Skip to content
The Stoa
Translation

On Benefits

Book IV

40 chapters

1

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

OF all the matters which we have discussed, Æbutius Liberalis,
there is none more essential, or which, as Sallust says, ought to
be stated with more care than that which is now before us: whether
the bestowal of benefits and the return of gratitude for them are
desirable objects in themselves. Some men are found who act
honourably from commercial motives, and who do not care for
unrewarded virtue, though it can confer no glory if it brings any
profit. What can be more base than for a man to consider what it
costs him to be a good man, when virtue neither allures by gain nor
deters by loss, and is so far from bribing any one with hopes and
promises, that on the other hand she bids them spend money upon
herself, and often consists in voluntary gifts? We must go to her,
trampling what is merely useful under our feet: whithersoever she
may call us or send us we must go, without any regard for our
private fortunes, sometimes without sparing even our own blood, nor
must we ever refuse to obey any of her commands. "What shall I
gain," says my opponent, "if I do this bravely and gratefully?" You
will gain the doing of it--the deed itself is your gain. Nothing
beyond this is promised. If any advantage chances to accrue to you,
count it as something extra. The reward of honourable dealings lies
in themselves. If honour is to be sought after for itself, since a
benefit is honourable, it follows that because both of these are of
the same nature, their conditions must also be the same. Now it has
frequently and satisfactorily been proved, that honour ought to be
sought after for itself alone.

2

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

In this part of the subject we oppose the Epicureans, an
effeminate and dreamy sect who philosophize in their own paradise,
amongst whom virtue is the handmaid of pleasures, obeys them, is
subject to them, and regards them as superior to itself. You say,
"there is no pleasure without virtue." But wherefore is it superior
to virtue? Do you imagine that the matter in dispute between them
is merely one of precedence? Nay, it is virtue itself and its
powers which are in question. It cannot be virtue if it can follow;
the place of virtue is first, she ought to lead, to command, to
stand in the highest rank; you bid her look for a cue to follow.
"What," asks our opponent, "does that matter to you? I also declare
that happiness is impossible without virtue. Without virtue I
disapprove of and condemn the very pleasures which I pursue, and to
which I have surrendered myself. The only matter in dispute is
this, whether virtue be the cause of the highest good, or whether
it be itself the highest good." Do you suppose, though this be the
only point in question, that it is a mere matter of precedence? It
is a confusion and obvious blindness to prefer the last to the
first. I am not angry at virtue being placed below pleasure, but at
her being mixed up at all with pleasure, which she despises, whose
enemy she is, and from which she separates herself as far as
possible, being more at home with labour and sorrow, which are
manly troubles, than with your womanish good things.

3

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

It was necessary to insert this argument, my Liberalis,
because it is the part of virtue to bestow those benefits which we
are now discussing, and it is most disgraceful to bestow benefits
for any other purpose than that they should be free gifts. If we
give with the hope of receiving a return, we should give to the
richest men, not to the most deserving: whereas we prefer a
virtuous poor man to an unmannerly rich one. That is not a benefit,
which takes into consideration the fortune of the receiver.
Moreover, if our only motive for benefiting others was our own
advantage, those who could most easily distribute benefits, such as
rich and powerful men, or kings, and persons who do not stand in
need of the help of others, ought never to do so at all; the gods
would not bestow upon us the countless blessings which they pour
upon us unceasingly by night and by day, for their own nature
suffices them in all respects, and renders them complete, safe, and
beyond the reach of harm; they will, therefore, never bestow a
benefit upon any one, if self and self interest be the only cause
for the bestowal of benefits. To take thought, not where your
benefit will be best bestowed, but where it may be most profitably
placed at interest, from whence you will most easily get it back,
is not bestowal of benefits, but usury. Now the gods have nothing
to do with usury; it follows, therefore, that they cannot be
liberal; for if the only reason for giving is the advantage of the
giver, since God cannot hope to receive any advantages from us,
there is no cause why God should give anything.

4

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

I know what answer may be made to this. "True; therefore God
does not bestow benefits, but, free from care and unmindful of us,
He turns away from our world and either does something else, or
else does nothing, which Epicurus thought the greatest possible
happiness, and He is not affected either by benefits or by
injuries." The man who says this cannot surely hear the voices of
worshippers, and of those who all around him are raising their
hands to heaven and praying for the success both of their private
affairs and those of the state; which certainly would not be the
case, all men would not agree in this madness of appealing to deaf
and helpless gods, unless we knew that their benefits are sometimes
bestowed upon us unasked, sometimes in answer to our prayers, and
that they give us both great and seasonable gifts, which shield us
from the most terrible dangers. Who is there so poor, so uncared
for, born to sorrow by so unkind a fate, as never to have felt the
vast generosity of the Gods? Look even at those who complain and
are discontented with their lot; you will find that they are not
altogether without a share in the bounty of heaven, that there is
no one upon whom something has not been shed from that most
gracious fount. Is the gift which is bestowed upon all alike, at
their birth, not enough? However unequally the blessings of after
life may be dealt out to us, did nature give us too little when she
gave us herself?

5

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

It is said, "God does not bestow benefits." Whence, then, comes
all that you possess, that you give or refuse to give, that you
hoard or steal? whence come these innumerable delights of our eyes,
our ears, and our minds? whence the plenty which provides us even
with luxury--for it is not our bare necessities alone against which
provision is made; we are loved so much as actually to be pampered--
whence so many trees bearing various fruits, so many wholesome
herbs, so many different sorts of food distributed throughout the
year, so that even the slothful may find sustenance in the chance
produce of the earth? Then, too, whence come the living creatures
of all kinds, some inhabiting the dry land, others the waters,
others alighting from the sky, that every part of nature may pay us
some tribute; the rivers which encircle our meadows with most
beauteous bends, the others which afford a passage to merchant
fleets as they flow on, wide and navigable, some of which in summer
time are subject to extraordinary overflowings in order that lands
lying parched under a glowing sun may suddenly be watered by the
rush of a midsummer torrent?

What of the fountains of medicinal waters? What of the bursting
forth of warm waters upon the seashore itself? Shall I

"Tell of the seas round Italy that flow,
Which laves her shore above, and which below;
Or of her lakes, unrivalled Larius, thee,
Or thee, Benacus, roaring like a sea?"

6

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

If any one gave you a few acres, you would say that you had
received a benefit; can you deny that the boundless extent of the
earth is a benefit? If any one gave you money, and filled your
chest, since you think that so important, you would call that a
benefit. God has buried countless mines in the earth, has poured
out from the earth countless rivers, rolling sands of gold; He has
concealed in every place huge masses of silver, copper and iron,
and has bestowed upon you the means of discovering them, placing
upon the surface of the earth signs of the treasures hidden below;
and yet do you say that you have received no benefit? If a house
were given you, bright with marble, its roof beautifully painted
with colours and gilding, you would call it no small benefit. God
has built for you a huge mansion that fears no fire or ruin, in
which you see no flimsy veneers, thinner than the very saw with
which they are cut, but vast blocks of most precious stone, all
composed of those various and different substances whose paltriest
fragments you admire so much; he has built a roof which glitters in
one fashion by day, and in another by night; and yet do you say
that you have received no benefit? When you so greatly prize what
you possess, do you act the part of an ungrateful man, and think
that there is no one to whom you are indebted for them? Whence
comes the breath which you draw? the light by which you arrange and
perform all the actions of your life? the blood by whose
circulation your vital warmth is maintained? those meats which
excite your palate by their delicate flavour after your hunger is
appeased? those provocatives which rouse you when wearied with
pleasure? that repose in which you are rotting and mouldering? Will
you not, if you are grateful, say--

"'Tis to a god that this repose I owe,
For him I worship, as a god below.
Oft on his altar shall my firstlings bleed,
See, by his bounty here with rustic reed
I play the airs I love the livelong day,
The while my oxen round about me stray."

