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The Stoa
Translation

On Benefits

Book VI

43 chapters

1

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

THERE are some things, my most excellent Liberalis, which lie
completely outside of our actual life, and which we only inquire
into in order to exercise our intellects, while others both give us
pleasure while we are discovering them, and are of use when
discovered. I will place all these in your hands; you, at your own
discretion, may order them either to be investigated thoroughly, or
to be reserved, and be used as agreeable interludes. Something will
be gained even by those which you dismiss at once, for it is
advantageous even to know what subjects are not worth learning. I
shall be guided, therefore, by your face: according to its
expression, I shall deal with some questions at greater length, and
drive others out of court, and put an end to them at once.

2

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

It is a question whether a benefit can be taken away from one
by force. Some say that it cannot, because it is not a thing, but
an act. A gift is not the same as the act of giving, any more than
a sailor is the same as the act of sailing. A sick man and a
disease are not the same thing, although no one can be ill without
disease; and, similarly, a benefit itself is one thing, and what
any of us receive through a benefit is another. The benefit itself
is incorporeal, and never becomes invalid; but its subject-matter
changes owners, and passes from hand to hand. So, when you take
away from anyone what you have given him, you take away the
subject-matter only of the benefit, not the benefit itself. Nature
herself cannot recall what she has given. She may cease to bestow
benefits, but cannot take them away: a man who dies, yet has lived;
a man who becomes blind, nevertheless has seen. She can cut off her
blessings from us in the future, but she cannot prevent our having
enjoyed them in the past. We are frequently not able to enjoy a
benefit for long, but the benefit is not thereby destroyed. Let
Nature struggle as hard as she please, she cannot give herself
retrospective action. A man may lose his house, his money, his
property--everything to which the name of benefit can be given--
yet the benefit itself will remain firm and unmoved; no power can
prevent his benefactor's having bestowed them, or his having
received them.

3

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

I think that a fine passage in Rabirius's poem, where M.
Antonius, seeing his fortune deserting him, nothing left him except
the privilege of dying, and even that only on condition that he
used it promptly, exclaims,

"What I have given, that I now possess!"

How much he might have possessed, had he chosen! These are riches
to be depended upon, which through all the turmoil of human life
will remain steadfast; and the greater they are, the less envy they
will attract. Why are you sparing of your property, as though it
were your own? You are but the manager of it. All those treasures,
which make you swell with pride, and soar above mere mortals, till
you forget the weakness of your nature; all that which you lock up
in iron-grated treasuries, and guard in arms, which you win from
other men with their lives, and defend at the risk of your own; for
which you launch fleets to dye the sea with blood, and shake the
walls of cities, not knowing what arrows fortune may be preparing
for you behind your back; to gain which you have so often violated
all the ties of relationship, of friendship, and of colleagueship,
till the whole world lies crushed between the two combatants: all
these are not yours; they are a kind of deposit, which is on the
point of passing into other hands: your enemies, or your heirs, who
are little better, will seize upon them. "How," do you ask, "can
you make them your own?" "By giving them away." Do, then, what is
best for your own interests, and gain a sure enjoyment of them,
which cannot be taken from you, making them at once more certainly
yours, and more honorable to you. That which you esteem so highly,
that by which you think that you are made rich and powerful, owns
but the shabby title of "house," "slave," or "money;" but when you
have given it away, it becomes a benefit.

