Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)
"To return a thing," says our adversary, "is to hand it over
to one who can receive it. Why, if you owed some wine to any man,
and he bade you pour it into a net or a sieve, would you say that
you had returned it? or would you be willing to return it in such a
way that in the act of returning it was lost between you?" To
return is to give that which you owe back to its owner when he
wishes for it. It is not my duty to perform more than this; that he
should possess what he has received from me is a matter for further
consideration; I do not owe him the safe-keeping of his property,
but the honourable payment of my debt, and it is much better that
he should not have it, than that I should not return it to him. I
would repay my creditor, even though he would at once take what I
paid him to the market; even if he deputed an adulteress to receive
the money from me, I would pay it to her; even if he were to pour
the coins which he receives into a loose fold of his cloak, I would
pay it. It is my business to return it to him, not to keep it and
save it for him after I have returned it; I am bound to take care
of his bounty when I have received it, but not when I have returned
it to him. While it remains with me, it must be kept safe; but when
he asks for it again I must give it to him, even though it slips
out of his hands as he takes it. I will repay a good man when it is
convenient; I will repay a bad man when he asks me to do so.
"You cannot," argues our adversary, "return him a benefit of the
same kind as that which you received; for you received it from a
wise man, and you are returning it to a fool." Do I not return to
him such a benefit, as he is now able to receive? It is not my
fault if I return it to him worse than I received it, the fault
lies with him, and so, unless he regains his former wisdom, I shall
return it in such a form as he in his fallen condition is able to
receive. "But what," asks he, "if he become not only bad, but
savage and ferocious, like Apollodorus or Phalaris, would you
return even to such a man as this a benefit which you had received
from him?" I answer, Nature does not admit of so great a change in
a wise man. Men do not change from the best to the worst; even in
becoming bad, he would necessarily retain some traces of goodness;
virtue is never so utterly quenched as not to imprint on the mind
marks which no degradation can efface. If wild animals bred in
captivity escape into the woods, they still retain something of
their original tameness, and are as remote from the gentlest in the
one extreme as they are in the other from those which have always
been wild, and have never endured to be touched by man's hand. No
one who has ever applied himself to philosophy ever becomes
completely wicked; his mind becomes so deeply coloured with it,
that its tints can never be entirely spoiled and blackened. In the
next place, I ask whether this man of yours be ferocious merely in
intent, or whether he breaks out into actual outrages upon mankind?
You have instanced the tyrants Apollodorus and Phalaris; if the bad
man restrains their evil likeness within himself, why should I not
return his benefit to him, in order to set myself free from any
further dealings with him? If, however, he not only delights in
human blood, but feeds upon it; if he exercises his insatiable
cruelty in the torture of persons of all ages, and his fury is not
prompted by anger, but by a sort of delight in cruelty, if he cuts
the throats of children before the eyes of their parents; if, not
satisfied with merely killing his victims, he tortures them, and
not only burns but actually roasts them; if his castle is always
wet with freshly shed blood; then it is not enough not to return
his benefits. All connexion between me and such a man has been
broken off by his destruction of the bonds of human society. If he
had bestowed something upon me, but were to invade my native
country, he would have lost all claim to my gratitude, and it would
be counted a crime to make him any return; if he does not attack my
country, but is the scourge of his own; if he has nothing to do
with my nation, but torments and cuts to pieces his own, then in
the same manner such depravity, though it does not render him my
personal enemy, yet renders him hateful to me, and the duty which I
owe to the human race is anterior to and more important than that
which I owe to him as an individual.
trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)