The true God is he who has placed, not a few oxen, but all the
herds on their pastures throughout the world; who furnishes food to
the flocks wherever they wander; who has ordained the alternation
of summer and winter pasturage, and has taught us not merely to
play upon a reed, and to reduce to some order a rustic and artless
song, but who has invented so many arts and varieties of voice, so
many notes to make music, some with our own breath, some with
instruments. You cannot call our inventions our own any more than
you call our growth our own, or the various bodily functions which
correspond to each stage of our lives; at one time comes the loss
of childhood's teeth, at another, when our age is advancing and
growing into robuster manhood, puberty and the last wisdom-tooth
marks the end of our youth. "We have implanted in us the seeds of
all ages, of all arts, and God our master brings forth our
intellects from obscurity.

7

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"Nature," says my opponent, "gives me all this." Do you not
perceive when you say this that you merely speak of God under
another name? for what is nature but God and divine reason, which
pervades the universe and all its parts? You may address the author
of our world by as many different titles as you please; you may
rightly call him Jupiter, Best and Greatest, and the Thunderer, or
the Stayer, so called, not because, as the historians tell us, he
stayed the flight of the Roman army in answer to the prayer of
Romulus, but because all things continue in their stay through his
goodness. If you were to call this same personage Fate, you would
not lie; for since fate is nothing more than a connected chain of
causes, he is the first cause of all upon which all the rest
depend. You will also be right in applying to him any names that
you please which express supernatural strength and power: he may
have as many titles as he has attributes.

8

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Our school regards him as Father Liber, and Hercules, and
Mercurius: he is Father Liber because he is the parent of all, who
first discovered the power of seed, and our being led by pleasure
to plant it; he is Hercules, because his might is unconquered, and
when it is wearied after completing its labours, will retire into
fire; he is Mercurius, because in him is reasoning, and numbers,
and system, and knowledge. Whither-soever you turn yourself you
will see him meeting you: nothing is void of him, he himself fills
his own work. Therefore, most ungrateful of mortals, it is in vain
that you declare yourself indebted, not to God, but to nature,
because there can be no God without nature, nor any nature without
God; they are both the same thing, differing only in their
functions. If you were to say that you owe to Annaeus or to Lucius
what you received from Seneca, you would not change your creditor,
but only his name, because he remains the same man whether you use
his first, second, or third name. So whether you speak of nature,
fate, or fortune, these are all names of the same God, using his
power in different ways. So likewise justice, honesty, discretion,
courage, frugality, are all the good qualities of one and the same
mind; if you are pleased with any one of these, you are pleased
with that mind.

9

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

However, not to drift aside into a distinct controversy, God
bestows upon us very many and very great benefits without hope of
receiving any return; since he does not require any offering from
us, and we are not capable of bestowing anything upon him:
wherefore, a benefit is desirable in itself. In it the advantage of
the receiver is all that is taken into consideration: we study this
without regarding our own interests. "Yet," argues our opponent,
"you say that we ought to choose with care the persons upon whom we
bestow benefits, because neither do husbandmen sow seed in the
sand: now if this be true, we follow our own interest in bestowing
benefits, just as much as in ploughing and sowing: for sowing is
not desirable in itself. Besides this you inquire where and how you
ought to bestow a benefit, which would not need to be done if the
bestowal of a benefit was desirable in itself: because in whatever
place and whatever manner it might be bestowed, it still would be
a benefit." We seek to do honourable acts, solely because they are
honourable; yet even though we need think of nothing else, we
consider to whom we shall do them, and when, and how; for in these
points the act has its being. In like manner, when I choose upon
whom I shall bestow a benefit, and when I aim at making it a
benefit; because if it were bestowed upon a base person, it could
neither be a benefit nor an honourable action.

10

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

To restore what has been entrusted to one is desirable in
itself; yet I shall not always restore it, nor shall I do so in any
place or at any time you please. Sometimes it makes no difference
whether I deny that I have received it, or return it openly. I
shall consider the interests of the person to whom I am to return
it, and shall deny that I have received a deposit, which would
injure him if returned. I shall act in the same manner in bestowing
a benefit: I shall consider when to give it, to whom, in what
manner, and on what grounds. Nothing ought to be done without a
reason: a benefit is not truly so, if it be bestowed without a
reason, since reason accompanies all honorable action. How often do
we hear men reproaching themselves for some thoughtless gift, and
saying, "I had rather have thrown it away than have given it to
him!" What is thoughtlessly given away is lost in the most
discreditable manner, and it is much worse to have bestowed a
benefit badly than to have received no return for it; that we
receive no return is the fault of another; that we did not choose
upon whom we should bestow it, is our own. In choosing a fit
person, I shall not, as you expect, pay the least attention to
whether I am likely to get any return from him, for I choose one
who will be grateful, not one who will return my goodness, and it
often happens that the man who makes no return is grateful, while
he who returns a benefit is ungrateful for it. I value men by their
hearts alone, and, therefore, I shall pass over a rich man if he be
unworthy, and give to a good man though he be poor; for he will be
grateful however destitute he may be, since whatever he may lose,
his heart will still be left him.

11

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

I do not fish for gain, for pleasure, or for credit, by
bestowing benefits: satisfied in doing so with pleasing one man
alone, I shall give in order to do my duty. Duty, however, leaves
one some choice; do you ask me, how I am to choose? I shall choose
an honest, plain, man, with a good memory, and grateful for
kindness; one who keeps his hands off other men's goods, yet does
not greedily hold to his own, and who is kind to others; when I
have chosen such a man, I shall have acted to my mind, although
fortune may have bestowed upon him no means of returning my
kindness. If my own advantage and mean calculation made me liberal,
if I did no one any service except in order that he might in turn
do a service to me, I should never bestow a benefit upon one who
was setting out for distant and foreign countries, never to return;
I should not bestow a benefit upon one who was so ill as to be past
hope of recovery, nor should I do so when I myself was failing,
because I should not live long enough to receive any return. Yet,
that you may know that to do good is desirable in itself, we afford
help to strangers who put into our harbour only to leave it
straightway; we give a ship and fit it out for a shipwrecked
stranger to sail back in to his own country. He leaves us hardly
knowing who it was who saved him, and, as he will never return to
our presence, he hands over his debt of gratitude to the gods, and
beseeches them to fulfil it for him: in the meanwhile we rejoice in
the barren knowledge that we have done a good action. What? when we
stand upon the extreme verge of life, and make our wills, do we not
assign to others benefits from which we ourselves shall receive no
advantage? How much time we waste, how long we consider in secret
how much property we are to leave, and to whom! What then? does it
make any difference to us to whom we leave our property, seeing
that we cannot expect any return from any one? Yet we never give
anything with more care, we never take such pains in deciding upon
our verdict, as when, without any views of personal advantage, we
think only of what is honourable, for we are bad judges of our duty
as long as our view of it is distorted by hope and fear, and that
most indolent of vices, pleasure: but when death has shut off all
these, and brought us as incorrupt judges to pronounce sentence, we
seek for the most worthy men to leave our property to, and we never
take more scrupulous care than in deciding what is to be done with
what does not concern us. Yet, by Hercules, then there steals over
us a great satisfaction as we think, "I shall make this man richer,
and by bestowing wealth upon that man I shall add lustre to his
high position." Indeed, if we never give without expecting some
return, we must all die without making our wills.