4

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"You admit," says our adversary, "that we sometimes are under
no obligation to him from whom we have received a benefit. In that
case it has been taken by force." Nay, there are many things which
would cause us to cease to feel gratitude for a benefit, not
because the benefit has been taken from me, but because it has been
spoiled. Suppose that a man has defended me in a lawsuit, but has
forcibly outraged my wife; he has not taken away the benefit which
he conferred upon me, but by balancing it with an equivalent wrong,
he has set me free from my debt; indeed, if he has injured me more
than he had previously benefited me, he not only puts an end to my
gratitude, but makes me free to revenge myself upon him, and to
complain of him, when the wrong outweighs the benefit; in such a
case the benefit is not taken away, but is overcome. Why, are not
some fathers so cruel and so wicked that it is right and proper for
their sons to turn away from them, and disown them? Yet, pray, have
they taken away the life which they gave? No, but their unnatural
conduct in later years has destroyed all the gratitude which was
due to them for their original benefit. In these cases it is not a
benefit itself, but the gratitude owing for a benefit which is
taken away, and the result is, not that one does not possess the
benefit, but that one is not laid under any obligation by it. It is
as though a man were to lend me money, and then burn my house down;
the advantage of the loan is balanced by the damage which he has
caused: I do not repay him, and yet I am not in his debt. In like
manner any one who may have acted kindly and generously to me, and
who afterwards has shown himself haughty, insulting, and cruel,
places me in just the same position as though I never had received
anything from him: he has murdered his own benefits. Though the
lease may remain in force, still a man does not continue to be a
tenant if his landlord tramples down his crops, or cuts down his
orchard; their contract is at an end, not because the landlord has
received the rent which was agreed upon, but because he has made it
impossible that he should receive it. So, too, a creditor often has
to pay money to his debtor, should he have taken more property from
him in other transactions than he claims as having lent him. The
judge does not sit merely to decide between debtor and creditor,
when he says, "You did lend the man money; but then, what followed?
You have driven away his cattle, you have murdered his slave, you
have in your possession plate which you have not paid for. After
valuing what each has received, I order you, who came to this court
as a creditor, to leave it as a debtor." In like manner a balance
is struck between benefits and injuries. In many cases, I repeat, a
benefit is not taken away from him who receives it, and yet it lays
him under no obligation, if the giver has repented of giving it,
called himself unhappy because he gave it, sighed or made a wry
face while he gave it; if he thought that he was throwing it away
rather than giving it, if he gave it to please himself, or to
please any one except me, the receiver; if he persistently makes
himself offensive by boasting of what he has done, if he brags of
his gift everywhere, and makes it a misery to me, then indeed the
benefit remains in my hands, but I owe him nothing for it, just as
sums of money to which a creditor has no legal right are owed to
him, but cannot be claimed by him;

5

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Though you have bestowed a benefit upon me, yet you have since
done me a wrong; the benefit demanded gratitude, the wrong required
vengeance: the result is that I do not owe you gratitude, nor do
you owe me compensation--each is cancelled by the other. When we
say, "I returned him his benefit," we do not mean that we restored
to him the very thing which we had received, but something else in
its place. To return is to give back one thing instead of another,
because, of course, in all repayment it is not the thing itself,
but its equivalent which is returned. We are said to have returned
money even though we count out gold pieces instead of silver ones,
or even if no money passes between us, but the transaction be
effected verbally by the assignment of a debt.

I think I see you say, "You are wasting your time; of what use is
it to me to know whether what I do not owe to another still remains
in my hands or not? These are like the ingenious subtleties of the
lawyers, who declare that one cannot acquire an inheritance by
prescription, but can only acquire those things of which the
inheritance consists, as though there were any difference between
the heritage and the things of which it consists. Rather decide
this point for me, which may be of use. If the same man confers a
benefit upon me, and afterwards does me a wrong, is it my duty to
return the benefit to him, and nevertheless to avenge myself upon
him, having, as it were, two distinct accounts open with him, or to
mix them both together, and do nothing, leaving the benefit to be
wiped out by the injury, the injury by the benefit? I see that the
former course is adopted by the law of the land; you know best what
the law may be among you Stoic philosophers in such a case. I
suppose that you keep the action which I bring against another
distinct from that which he Strings against me, and the two
processes are not merged into one? For instance, if a man entrusts
me with money, and afterwards robs me, I shall bring an action
against him for theft, and he will bring one against me for
unlawfully detaining his property?"

6

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

The cases which you have mentioned, my Liberalis, come under
well-established laws, which it is necessary for us to follow. One
law cannot be merged in another: each one proceeds its own way.
There is a particular action which deals with deposits just as
there is one which deals with theft. A benefit is subject to no
law; it depends upon my own arbitration. I am at liberty to
contrast the amount of good or harm which any one may have done me,
and then to decide which of us is indebted to the other. In legal
processes we ourselves have no power, we must go whither they lead
us; in the case of a benefit the supreme power is mine, I pronounce
sentence. Consequently I do not separate or distinguish between
benefits and wrongs, but send them before the same judge. Unless I
did so, you would bid me love and hate, give thanks and make
complaints at the same time, which human nature does not admit of.
I would rather compare the benefit and the injury with one another,
and see whether there were any balance in my favour. If anybody
puts lines of other writing upon my manuscript he conceals, though
he does not take away, the letters which were there before, and in
like manner a wrong coming after a benefit does not allow it to be
seen.

