet is a benefit. Suppose that I
find the corpse of some one's father in a wilderness, and bury it,
then I certainly have done him no good, for what difference could
it make to him in what manner his body decayed? Nor have I done any
good to his son, for what advantage does he gain by my act?" I will
tell you what he gains. He has by my means performed a solemn and
necessary rite; I have performed a service for his father which he
would have wished, nay, which it would have been his duty to have
performed himself. Yet this act is not a benefit, if I merely
yielded to those feelings of pity and kindliness which would make
me bury any corpse whatever, but only if I recognized this body,
and buried it, with the thought in my mind that I was doing this
service to the son; but, by merely throwing earth over a dead
stranger, I lay no one under an obligation for an act performed on
general principles of humanity.

It may be asked, "Why are you so careful in inquiring upon whom you
bestow benefits, as though some day you meant to demand repayment
of them? Some say that repayment should never be demanded; and they
give the following reasons. An unworthy man will not repay the
benefit which he has received, even if it be demanded of him, while
a worthy man will do so of his own accord. Consequently, if you
have bestowed it upon a good man, wait; do not outrage him by
asking him for it, as though of his own accord he never would repay
it. If you have bestowed it upon a bad man, suffer for it, but do
not spoil your benefit by turning it into a loan. Moreover the law,
by not authorizing you, forbids you, by implication, to demand the
repayment of a benefit." All this is nonsense. As long as I am in
no pressing need, as long as I am not forced by poverty, I will
lose my benefits rather than ask for repayment; but if the lives of
my children were at stake, if my wife were in danger, if my regard
for the welfare of my country and for my own liberty were to force
me to adopt a course which I disliked, I should overcome my
delicacy, and openly declare that I had done all that I could to
avoid the necessity of receiving help from an ungrateful man; the
necessity of obtaining repayment of one's benefit will in the end
overcome one's delicacy about asking for it. In the next place,
when I bestow a benefit upon a good man, I do so with the intention
of never demanding repayment, except in case of absolute necessity.

21

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"But," argues he, "by not authorizing you, the law forbids you
to exact repayment." There are many things which are not enforced
by any law or process, but which the conventions of society, which
are stronger than any law, compel us to observe. There is no law
forbidding us to divulge our friend's secrets; there is no law
which bids us keep faith even with an enemy; pray what law is there
which binds us to stand by what we have promised? There is none.
Nevertheless I should remonstrate with one who did not keep a
secret, and I should be indignant with one who pledged his word and
broke it. "But," he argues, "you are turning a benefit into a
loan." By no means, for I do not insist upon repayment, but only
demand it; nay, I do not even demand it, but remind my friend of
it. Even the direst need will not bring me to apply for help to one
with whom I should have to undergo a long struggle.

If there be any one so ungrateful that it is not sufficient to
remind him of his debt, I should pass him over, and think that he
did not deserve to be made grateful by force. A money-lender does
not demand repayment from his debtors if he knows they have become
bankrupt, and, to their shame, have nothing but shame left to lose;
and I, like him, should pass over those who are openly and
obstinately ungrateful, and would demand repayment only from those
who were likely to give it me, not from those from whom I should
have to extort it by force.

22

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

There are many who cannot deny that they have received a
benefit, yet cannot return it--men who are not good enough to be
termed grateful, nor yet bad enough to be termed ungrateful; but
who are dull and sluggish, backward debtors, though not defaulters.
Such men as these I should not ask for repayment, but forcibly
remind them of it, and, from a state of indifference, bring them
back to their duty. They would at once reply, "Forgive me; I did
not know, by Hercules, that you missed this, or I would have
offered it of my own accord, I beg that you will not think me
ungrateful; I remember your goodness to me." Why need I hesitate to
make such men as these better to themselves and to me? I would
prevent any one from doing wrong, if I were able; much more would I
prevent a friend, both lest he should do wrong, and lest he should
do wrong to me in particular. I bestow a second benefit upon him by
not permitting him to be ungrateful; and I should not reproach him
harshly with what I had done for him, but should speak as gently as
I could. In order to afford him an opportunity of returning my
kindness, I should refresh his remembrance of it, and ask for a
benefit; he would understand that I was asking for repayment.
Sometimes I would make use of somewhat severe language, if I had
any hope that by it he might be amended; though I would not
irritate a hopelessly ungrateful man, for fear that I might turn
him into an enemy. If we spare the ungrateful even the affront of
reminding them of their conduct, we shall render them' more
backward in returning benefits; and although some might be cured of
their evil ways, and be made into good men, if their consciences
were stung by remorse, yet we shall allow them to perish for want
of a word of warning, with which a father sometimes corrects his
son, a wife brings back to herself an erring husband, or a man
stimulates the wavering fidelity of his friend.