12

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

It may be said, "You define a benefit as a loan which cannot
be repaid: now a loan is not a desirable thing in itself." When we
speak of a loan, we make use of a figure, or comparison, just as we
speak of law as; the standard of right and wrong, although a
standard is not a thing to be desired for its own sake. I have
adopted this phrase in order to illustrate my subject: when I speak
of a loan, I must be understood to mean something resembling a
loan. Do you wish to know how it differs from one? I add the words
"which cannot be repaid," whereas every loan both can and ought to
be repaid. It is so far from being right to bestow a benefit for
one's own advantage, that often, as I have explained, it is one's
duty to bestow it when it involves one's own loss and risk: for
instance, if I assist a man when beset by robbers, so that he gets
away from them safely, or help some victim of power, and bring upon
myself the party spite of a body of influential men, very, probably
incurring myself the same disgrace from which I saved him, although
I might have taken the other side, and looked on with safety at
struggles with which I have nothing to do: if I were to give bail
for one who has been condemned, and when my friend's goods were
advertised for sale I were to give a bond to the effect that I
would make restitution to the creditors, if, in order to save a
proscribed person I myself run the risk of being proscribed. No
one, when about to buy a villa at Tusculum or Tibur, for a summer
retreat, because of the health of the locality, considers how many
years' purchase he gives for it; this must be looked to by the man
who makes a profit by it. The same is true with benefits; when you
ask what return I get for them, I answer, the consciousness of a
good action. "What return does one get for benefits?" Pray tell me
what return one gets for righteousness, innocence, magnanimity,
chastity, temperance? If you wish for anything beyond these
virtues, you do not wish for the virtues themselves. For what does
the order of the universe bring round the seasons? for what does
the sun make the day now longer and now shorter? all these things
are benefits, for they take place for our good. As it is the duty
of the universe to maintain the round of the seasons, as it is the
duty of the sun to vary the points of his rising and setting, and
to do all these things by which we profit, without any reward, so
is it the duty of man, amongst other things, to bestow benefits.
Wherefore then does he give? He gives for fear that he should not
give, lest he might lose an opportunity of doing a good action.

13

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

You Epicureans take pleasure in making a study of dull
torpidity, in seeking for a repose which differs little from sound
sleep, in lurking beneath the thickest shade, in amusing with the
feeblest possible trains of thought that sluggish condition of your
languid minds which you term tranquil contemplation, and in
stuffing with food and drink, in the recesses of your gardens, your
bodies which are pallid with want of exercise; we Stoics, on the
other hand, take pleasure in bestowing benefits, even though they
cost us labour, provided that they lighten the labours of others;
though they lead us into danger, provided that they save others,
though they straiten our means, if they alleviate the poverty and
distresses of others. What difference does it make to me whether I
receive benefits or not? even if I receive them, it is still my
duty to bestow them. A benefit has in view the advantage of him
upon whom we bestow it, not our own; otherwise we merely bestow it
upon ourselves. Many things, therefore, which are of the greatest
possible use to others lose all claim to gratitude by being paid
for. Merchants are of use to cities, physicians to invalids,
dealers to slaves; yet all these have no claim to the gratitude of
those whom they benefit, because they seek their own advantage
through that of others. That which is bestowed with a view to
profit is not a benefit. "I will give this in order that I may get
a return for it" is the language of a broker.

14

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

I should not call a woman modest, if she rebuffed her lover in
order to increase his passion, or because she feared the law or her
husband; as Ovid says:

"She that denies, because she does not dare
To yield, in spirit grants her lover's prayer."

Indeed, the woman who owes her chastity, not to her own virtue, but
to fear, may rightly be classed as a sinner. In the same manner, he
who merely gave in order that he might receive, cannot be said to
have given. Pray, do we bestow benefits upon animals when we feed
them for our use or for our table? do we bestow benefits upon trees
when we tend them that they may not suffer from drought or from
hardness of ground? No one is moved by righteousness and goodness
of heart to cultivate an estate, or to do any act in which the
reward is something apart from the act itself; but he is moved to
bestow benefits, not by low and grasping motives, but by a kind and
generous mind, which even after it has given is willing to give
again, to renew its former bounties by fresh ones, which thinks
only of how much good it can do the man to whom it gives; whereas
to do any one a service because it is our interest to do so is a
mean action, which deserves no praise, no credit. What grandeur is
there in loving oneself, sparing oneself, gaining profit for
oneself? The true love of giving calls us away from all this,
forcibly leads us to put up with loss, and foregoes its own
interest, deriving its greatest pleasure from the mere act of doing
good.

15

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Can we doubt that the converse of a benefit is an injury? As
the infliction of injuries is a thing to be avoided, so is the
bestowal of benefits to be desired for its own sake. In the former,
the disgrace of crime outweighs all the advantages which incite us
to commit it; while we are urged to the latter course by the
appearance of honour, in itself a powerful incentive to action,
which attends it.

I should not lie if I were to affirm that every one takes pleasure
in the benefits which he has bestowed, that everyone loves best to
see the man whom he has most largely benefited. Who does not thinks
that to have bestowed one benefit is a reason for bestowing a
second? and would this be so, if the act of giving did not itself
give us pleasure? How often you may hear a man say, "I cannot bear
to desert one whose life I have preserved, whom I have saved from
danger. True, he asks me to plead his cause against men of great
influence. I do not wish to do so, yet what am I to do? I have
already helped him once, nay twice." Do you not perceive how very
powerful this instinct must be, if it leads us to bestow benefits
first because it is right to do so, and afterwards because we have
already bestowed somewhat? Though at the outset a man may have had
no claim upon us, we yet continue to give to him because we have
already given to him. So untrue is it that we are urged to bestow
benefits by our own interest, that even when our benefits prove
failures we continue to nurse them and encourage them out of sheer
love of benefiting, which has a natural weakness even for what has
been ill-bestowed, like that which we feel for our vicious
children.

16

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

These same adversaries of ours admit that they are grateful,
yet not because it is honourable, but because it is profitable to
be so. This can be proved to be untrue all the more easily, because
it can be established by the same arguments by which we have
established that to bestow a benefit is desirable for its own sake.
All our arguments start from this settled point, that honour is
pursued for no reason except because it is honour. Now, who will
venture to raise the question whether it be honourable to be
grateful? who does not loathe the ungrateful man, useless as he is
even to himself? How do you feel when any one is spoken of as being
ungrateful for great benefits conferred upon him by a friend? Is it
as though he had done something base, or had merely neglected to do
something useful and likely to be profitable to himself? I imagine
that you think him a bad man, and one who deserves punishment, not
one who needs a guardian; and this would not be the case, unless
gratitude were desirable in itself and honourable. Other qualities,
it may be, manifest their importance less clearly, and require an
explanation to prove whether they be honourable or no; this is
openly proved to be so in the sight of all, and is too beautiful
for anything to obscure or dim its glory. What is more
praiseworthy, upon what are all men more universally agreed, than
to return gratitude for good offices?