7

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Your face, by which I have agreed to be guided, now becomes
wrinkled with frowns, as though I were straying too widely from the
subject. You seem to say to me:

"Why steer to seaward? Hither bend thy course,
Hug close the shore..."

I do hug it as close as possible. So now, if you think that we have
dwelt sufficiently upon this point, let us proceed to the
consideration of the next--that is, whether we are at all indebted
to any one who does us good without wishing to do so. I might have
expressed this more clearly, if it were not right that the question
should be somewhat obscurely stated, in order that by the
distinction immediately following it may be shown that we mean to
investigate the case both of him who does us good against his will,
and that of him who does us good without knowing it. That a man who
does us good by acting under compulsion does not thereby lay us
under any obligation, is so clear, that no words are needed to
prove it. Both this question, and any other of the like character
which may be raised, can easily be settled if in each case we bear
in mind that, for anything to be a benefit, it must reach us in the
first place through some thought, and secondly through the thought
of a friend and well-wisher. Therefore we do not feel any gratitude
towards rivers, albeit they may bear large ships, afford an ample
and unvarying stream for the conveyance of merchandise, or flow
beauteously and full of fish through fertile fields. No one
conceives himself to be indebted for a benefit to the Nile, any
more than he would owe it a grudge if its waters flooded his fields
to excess, and retired more slowly than usual; the wind does not
bestow benefits, gentle and favorable though it may be, nor does
wholesome and useful food; for he who would bestow a benefit upon
me, must not only do me good, but must wish to do so. No obligation
can therefore be incurred towards dumb animals; yet how many men
have been saved from peril by the swiftness of a horse!--nor yet
towards trees--yet how many sufferers from summer heat have been
sheltered by the thick foliage of a tree! What difference can it
make, whether I have profited by the act of one who did not know
that he was doing me good, or one who could not know it, when in
each case the will to do me good was wanting? You might as well bid
me be grateful to a ship, a carriage, or a lance for saving me from
danger, as bid me be grateful to a man who may have done me good by
chance, but with no more intention of doing me good than those
things could have.

8

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Some men may receive benefits without knowing it, but no man
can bestow them without knowing it. Many sick persons have been
cured by chance circumstances, which do not therefore become
specific remedies; as, for instance, one man was restored to health
by falling into a river during very cold weather, as another was
set free from a quartan fever by means of a flogging, because the
sudden terror turned his attention into a new channel, so that the
dangerous hours passed unnoticed. Yet none of these are remedies,
even though they may have been successful; and in like manner some
men do us good, though they are unwilling--indeed, because they are
unwilling to do so--yet we need not feel grateful to them as though
we had received a benefit from them, because fortune has changed
the evil which they intended into good. Do you suppose that I am
indebted to a man who strikes my enemy with a blow which he aimed
at me, who would have injured me had he not missed his mark? It
often happens that by openly perjuring himself a man makes even
trustworthy witnesses disbelieved, and renders his intended victim
an object of compassion, as though he were being ruined by a
conspiracy. Some have been saved by the very power which was
exerted to crush them, and judges who would have condemned a man by
law, have refused to condemn him by favour. Yet they did not confer
a benefit upon the accused, although they rendered him a service,
because we must consider at what the dart was aimed, not what it
hits, and a benefit is distinguished from an injury not by its
result, but by the spirit in which it was meant. By contradicting
himself, by irritating the judge by his arrogance, or by rashly
allowing his whole case to depend upon the testimony of one
witness, my opponent may have saved my cause. I do not consider
whether his mistakes benefited me or not, for he wished me ill.

9

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

In order that I may be grateful, I must wish to do what my
benefactor must have wished in order that he might bestow a
benefit. Can anything be more unjust than to bear a grudge against
a person who may have trodden upon one's foot in a crowd, or
splashed one, or pushed one the way which one did not wish to go?
Yet it was by his act that we were injured, and we only refrain
from complaining of him, because he did not know what he was doing.
The same reason makes it possible for men to do us good without
conferring benefits upon us, or to harm us without doing us wrong,
because it is intention which distinguishes our friends from our
enemies. How many have been saved from service in the army by
sickness! Some men have been saved from sharing the fall of their
house, by being brought up upon their recognizances to a court of
law by their enemies; some have been saved by ship-wreck from
falling into the hands of pirates; yet we do not feel grateful to
such things, because chance has no feeling of the service it
renders, nor are we grateful to our enemy, though his lawsuit,
while it harassed and detained us, still saved our lives. Nothing
can be a benefit which does not proceed from good will, and which
is not meant as such by the giver. If any one does me a service,
without knowing it, I am under no obligation to him; should he do
so, meaning to injure me, I shall imitate his conduct.