23

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

To awaken some men, it is only necessary to stir them, not
to strike them; in like manner, with some men, the feeling of
honour about returning a benefit is not extinct, but slumbering.
Let us rouse it. "Do not," they will say, "make the kindness you
have done me into a wrong: for it is a wrong, if you do not demand
some return from me, and so make me ungrateful. What if I do not
know what sort of repayment you wish for? if I am so occupied by
business, and my attention is so much diverted to other subjects
that I have not been able to watch for an opportunity of serving
you? Point out to me what I can do for you, what you wish me to do.
Why do you despair, before making a trial of me? Why are you in
such haste to lose both your benefit and your friend? How can you
tell whether I do not wish, or whether I do not know how to repay
you: whether it be in intention or in opportunity that I am
wanting? Make a trial of me." I would therefore remind him of what
I had done, without bitterness, not in public, or in a reproachful
manner, but so that he may think that he himself has remembered it
rather than that it has been recalled to him.

24

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

One of Julius Caesar's veterans was once pleading before him
against his neighbours, and the cause was going against him. "Do
you remember, general," said he, "that in Spain you dislocated your
ankle near the river Sucro?" When Caesar said
that he remembered it, he continued, "Do you remember that when,
during the excessive heat, you wished to rest under a tree which
afforded very little shade, as the ground in which that solitary
tree grew was rough and rocky, one of your comrades spread his
cloak under you?" Caesar answered, "Of course, I remember; indeed,
I was perishing with thirst; and since was unable to walk to the
nearest spring, I would have crawled thither on my hands and knees,
had not my comrade, a brave and active man, brought me water in his
helmet." "Could you, then, my general, recognize that man or that
helmet?" Caesar replied that he could not remember the helmet, but
that he could remember the man well; and he added, I fancy in anger
at being led away to this old story in the midst of a judicial
enquiry, "At any rate, you are not he." "I do not blame you,
Caesar," answered the man, "for not recognizing me; for when this
took place, I was unwounded; but afterwards, at the battle of
Munda, my eye was struck out, and the bones of my skull crushed.
Nor would you recognize that helmet if you saw it, for it was split
by a Spanish sword." Caesar would not permit this man to be
troubled with lawsuits, and presented his old soldier with the
fields through which a village right of way had given rise to the
dispute.

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. Xucar
25

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

In this case, what ought he to have done? Because his
commander's memory was confused by a multitude of incidents, and
because his position as the leader of vast armies did not permit
him to notice individual soldiers, ought the man not to have asked
for a return for the benefit which he had conferred? To act as he
did is not so much to ask for a return as to take it when it lies
in a convenient position ready for us, although we have to stretch
out our hands in order to receive it. I shall therefore ask for the
return of a benefit, whenever I am either reduced to great straits,
or where by doing so I shall act to the advantage of him from whom
I ask it. Tiberius Caesar, when some one addressed him with the
words, "Do you remember . . . .?" answered, before the man could
mention any further proofs of former acquaintance, "I do not
remember what I was." Why should it not be forbidden to demand of
this man repayment of former favours? He had a motive for
forgetting them: he denied all knowledge of his friends and
comrades, and wished men only to see, to think, and to speak of him
as emperor. He regarded his old friend as an impertinent meddler.

We ought to be even more careful to choose a favorable opportunity
when we ask for a benefit to be repaid to us than when we ask for
one to be bestowed upon us. We must be temperate in our language,
so that the grateful may not take offence, or the ungrateful
pretend to do so. If we lived among wise men, it would be our duty
to wait in silence until our benefits were returned. Yet even to
wise men it would be better to give some hint of what our position
required. We ask for help even from the gods themselves, from whose
knowledge nothing is hid, although our prayers cannot alter their
intentions towards us, but can only recall them to their minds.
Homer's priest, I say, recounts even to the gods
his duteous conduct and his pious care of their altars. The second
best form of virtue is to be willing and able to take advice. A horse who is docile and prompt to obey can be guided
hither and thither by the slightest movement of the reins. Very few
men are led by their own reason: those who come next to the best
are those who return to the right path in consequence of advice;
and these we must not deprive of their guide. When our eyes are
covered they still possess sight; but it is the light of day which,
when admitted to them, summons them to perform their duty: tools
lie idle, unless the workman uses them to take part in his work.
Similarly men's minds contain a good feeling, which, however, lies
torpid, either through luxury and disuse, or through ignorance of
its duties. This we ought to render useful, and not to get into a
passion with it, and leave it in its wrong doing, but bear with it
patiently, just as schoolmasters bear patiently with the blunders
of forgetful scholars; for as by the prompting of a word or two
their memory is often recalled to the text of the speech which they
have to repeat, so men's goodwill can be brought to return kindness
by reminding them of it.

Stewart’s notes (2)
  1. Il. i. 39 sqq.
  2. Hes. Op. 291.

Sources for this text

  • Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

    L. Annaeus Seneca On Benefits, trans. Aubrey Stewart (London: George Bell & Sons, 1887)

    Public domain · Source file

    Transcription: Wikisource

On Benefits
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