17

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Pray tell me, what is it that urges us to do so? Is it
profit? Why, unless a man despises profit, he is not grateful. Is
it ambition? why, what is there to boast of in having paid what you
owe? Is it fear? The ungrateful man feels none, for against this
one crime we have provided no law, as though nature had taken
sufficient precautions against it. Just as there is no law which
bids parents love and indulge their children, seeing that it is
superfluous to force us into the path which we naturally take, just
as no one needs to be urged to love himself, since self-love begins
to act upon him as soon as he is born, so there is no law bidding
us to seek that which is honourable in itself; for such things
please us by their very nature, and so attractive is virtue that
the disposition even of bad men leads them to approve of good
rather than of evil. Who is there who does not wish to appear
beneficent, who does not even when steeped in crime and wrong-doing
strive after the appearance of goodness, does not put some show of
justice upon even his most intemperate acts, and endeavour to seem
to have conferred a benefit even upon those whom he has injured?
Consequently, men allow themselves to be thanked by those whom they
have ruined, and pretend to be good and generous, because they
cannot prove themselves so; and this they never would do were it
not that a love of honour for its own sake forces them to seek a
reputation quite at variance with their real character, and to
conceal their baseness, a quality whose fruits we covet, though we
regard it itself with dislike and shame. No one has ever so far
rebelled against the laws of nature and put off human feeling as to
act basely for mere amusement. Ask any of those who live by robbery
whether he would not rather obtain what he steals and plunders by
honest means; the man whose trade is highway robbery and the murder
of travellers would rather find his booty than take it by force;
you will find no one who would not prefer to enjoy the fruits of
wickedness without acting wickedly. Nature bestows upon us all this
immense advantage, that the light of virtue shines into the minds
of all alike; even those who do not follow her, behold her.

18

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

A proof that gratitude is desirable for itself lies in the
fact that ingratitude is to be avoided for itself, because no vice
more powerfully rends asunder and destroys the union of the human
race. To what do we trust for safety, if not in mutual good offices
one to another? It is by the interchange of benefits alone that we
gain some measure of protection for our lives, and of safety
against sudden disasters. Taken singly, what should we be? a prey
and quarry for wild beasts, a luscious and easy banquet; for while
all other animals have sufficient strength to protect themselves,
and those which are born to a wandering solitary life are armed,
man is covered by a soft skin, has no powerful teeth or claws with
which to terrify other creatures, but weak and naked by himself is
made strong by union.

God has bestowed upon him two gifts, reason and union, which raise
him from weakness to the highest power; and so he, who if taken
alone would be inferior to every other creature, possesses supreme
dominion. Union has given him sovereignty over all animals; union
has enabled a being born upon the earth to assume power over a
foreign element, and bids him be lord of the sea also; it is union
which has checked the inroads of disease, provided supports for our
old age, and given us relief from pain; it is union which makes us
strong, and to which we look for protection against the caprices of
fortune. Take away union, and you will rend asunder the association
by which the human race preserves its existence; yet you will take
it away if you succeed in proving that ingratitude is not to be
avoided for itself, but because something is to be feared for it;
for how many are there who can with safety be ungrateful? In fine,
I call every man ungrateful who is merely made grateful by fear.

19

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

No sane man fears the gods; for it is madness to fear what is
beneficial, and no man loves those whom he fears. You, Epicurus,
ended by making God unarmed; you stripped him of all weapons, of
all power, and, lest anyone should fear him, you banished him out
of the world. There is no reason why you should fear this being,
cut off as he is, and separated from the sight and touch of mortals
by a vast and impassable wall; he has no power either of rewarding
or of injuring us; he dwells alone half-way between our heaven and
that of another world, without the society either of animals, of
men, or of matter, avoiding the crash of worlds as they fall in
ruins above and around him, but neither hearing our prayers nor
interested in us. Yet you wish to seem to worship this being just
as a father, with a mind, I suppose, full of gratitude; or, if you
do not wish to seem grateful, why should you worship him, since you
have received no benefit from him, but have been put together
entirely at random and by chance by those atoms and mites of yours?
"I worship him," you answer, "because of his glorious majesty and
his unique nature." Granting that you do this, you clearly do it
without the attraction of any reward, or any hope; there is
therefore something which is desirable for itself, whose own worth
attracts you, that is, honour. Now what is more honourable than
gratitude? the means of practising this virtue are as extensive as
life itself.

20

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"Yet," argues he, "there is also a certain amount of profit
inherent in this virtue." In what virtue is there not? But that
which we speak of as desirable for itself is such, that although it
may possess some attendant advantages, yet it would be desirable
even if stripped of all these. It is profitable to be grateful; yet
I will be grateful even though it harm me. What is the aim of the
grateful man? is it that his gratitude may win for him more friends
and more benefits? What then? If a man is likely to meet with
affronts by showing his gratitude, if he knows that far from
gaining anything by it, he must lose much even of what he has
already acquired, will he not cheerfully act to his own
disadvantage? That man is ungrateful who, in returning a kindness,
looks forward to a second gift--who hopes while he repays. I call
him ungrateful who sits at the bedside of a sick man because he is
about to make a will, when he is at leisure to think of
inheritances and legacies. Though he may do everything which a good
and dutiful friend ought to do, yet, if any hope of gain be
floating in his mind, he is a mere legacy-hunter, and is angling
for an inheritance. Like the birds which feed upon carcases, which
come close to animals weakened by disease, and watch till they
fall, so these men are attracted by death and hover around a
corpse.

21

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

A grateful mind is attracted only by a sense of the beauty of
its purpose. Do you wish to know this to be so, and that it is not
bribed by ideas of profit? There are two classes of grateful men: a
man is called grateful who has made some return for what he
received; this man may very possibly display himself in this
character, he has something to boast of, to refer to. We also call
a man grateful who receives a benefit with goodwill, and owes it to
his benefactor with goodwill; yet this man's gratitude lies
concealed within his own mind. What profit can accrue to him from
this latent feeling? yet this man, even though he is not able to do
anything more than this, is grateful; he loves his benefactor, he
feels his debt to him, he longs to repay his kindness; whatever
else you may find wanting, there is nothing wanting in the man. He
is like a workman who has not the tools necessary for the practice
of his craft, or like a trained singer whose voice cannot be heard
through the noise of those who interrupt him. I wish to repay a
kindness: after this there still remains something for me to do,
not in order that I may become grateful, but that I may discharge
my debt; for, in many cases, he who returns a kindness is
ungrateful for it, and he who does not return it is grateful. Like
all other virtues, the whole value of gratitude lies in the spirit
in which it is done; so, if this man's purpose be loyal, any
shortcomings on his part are due not to himself, but to fortune. A
man who is silent may, nevertheless, be eloquent; his hands may be
folded or even bound, and he may yet be strong; just as a pilot is
a pilot even when upon dry land, because his knowledge is complete,
and there is nothing wanting to it, though there may be obstacles
which prevent his making use of it. In the same way, a man is
grateful who only wishes to be so, and who has no one but himself
who can bear witness to his frame of mind. I will go even further
than this: a man sometimes is grateful when he appears to be
ungrateful, when ill-judging report has declared him to be so. Such
a man can look to nothing but his own conscience, which can please
him even when overwhelmed by calumny, which contradicts the mob and
common rumour, relies only upon itself, and though it beholds a
vast crowd of the other way of thinking opposed to it, does not
count heads, but wins by its own vote alone. Should it see its own
good faith meet with the punishment due to treachery, it will not
descend from its pedestal, and will remain superior to its
punishment. "I have," it says, "what I wished, what I strove for. I
do not regret it, nor shall I do so; nor shall fortune, however
unjust she may be, ever hear me say, 'What did I want? What now is
the use of having meant well?'" A good conscience is of value on
the rack, or in the fire; though fire be applied to each of our
limbs, gradually encircle our living bodies, and burst our heart,
yet if our heart be filled with a good conscience, it will rejoice
in the fire which will make its good faith shine before the world.