10

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Let us turn our attention to the first of these. Can you desire
me to do anything to express my gratitude to a man who did nothing
in order to confer a benefit upon me? Passing on to the next, do
you wish me to show my gratitude to such a man, and of my own will
to return to him what I received from him against his will? What am
I to say of the third, he who, meaning to do an injury, blunders
into bestowing a benefit? That you should have wished to confer a
benefit upon me is not sufficient to render me grateful; but that
you should have wished not to do so is enough to set me free from
any obligation to you. A mere wish does not constitute a benefit;
and just as the best and heartiest wish is not a benefit when
fortune prevents its being carried into effect, neither is what
fortune bestows upon us a benefit, unless good wishes preceded it.
In order to lay me under an obligation, you must not merely do me a
service, but you must do so intentionally.

11

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Cleanthes makes use of the following example:--"I sent," says
he, "two slaves to look for Plato and bring him to me from the
Academy. One of them searched through the whole of the colonnade,
and every other place in which he thought that he was likely to be
found, and returned home alike weary and unsuccessful; the other
sat down among the audience of a mountebank close by, and, while
amusing himself in the society of other slaves like a careless
vagabond as he was, found Plato, without seeking for him, as he
happened to pass that way. We ought," says he, "to praise that
slave who, as far as lay in his power, did what he was ordered, and
we ought to punish the other whose laziness turned out so
fortunate." It is goodwill alone which does one real service; let
us then consider under what conditions it lays us under
obligations. It is not enough to wish a man well, without doing him
good; nor is it enough to do him good without wishing him well.
Suppose that some one wished to give me a present, but did not give
it; I have his good will, but I do not have his benefit, which
consists of subject matter and goodwill together. I owe nothing to
one who wished to lend me money but did not do so, and in like
manner I shall be the friend of one who wished but was not able to
bestow a benefit upon me, but I shall not be under any obligation
to him. I also shall wish to bestow something upon him, even as he
did upon me; but if fortune be more favorable to me than to him,
and I succeed in bestowing something upon him, my doing so will be
a benefit bestowed upon him, not a repayment out of gratitude for
what he did for me. It will become his duty to be grateful to me; I
shall have begun the interchange of benefits; the series must be
counted from my act.

12

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

I already understand what you wish to ask; there is no need
for you to say anything, your countenance speaks for you. "If any
one does us good for his own sake, are we," you ask, "under an
obligation to him? I often hear you complain that there are some
things which men make use of themselves, but which they put down to
the account of others." I will tell you, my Liberalis; but first
let me distinguish between the two parts of your question, and
separate what is fair from what is unfair. It makes a great
difference whether any one bestows a benefit upon us for his own
sake, or whether he does so partly for his own sake and partly for
ours. He who looks only to his own interests, and who does us good
because he cannot otherwise make a profit for himself, seems to me
to be like the farmer who provides winter and summer fodder for his
flocks, or like the man who feeds up the captives whom he has
bought in order that they may fetch a better price in the slave
market, or who crams and curry-combs fat oxen for sale; or like the
keeper of a school of arms, who takes great pains in exercising and
equipping his gladiators. As Cleanthes says, there is a great
difference between benefits and trade.

13

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

On the other hand, I am not so unjust as to feel no gratitude
to a man, because, while helping me, he helped himself also; for I
do not insist upon his consulting my interests to the exclusion of
his own--nay, I should prefer that the benefit which I receive may
be of even greater advantage to the giver, provided that he thought
of us both when giving it, and meant to divide it between me and
himself. Even should he possess the larger portion of it, still, if
he admits me to a share, if he meant it for both of us, I am not
only unjust but ungrateful, if I do not rejoice in what has
benefited me benefiting him also. It is the essence of spitefulness
to say that nothing can be a benefit which does not cause some
inconvenience to the giver.

As for him who bestows a benefit for his own sake, I should say to
him, "You have made use of me, and how can you say that you have
bestowed a benefit upon me, rather than I upon you?" "Suppose,"
answers he, "that I cannot obtain a public office except by
ransoming ten citizens out of a great number of captives, will you
owe me nothing for setting you free from slavery and bondage? Yet I
shall do so for my own sake." To this I should answer, "You do this
partly for my sake, partly for your own. It is for your own sake
that you ransom captives, but it is for my sake that you ransom me;
for to serve your purpose it would be enough for you to ransom any
one. I am therefore your debtor, not for ransoming me but for
choosing me, since you might have attained the same result by
ransoming some one else instead of me. You divide the advantages of
the act between yourself and me, and you confer upon me a benefit
by which both of us profit. What you do entirely for my sake is,
that you choose me in preference to others. If therefore you were
to be made praetor for ransoming ten captives, and there were only
ten of us captives, none of us would be under any obligation to
you, because there is nothing for which you can ask any one of us
to give you credit apart from your own advantage. I do not regard a
benefit jealously and wish it to be given to myself alone, but I
wish to have a share in it."

14

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"Well, then," says he, "suppose that I were to order all your
names to be put into a ballot-box, and that your name was drawn
among those who were to be ransomed, would you owe me nothing?"
Yes, I should owe you something, but very little: how little, I
will explain to you. By so doing you do something for my sake, in
that you grant me the chance of being ransomed; I owe to fortune
that my name was drawn, all I owe to you is that my name could be
drawn. You have given me the means of obtaining your benefit. For
the greater part of that benefit I am indebted to fortune; that I
could be so indebted, I owe to you.

I shall take no notice whatever of those whose benefits are
bestowed in a mercenary spirit, who do not consider to whom, but
upon what terms they give, whose benefits are entirely selfish.
Suppose that some one sells me corn; I cannot live unless I buy it;
yet I do not owe my life to him because I have bought it. I do not
consider how essential it was to me, and that I could not live
without it; but how little thanks are due for it, since I could not
have had it without paying for it, and since the merchant who
imported it did not consider how much good he would do me, but how
much he would gain for himself, I owe nothing for what I have
bought and paid for.

15

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"According to this reasoning," says my opponent, "you would say
that you owe nothing to a physician beyond his paltry fee, nor to
your teacher, because you have paid him some money; yet these
persons are all held very dear, and are very much respected." In
answer to this I should urge that some things are of greater value
than the price which we pay for them. You buy of a physician life
and good health, the value of which cannot be estimated in money;
from a teacher of the liberal sciences you buy the education of a
gentleman and mental culture; therefore you pay these persons the
price, not of what they give us, but of their trouble in giving it;
you pay them for devoting their attention to us, for disregarding
their own affairs to attend to us: they receive the price, not of
their services, but of the expenditure of their time. Yet this may
be more truly stated in another way, which I will at once lay
before you, having first pointed out how the above may be confuted.
Our adversary would say, "If some things are of greater value than
the price which we pay for them, then, though you may have bought
them, you still owe me something more for them." I answer, in the
first place, what does their real value matter, since the buyer and
seller have settled the price between them? Next, I did not buy it
at it's own price, but at yours. "It is," you say, "worth more than
its sale price." True, but it cannot be sold for more. The price of
everything varies according to circumstances; after you have well
praised your wares, they are worth only the highest price at which
you can sell them; a man who buys things cheap is not on that
account under any obligation to the seller. In the next place, even
if they are worth more, there is no generosity in your letting them
go for less, since the price is settled by custom and the rate of
the market, not by the uses and powers of the merchandise. What
would you state to be the proper payment of a man who crosses the
seas, holding a true course through the midst of the waves after
the land has sunk out of sight, who foresees coming storms, and
suddenly, when no one expects danger, orders sails to be furled,
yards to be lowered, and the crew to stand at their posts ready to
meet the fury of the unexpected gale? and yet the price of such
great skill is fully paid for by the passage money. At what sum can
you estimate the value of a lodging in a wilderness, of a shelter
in the rain, of a bath or fire in cold weather? Yet I know on what
terms I shall be supplied with these when I enter an inn. How much
the man does for us who props our house when it is about to fall,
and who, with a skill beyond belief, suspends in the air a block of
building which has begun to crack at the, foundation; yet we can
contract for underpinning at a fixed and cheap rate. The city wall
keeps us safe from our enemies, and from sudden inroads of
brigands; yet it is, well known how much a day a smith would earn
for erecting towers and scaffoldings to provide for the public safety.