22

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Now let that question also which has been already stated be
again brought forward; Why is it that we should wish to be grateful
when we are dying, that we should carefully weigh the various
services rendered us by different individuals, and carefully review
our whole life, that we may not seem to have forgotten any
kindness? Nothing then remains for us to hope for; yet when on the
very threshold, we wish to depart from human life as full of
gratitude as possible. There is in truth an immense reward for this
thing merely in doing it, and what is honourable has great power to
attract men's minds, which are overwhelmed by its beauty and
carried off their balance, enchanted by its brilliancy and
splendour. "Yet," argues our adversary, "from it many advantages
take their rise, and good men obtain a safer life and love, and the
good opinion of the better class, while their days are spent in
greater security when accompanied by innocence and gratitude."

Indeed, nature would have been most unjust had she rendered this
great blessing miserable, uncertain, and fruitless. But consider
this point, whether you would make your way to that virtue, to
which it is generally safe and easy to attain, even though the path
lay over rocks and precipices, and were beset with fierce beasts
and venomous serpents. A virtue is none the less to be desired for
its own sake, because it has some adventitious profit connected
with it: indeed, in most cases the noblest virtues are accompanied
by many extraneous advantages, but it is the virtues that lead the
way, and these merely follow in their train.

23

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Can we doubt that the climate of this abode of the human
race is regulated by the motion of the sun and moon in their
orbits? that our bodies are sustained, the hard earth loosened,
excessive moisture reduced, and the surly bonds of winter broken by
the heat of the one, and that crops are brought to ripeness by the
effectual all-pervading warmth of the other? that the fertility of
the human race corresponds to the courses of the moon? that the sun
by its revolution marks out the year, and that the moon, moving in
a smaller orbit, marks out the months? Yet, setting aside all this,
would not the sun be a sight worthy to be contemplated and
worshipped, if he did no more than rise and set? would not the moon
be worth looking at, even if it passed uselessly through the
heavens? Whose attention is not arrested by the universe itself,
when by night it pours forth its fires and glitters with
innumerable stars? Who, while he admires them, thinks of their
being of use to him? Look at that great company gliding over our
heads, how they conceal their swift motion under the semblance of a
fixed and immovable work. How much takes place in that night which
you make use of merely to mark and count your days! What a mass of
events is being prepared in that silence! What a chain of destiny
their unerring path is forming! Those which you imagine to be
merely strewn about for ornament are really one and all at work.
Nor is there any ground for your belief that only seven stars
revolve, and that the rest remain still: we understand the orbits
of a few, but countless divinities, further removed from our sight,
come and go; while the greater part of those whom our sight reaches
move in a mysterious manner and by an unknown path.

24

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

What then? would you not be captivated by the sight of such a
stupendous work, even though it did not cover you, protect you,
cherish you, bring you into existence and penetrate you with its
spirit? Though these heavenly bodies are of the very first
importance to us, and are, indeed, essential to our life, yet we
can think of nothing but their glorious majesty, and similarly all
virtue, especially that of gratitude, though it confers great
advantages upon us, does not wish to be loved for that reason; it
has something more in it than this, and he who merely reckons it
among useful things does not perfectly comprehend it. A man, you
say, is grateful because it is to his advantage to be so. If this
be the case, then his advantage will be the measure of his
gratitude. Virtue will not admit a covetous lover; men must
approach her with open purse. The ungrateful man thinks, "I did
wish to be grateful, but I fear the expense and danger and insults
to which I should expose myself: I will rather consult my own
interest." Men cannot be rendered grateful and ungrateful by the
same line of reasoning: their actions are as distinct as their
purposes. The one is ungrateful, although it is wrong, because it
is his interest; the other is grateful, although it is not his
interest, because it is right.

25

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

It is our aim to live in harmony with the scheme of the
universe, and to follow the example of the gods. Yet in all their
acts the gods have no object in view other than the act itself,
unless you suppose that they obtain a reward for their work in the
smoke of burnt sacrifices and the scent of incense. See what great
things they do every day, how much they divide amongst us, with how
great crops they fill the earth, how they move the seas with
convenient winds to carry us to all shores, how by the fall of
sudden showers they soften the ground, renew the dried-up springs
of fountains, and call them into new life by unseen supplies of
water. All this they do without reward, without any advantage
accruing to themselves. Let our line of conduct, if it would not
depart from its model, preserve this direction, and let us not act
honourably because we are hired to do so. We ought to feel ashamed
that any benefit should have a price: we pay nothing for the gods.

26

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"If," our adversary may say, "you wish to imitate the gods,
then bestow benefits upon the ungrateful as well as the grateful;
for the sun rises upon the wicked as well as the good, the seas are
open even to pirates." By this question he really asks whether a
good man would bestow a benefit upon an ungrateful person, knowing
him to be ungrateful. Allow me here to introduce a short
explanation, that we may not be taken in by a deceitful question.
Understand that according to the system of the Stoics there are two
classes of ungrateful persons. One man is ungrateful because he is
a fool; a fool is a bad man; a man who is bad possesses every vice:
therefore he is ungrateful. In the same way we speak of all bad men
as dissolute, avaricious, luxurious, and spiteful, not because each
man has all these vices in any great or remarkable degree, but
because he might have them; they are in him, even though they be
not seen. The second form of ungrateful person is he who is
commonly meant by the term, one who is inclined by nature to this
vice. In the case of him who has the vice of ingratitude just as he
has every other, a wise man will bestow a benefit, because if he
sets aside all such men there will be no one left for him to bestow
it on. As for the ungrateful man who habitually misapplies benefits
and acts so by choice, he will no more bestow a benefit upon him
than he would lend money to a spendthrift, or place a deposit in
the hands of one who had already often refused to many persons to
give up the property with which they had entrusted him.