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. See Viollet-le-Duc's "Dictionnaire d'Architecture," articles "Architecture Militaire" and "Hourds," for the probable meaning of "Propugnacula."
16

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

I might go on for ever collecting instances to prove that
valuable things are sold at a low price. What then? why is it that
I owe something extra both to my physician and to my teacher, and
that I do not acquit myself of all obligation to them by paying
them their fee? It is because they pass from physicians and
teachers into friends, and lay us under obligations, not by the
skill which they sell to us, but by kindly and familiar good will.
If my physician does no more than feel my pulse and class me among
those whom he sees in his daily rounds, pointing out what I ought
to do or to avoid without any personal interest, then I owe him no
more than his fee, because he views me with the eye not of a
friend, but of a commander. Neither have I any reason for loving
my teacher, if he has regarded me merely as one of the mass of his
scholars, and has not thought me worthy of taking especial pains
with by myself, if he has never fixed his attention upon me, and if
when he discharged his knowledge on the public, I might be said
rather to have picked it up than to have learnt it from him. What
then is our reason for owing them much? It is, not that what they
have sold us is worth more than we paid for it, but that they have
given something to us personally. Suppose that my physician has
spent more consideration upon my case than was professionally
necessary; that it was for me, not for his own credit, that he
feared: that he was not satisfied with pointing out remedies, but
himself applied them, that he sat by my bedside among my anxious
friends, and came to see me at the crises of my disorder; that no
service was too troublesome or too disgusting for him to perform;
that he did not hear my groans unmoved; that among the numbers who
called for him I was his favourite case; and that he gave the
others only so much time as his care of my health permitted him: I
should feel obliged to such a man not as to a physician, but as to
a friend. Suppose again that my teacher endured labour and
weariness in instructing me; that he taught me something more than
is taught by all masters alike; that he roused my better feelings
by his encouragement, and that at one time he would raise my
spirits by praise, and at another warn me to shake off
slothfulness: that he laid his hand, as it were, upon my latent and
torpid powers of intellect and drew them out into the light of day;
that he did not stingily dole out to me what he knew, in order that
he might be wanted for a longer time, but was eager, if possible,
to pour all his learning into me; then I am ungrateful, if I do not
love him as much as I love my nearest relatives and my dearest
friends.

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. I read "Non tamquam amicus videt sed tamquam imperator."
17

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

We give something additional even to those who teach the
meanest trades, if their efforts appear to be extraordinary; we
bestow a gratuity upon pilots, upon workmen who deal with the
commonest materials and hire themselves out by the day. In the
noblest arts, however, those which either preserve or beautify our
lives, a man would be ungrateful who thinks he owes the artist no
more than he bargained for. Besides this, the teaching of such
learning as we have spoken of blends mind with mind; now when this
takes place, both in the case of the physician and of the teacher
the price of his work is paid, but that of his mind remains owing.

18

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Plato once crossed a river, and as the ferryman did not ask
him for anything, he supposed that he had let him pass free out of
respect, and said that the ferryman had laid Plato under an
obligation. Shortly afterwards, seeing the ferryman take one person
after another across the river with the same pains, and without
charging anything, Plato declared that the ferryman had not laid
him under an obligation. If you wish me to be grateful for what you
give, you must not merely give it to me, but show that you mean it
specially for me; you cannot make any claim upon one for having
given him what you fling away broad-cast among the crowd. What
then? shall I owe you nothing for it? Nothing, as an individual; I
will pay, when the rest of mankind do, what I owe no more than
they.