27

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

We call some men timid because they are fools: in this they
are like the bad men who are steeped in all vices without
distinction. Strictly speaking, we call those persons timid who are
alarmed even at unmeaning noises. A fool possesses all vices, but
he is not equally inclined by nature to all; one is prone to
avarice, another to luxury, and another to insolence. Those
persons, therefore, are mistaken, who ask the Stoics, "What do you
say, then? is Achilles timid? Aristides, who received a name for
justice, is he unjust? Fabius, who 'by delays retrieved the day,'
is he rash? Does Decius fear death? Is Mucius a traitor? Camillus a
betrayer?" We do not mean that all vices are inherent in all men in
the same way in which some especial ones are noticeable in certain
men, but we declare that the bad man and the fool possess all
vices; we do not even acquit them of fear when they are rash, or of
avarice when they are extravagant. Just as a man has all his
senses, yet all men have not on that account as keen a sight as
Lynceus, so a man that is a fool has not all vices in so active and
vigorous a form as some persons have spine of them, yet he has them
all. All vices exist in all of them, yet all are not prominent in
each individual. One man is naturally prone to avarice, another is
the slave of wine, a third of lust; or, if not yet enslaved by
these passions, he is so fashioned by nature that this is the
direction in which his character would probably lead him.
Therefore, to return to my original proposition, every bad man is
ungrateful, because he has the seeds of every villainy in him; but
he alone is rightly so called who is naturally inclined to this
vice. Upon such a person as this, therefore, I shall not bestow a
benefit. One who betrothed his daughter to an ill-tempered man from
whom many women had sought a divorce, would be held to have
neglected her interests; a man would be thought a bad father if he
entrusted the care of his patrimony to one who had lost his own
family estate, and it would be the act of a madman to make a will
naming as the guardian of one's son a man who had already defrauded
other wards. So will that man be said to bestow benefits as badly
as possible, who chooses ungrateful persons, in whose hands they
will perish.

28

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"The gods," it may be said, "bestow much, even upon the
ungrateful." But what they bestow they had prepared for the good,
and the bad have their share as well, because they cannot be
separated. It is better to benefit the bad as well, for the sake of
benefiting the good, than to stint the good for fear of benefiting
the bad. Therefore the gods have created all that you speak of, the
day, the sun, the alternations of winter and summer, the
transitions through spring and autumn from one extreme to the
other, showers, drinking fountains, and regularly blowing winds for
the use of all alike; they could not except individuals from the
enjoyment of them. A king bestows honours upon those who deserve
them, but he gives largesse to the undeserving as well. The thief,
the bearer of false witness, and the adulterer, alike receive the
public grant of corn, and all are placed on the register without
any examination as to character; good and bad men share alike in
all the other privileges which a man receives, because he is a
citizen, not because he is a good man. God likewise has bestowed
certain gifts upon the entire human race, from which no one is shut
out. Indeed, it could not be arranged that the wind which was fair
for good men should be foul for bad ones, while it is for the good
of all men that the seas should be open for traffic and the kingdom
of mankind be enlarged; nor could any law be appointed for the
showers, so that they should not fall upon the fields of wicked and
evil men. Some things are given to all alike: cities are founded
for good and bad men alike; works of genius reach, by publication,
even unworthy men; medicine points out the means of health even to
the wicked; no one has checked the making up of wholesome remedies
for fear that the undeserving should be healed. You must seek for
examination and preference of individuals in such things as are
bestowed separately upon those who are thought to deserve them; not
in these, which admit the mob to share them without distinction.
There is a great difference between not shutting a man out and
choosing him. Even a thief receives justice; even murderers enjoy
the blessings of peace; even those who have plundered others can
recover their own property; assassins and private bravoes are
defended against the common enemy by the city wall; the laws
protect even those who have sinned most deeply against them. There
are some things which no man could obtain unless they were given to
all; you need not, therefore, cavil about those matters in which
all mankind is invited to share. As for things which men receive or
not at my discretion, I shall not bestow them upon one whom I know
to be ungrateful.

29

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"Shall we, then," argues he, "not give our advice to an
ungrateful man when he is at a loss, or refuse him a drink of water
when he is thirsty, or not show him the path when he has lost his
way? or would you do him these services and yet not give him
anything?" Here I will draw a distinction, or at any rate endeavour
to do so. A benefit is a useful service, yet all useful service is
not a benefit; for some are so trifling as not to claim the title
of benefits. To produce a benefit two conditions must concur.
First, the importance of the thing given; for some things fall
short of the dignity of a benefit. Who ever called a hunch of bread
a benefit, or a farthing dole tossed to a beggar, or the means of
lighting a fire? yet sometimes these are of more value than the
most costly benefits; still their cheapness detracts from their
value even when, by the exigency of time, they are rendered
essential. The next condition, which is the most important of all,
must necessarily be present, namely, that I should confer the
benefit for the sake of him whom I wish to receive it, that I
should judge him worthy of it, bestow it of my own free will, and
receive pleasure from my own gift, none of which conditions are
present in the cases of which we have just now spoken; for we do
not bestow such things as those upon these who are worthy of them,
but we give them carelessly, as trifles, and do not give them so
much to a man as to humanity.

30

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

I shall not deny that sometimes I would give even to the
unworthy, out of respect for others; as, for instance, in
competition for public offices, some of the basest of men are
preferred on account of their noble birth, to industrious men of no
family, and that for good reasons; for the memory of great virtues
is sacred, and more men will take pleasure in being good, if the
respect felt for good men does not cease with their lives. What
made Cicero's son a consul, except his father? What lately brought
Cinna out of
the camp of the enemy and raised him to the consulate? What made
Sextus Pompeius and the other Pompeii consuls, unless it was the
greatness of one man, who once was raised so high that, by his very
fall, he sufficiently exalted all his relatives. What lately made
Fabius Persicus a member of more than one college of priests,
though even profligates avoided his kiss? Was it not Verrucosus,
and Allobrogicus, and the three hundred who to serve their country
blocked the invader's path with the force of a single family? It is
our duty to respect the virtuous, not only when present with us,
but also when removed from our sight: as they have made it their
study not to bestow their benefits upon one age alone, but to leave
them existing after they themselves have passed away, so let us not
confine our gratitude to a single age. If a man has begotten great
men, he deserves to receive benefits, whatever he himself may be:
he has given us worthy men. If a man descends from glorious
ancestors, whatever he himself may be, let him find refuge under
the shadow of his ancestry. As mean places are lighted up by the
rays of the sun, so let the degenerate shine in the light of their
forefathers.

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. See Seneca on "Clemency," book i., ch. ix.
31

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

In this place, my Liberalis, I wish to speak in defence of
the gods. We sometimes say, "What could Providence mean by placing
an Arrhidaeus upon the throne?" Do you suppose that the crown was
given to Arrhidaeus? nay, it was given to his father and his
brother. Why did Heaven bestow the empire of the world upon Caius
Caesar, the most bloodthirsty of mankind, who was wont to order
blood to be shed in his presence as freely as if he wished to drink
of it? Why, do you suppose that it was given to him? It was given
to his father, Germanicus, to his grandfather, his great
grandfather, and to others before them, no less illustrious men,
though they lived as private citizens on a footing of equality with
others. Why, when you yourself were making Mamercus Scaurus consul,
were you ignorant of his vices? did he himself conceal them? did he
wish to appear decent?

*****
*****

Did you admit a man who was so openly filthy to the fasces and the
tribunal? Yes, it was because you were thinking of the great old
Scaurus, the chief of the Senate, and were unwilling that his
descendant should be despised.

32

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

It is probable that the gods act in the same manner, that
they show greater indulgence to some for the sake of their parents
and their ancestry, and to others for the sake of their children
and grandchildren, and a long line of descendants beyond them; for
they know the whole course of their works, and have constant access
to the knowledge of all that shall hereafter pass through their
hands. These things come upon us from the unknown future, and the
gods have foreseen and are familiar with the events by which we are
startled. "Let these men," says Providence, "be kings, because
their ancestors were good kings, because they regarded
righteousness and temperance as the highest rule of life, because
they did not devote the state to themselves, but devoted themselves
to the state. Let these others reign, because some one of their
ancestors before them was a good man, who bore a soul superior to
fortune, who preferred to be conquered rather than to conquer in
civil strife, because it was more to the advantage of the state. It was not possible
to make a sufficient return to him for this during so long a time;
let this other, therefore, out of regard for him, be chief of the
people, not because he knows how, or is capable, but because the
other has earned it for him. This man is misshapen, loathsome to
look upon, and will disgrace the insignia of his office. Men will
presently blame me, calling me blind and reckless, not knowing upon
whom I am conferring what ought to be given to the greatest and
noblest of men; but I know that, in giving this dignity to one man,
I am paying an old debt to another. How should the men of to-day
know that ancient hero, who so resolutely avoided the glory which
pressed upon him, who went into danger with the same look which
other men wear when they have escaped from danger, who never
regarded his own interest as apart from that of the commonwealth?"
"Where," you ask, "or who is he? whence does he come?" "You know
him not; it lies with me to balance the debit and credit account in
such cases as these; I know how much I owe to each man; I repay
some after a long interval, others beforehand, according as my
opportunities and the exigencies of my social system permit." I
shall, therefore, sometimes bestow somewhat upon an ungrateful man,
though not for his own sake.

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. Gertz, "Stud. Crit," p. 159, note.
33

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"What," argues he, "if you do not know whether your man be
ungrateful or grateful--will you wait until you know, or will you
not lose the opportunity of bestowing a benefit? To wait is a long
business--for, as Plato says, it is hard to form an opinion about
the human mind,--not to wait, is rash." To this objector we shall
answer, that we never should wait for absolute knowledge of the
whole case, since the discovery of truth is an arduous task, but
should proceed in the direction in which truth appeared to direct
us. All our actions proceed in this direction: it is thus that we
sow seed, that we sail upon the sea, that we serve in the army,
marry, and bring up children. The result of all these actions is
uncertain, so we take that course from which we believe that good
results may be hoped for. Who can guarantee a harvest to the sower,
a harbour to the sailor, victory to the soldier, a modest wife to
the husband, dutiful children to the father? We proceed in the way
in which reason, not absolute truth, directs us. Wait, do nothing
that will not turn out well, form no opinion until you have
searched but the truth, and your life will pass in absolute in
action. Since it is only the appearance of truth, not truth itself,
which leads me hither or thither, I shall confer benefits upon the
man who apparently will be grateful.

34

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"Many circumstances," argues he, "may arise which may enable
a bad man to steal into the place of a good one, or may cause a
good man to be disliked as though he were a bad one; for
appearances, to which we trust, are deceptive." Who denies it? Yet
I can find nothing else by which to guide my opinion. I must follow
these tracks in my search after truth, for I have none more
trustworthy than these; I will take pains to weigh the value of
these with all possible care, and will not hastily give my assent
to them. For instance, in a battle, it may happen that my hand may
be deceived by some mistake into turning my weapon against my
comrade, and sparing my enemy as though he were on my side; but
this will not often take place, and will not take place through any
fault of mine, for my object is to strike the enemy, and defend my
countryman. If I know a man to be ungrateful, I shall not bestow a
benefit upon him. But the man has passed himself off as a good man
by some trick, and has imposed upon me. Well, this is not at all
the fault of the giver, who gave under the impression that his
friend was grateful. "Suppose," asks he, "that you were to promise
to bestow a benefit, and afterwards were to learn that your man was
ungrateful, would you bestow it or not? If you do, you do wrong
knowingly, for you give to one to whom you ought not; if you
refuse, you do wrong likewise, for you do not give to him to whom
you promised to give. This case upsets your consistency, and that
proud assurance of yours that the wise man never regrets his
actions, or amends what he has done, or alters his plans." The wise
man never changes his plans while the conditions under which he
formed them remain the same; therefore, he never feels regret,
because at the time nothing better than what he did could have been
done, nor could any better decision have been arrived at than that
which was made; yet he begins everything with the saving clause,
"If nothing shall occur to the contrary." This is the reason why we
say that all goes well with him, and that nothing happens contrary
to his expectation, because he bears in mind the possibility of
something happening to prevent the realization of his projects. It
is an imprudent confidence to trust that fortune will be on our
side. The wise man considers both sides: he knows how great is the
power of errors, how uncertain human affairs are, how many
obstacles there are to the success of plans. Without committing
himself, he awaits the doubtful and capricious issue of events, and
weighs certainty of purpose against uncertainty of result. Here
also, however, he is protected by that saving clause, without which
he decides upon nothing, and begins nothing.

35

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

When I promise to bestow a benefit, I promise it, unless
something occurs which makes it my duty not to do so. What if, for
example, my country orders me to give to her what I had promised to
my friend? or if a law be passed forbidding any one to do what I
had promised to do for him? Suppose that I have promised you my
daughter in marriage, that then you turn out to be a foreigner, and
that I have no right of intermarriage with foreigners; in this
case, the law, by which I am forbidden to fulfil my promise, forms
my defence. I shall be treacherous, and hear myself blamed for
inconsistency, only if I do not fulfil, my promise when all
conditions remain the same as when I made it; otherwise, any change
makes me free to reconsider the entire case, and absolves me from
my promise. I may have promised to plead a cause; afterwards it
appears that this cause is designed to form a precedent for an
attack upon my father. I may have promised to leave my country, and
travel abroad; then news comes that the road is beset with robbers.
I was going to an appointment at some particular place; but my
son's illness, or my wife's confinement, prevented me. All
conditions must be the same as they were when I made the promise,
if you mean to hold me bound in honour to fulfil it. Now what
greater change can take place than that I should discover you to be
a bad and ungrateful man? I shall refuse to an unworthy man that
which I had intended to give him supposing him to be worthy, and I
shall also have reason to be angry with him for the trick which he
has put upon me.

36

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

I shall nevertheless look into the matter, and consider what
the value of the thing promised may be. If it be trifling, I shall
give it, not because you are worthy of it, but because I promised
it, and I shall not give it as a present, but merely in order to
make good my words and give myself a twitch of the ear. I will
punish my own rashness in promising by the loss of what I gave.
"See how grieved you are; mind you take more care what you say in
future." As the saying is, I will take tongue money from you. If
the matter be important, I will not, as Maecenas said, let ten
million sesterces reproach me. I will weigh the two sides of the
question one against the other: there is something in abiding by
what you have promised; on the other hand, there is a great deal in
not bestowing a benefit upon one who is unworthy of it. Now, how
great is this benefit? If it is a trifling one, let us wink and let
it pass; but if it will cause me much loss or much shame to give
it, I had rather excuse myself once for refusing it than have to do
so ever after for giving it. The whole point, I repeat, depends
upon how much the thing given is worth: let the terms of my promise
be appraised. Not only shall I refuse to give what I may have
promised rashly, but I shall also demand back again what I may have
wrongly bestowed: a man must be mad who keeps a promise made under
a mistake.

37

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Philip, king of the Macedonians, had a hardy soldier whose
services he had found useful in many campaigns. From time to time
he made this man presents of part of the plunder as the reward of
his valour, and used to excite his greedy spirit by his frequent
gifts. This man was cast by shipwreck upon the estate of a certain
Macedonian, who as soon as he heard the news hastened to him,
restored his breath, removed him to his own farmhouse, gave up his
own bed to him, nursed him out of his weakened and half-dead
condition, took care of him at his own expense for thirty days,
restored him to health and gave him a sum of money for his journey,
as the man kept constantly saying, "If only I can see my chief, I
will repay your kindness." He told Philip of his shipwreck, said
nothing about the help which he had received, and at once demanded
that a certain man's estate should be given to him. The man was a
friend of his: it was that very man by whom he had been rescued and
restored to health. Sometimes, especially in time of war, kings
bestow many gifts with their eyes shut. One just man cannot deal
with such a mass of armed selfishness. It is not possible for any
one to be at the same time a good man and a good general. How are
so many thousands of insatiable men to be satiated? What would they
have, if every man had his own? Thus Philip reasoned with himself
while he ordered the man to be put in possession of the property
which he asked for. However, the other, when driven out of his
estate, did not, like a peasant, endure his wrongs in silence,
thankful that he himself was not given away also, but sent a sharp
and outspoken letter to Philip, who, on reading it, was so much
enraged that he straightway ordered Pausanias to restore the
property to its former owner, and to brand that wickedest of
soldiers, that most ungrateful of guests, that greediest of
shipwrecked men, with letters bearing witness to his ingratitude.
He, indeed, deserved to have the letters not merely branded but
carved in his flesh, for having reduced his host to the condition
in which he himself had been when he lay naked and shipwrecked upon
the beach; still, let us see within what limits one ought to keep
in punishing him. Of course what he had so villainously seized
ought to be taken from him. But who would be affected by the
spectacle of his punishment? The crime which he had committed would
prevent his being pitied even by any humane person.

38

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Will Philip then give you a thing because he has promised
to give it, even though he ought not to do so, even though he will
commit a wrong by doing so, nay, a crime, even though by this one
act he will make it impossible for shipwrecked men to reach the
shore? There is no inconsistency in giving up an intention which we
have discovered to be wrong and have condemned as wrong; we ought
candidly to admit, "I thought that it was something different; I
have been deceived." It is mere pride and folly to persist, "what I
once have said, be it what it may, shall remain unaltered and
settled." There is no disgrace in altering one's plans according to
circumstances. Now, if Philip had left this man in possession of
that seashore which he obtained by his shipwreck, would he not have
practically pronounced sentence of banishment against all
unfortunates for the future? "Rather," says Philip, "do thou carry
upon thy forehead of brass those letters, that they may be
impressed upon the eyes of all throughout my kingdom. Go, let men
see how sacred a thing is the table of hospitality; show them your
face, that upon it they may read the decree which prevents its
being a capital crime to give refuge to the unfortunate under one's
roof. The order will be more certainly respected by this means than
if I had inscribed it upon tablets of brass."

39

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"Why then," argues our adversary, "did your Stoic
philosopher Zeno, when he had promised a loan of five hundred
denarii to some person, whom he afterwards discovered to be of
doubtful character, persist in lending it, because of his promise,
though his friends dissuaded him from doing so?" In the first place
a loan is on a different footing to a benefit. Even when we have
lent money to an undesirable person we can recall it; I can demand
payment upon a certain day, and if he becomes bankrupt, I can
obtain my share of his property; but a benefit is lost utterly and
instantly. Besides, the one is the act of a bad man, the other that
of a bad father of a family. In the next place, if the sum had been
a larger one, not even Zeno would have persisted in lending it. It
was five hundred denarii; the sort of sum of which one says, "May
he spend it in sickness," and it was worth paying so much to avoid
breaking his promise. I shall go out to supper, even though the
weather be cold, because I have promised to go; but I shall not if
snow be falling. I shall leave my bed to go to a betrothal feast,
although I may be suffering from indigestion; but I shall not do so
if I am feverish. I will become bail for you, because I promised;
but not if you wish me to become bail in some transaction of
uncertain issue, if you expose me to forfeiting my money to the
state. There runs through all these cases, I argue, an implied
exception; if I am able, provided it is right for me to do so, if
these things be so and so. Make the position the same when you ask
me to fulfil my promise, as it was when I gave it, and it will be
mere fickleness to disappoint you; but if something new has taken
place in the meanwhile, why should you wonder at my intentions
being changed when the conditions under which I gave the promise
are changed? Put everything back as it was, and I shall be the same
as I was. We enter into recognizances to appear, yet if we fail to
do so an action will not in all cases lie against us, for we are
excused for making default if forced to do so by a power which we
cannot resist.

40

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

You may take the same answer to the question as to whether we
ought in all cases to show gratitude for kindness, and whether a
benefit ought in all cases to be repaid. It is my duty to show a
grateful mind, but in some cases my own poverty, in others the
prosperity of the friend to whom I owe some return, will not permit
me to give it. What, for instance, am I, a poor man, to give to a
king or a rich man in return for his kindness, especially as some
men regard it as a wrong to have their benefits repaid, and are
wont to pile one benefit upon another? In dealing with such
persons, what more can I do than wish to repay them? Yet I ought
not to refuse to receive a new benefit, because I have not repaid
the former one. I shall take it as freely as it is given, and will
offer myself to my friend as a wide field for the exercise of his
good nature: he who is unwilling to receive new benefits must be
dissatisfied with what he has already received. Do you say, "I
shall not be able to return them?" What is that to the purpose? I
am willing enough to do so if opportunity or means were given me.
He gave it to me, of course, having both opportunity and means: is
he a good man or a bad one? if he is a good man, I have a good case
against him, and I will not plead if he be a bad one. Neither do I
think it right to insist on making repayment, even though it be
against the will of those whom we repay, and to press it upon them
however reluctant they may be; it is not repayment to force an
unwilling man to resume what you were once willing to take. Some
people, if any trifling present be sent to them, afterwards send
back something else for no particular reason, and then declare that
they are under no obligation; to send something back at once, and
balance one present by another, is the next thing to refusing to
receive it. On some occasions I shall not return a benefit, even
though I be able to do so. When? When by so doing I shall myself
lose more than he will gain, or if he would not notice any
advantage to himself in receiving that which it would be a great
loss to me to return. The man who is always eager to repay under
all circumstances, has not the feeling of a grateful man, but of a
debtor; and, to put it shortly, he who is too eager to repay, is
unwilling to be in his friend's debt; he who is unwilling, and yet
is in his friend's debt, is ungrateful.

Sources for this text

  • Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

    L. Annaeus Seneca On Benefits, trans. Aubrey Stewart (London: George Bell & Sons, 1887)

    Public domain · Source file

    Transcription: Wikisource

On Benefits
Esc

↑ ↓ to move · Enter to open