19

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"Do you say," inquires my opponent, "that he who carries me
gratis in a boat across the river Po, does not bestow any benefit
upon me?" I do. He does me some good, but he does not bestow a
benefit upon me; for he does it for his own sake, or at any rate
not for mine; in short, he himself does not imagine that he is
bestowing a benefit upon me, but does it for the credit of the
State, or of the neighbourhood, or of himself, and expects some
return for doing so, different from what he would receive from
individual passengers. "Well," asks my opponent, "if the emperor
were to grant the franchise to all the Gauls, or exemption, from
taxes to all the Spaniards, would each individual of them owe him
nothing on that account?" Of course he would: but he would be
indebted to him, not as having personally received a benefit
intended for himself alone, but as a partaker in one conferred upon
his nation. He would argue, "The emperor had no thought of me at
the time when he benefited us all; he did not care to give me the
franchise separately, he did not fix his attention upon me; why
then should I be grateful to one who did not have me in his mind
when he was thinking of doing what he did? In answer to this, I say
that when he thought of doing good to all the Gauls, he thought of
doing good to me also, for I was a Gaul, and he included me under
my national, if not under my personal appellation. In like manner,
I should feel grateful to him, not as for a personal, but for a
general benefit; being only one of the people, I should regard the
debt of gratitude as incurred, not by myself, but by my country,
and should not pay it myself, but only contribute my share towards
doing so. I do not call a man my creditor because he has lent money
to my country, nor should I include that money in a schedule of my
debts were I either a candidate for a public office, or a defendant
in the courts; yet I would pay my share towards extinguishing such
a debt. Similarly, I deny that I am laid under an obligation by a
gift bestowed upon my entire nation, because although the giver
gave it to me, yet he did not do so for my sake, but gave it
without knowing whether he was giving it to me or not: nevertheless
I should feel that I owed something for the gift, because it did
reach me, though not directly. To lay me under an obligation, a
thing must be done for my sake alone.

20

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"According to this," argues our opponent, "you are under no
obligation to the sun or the moon; for they do not move for your
sake alone." No, but since they move with the object of preserving
the balance of the universe, they move for my sake also, seeing
that I am a fraction of the universe. Besides, our position and
theirs is not the same, for he who does me good in order that he
may by my means do good to himself, does not bestow a benefit upon
me, because he merely makes use of me as an instrument for his own
advantage; whereas the sun and the moon, even if they do us good
for their own sakes, still cannot do good to us in order that by
our means they may do good to themselves, for what is there which
we can bestow upon them?

21

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"I should be sure," replies he, "that the sun and the moon
wished to do us good, if they were able to refuse to do so; but
they cannot help moving as they do. In short, let them stop and
discontinue their work."

See now, in how many ways this argument may be refuted. One who
cannot refuse to do a thing may nevertheless wish to do it; indeed
there is no greater proof of a fixed desire to do anything, than
not to be able to alter one's determination. A good man cannot
leave undone what he does: for unless he does it he will not be a
good man. Is a good man, then, not able to bestow a benefit,
because he does what he ought to do, and is not able not to do what
he ought to do? Besides this, it makes a great difference whether
you say, "He is not able not to do this, because he is forced to do
it," or "He is not able to wish not to do it;" for, if he could not
help doing it, then I am not indebted for it to him, but to the
person who forced him to do it; if he could not help wishing for it
because he had nothing better to wish for, then it is he who forces
himself to do it, and in this case the debt which as acting under
compulsion he could not claim, is due to him as compelling himself.

"Let the sun and moon cease to wish to benefit us," says our
adversary. I answer, "Remember what has been said. Who can be so
crazy as to refuse the name of free-will to that which has no
danger of ceasing to act, and of adopting the opposite course,
since, on the contrary, he whose will is fixed for ever, must be
thought to wish more earnestly than any one else. Surely if he, who
may at any moment change his mind, can be said to wish, we must not
deny the existence of will in a being whose nature does not admit
of change of mind.

22

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"Well," says he "let them stop, if it be possible." What you
say is this:--Let all those heavenly bodies, placed as they are at
vast distances from each other, and arranged to preserve the
balance of the universe, leave their appointed posts: let sudden
confusion arise, so that constellations may collide with
constellations, that the established harmony of all things may be
destroyed and the works of God be shaken into ruin; let the whole
frame of the rapidly moving heavenly bodies abandon in mid career
those movements which we were assured would endure for ages, and
let those which now by their regular advance and retreat keep the
world at a moderate temperature, be instantly consumed by fire, so
that instead of the infinite variety of the seasons all may be
reduced to one uniform condition; let fire rage everywhere,
followed by dull night, and let the bottomless abyss swallow up all
the gods." Is it worth while to destroy all this merely in order to
refute you? Even though you do not wish it, they do you good, and
they wheel in their courses for your sake, though their motion may
be due to some earlier and more important cause.

23

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Besides this, the gods act under no external constraint, but
their own will is a law to them for all time. They have established
an order which is not to be changed, and consequently it is
impossible that they should appear to be likely to do anything
against their will, since they wish to continue doing whatever they
cannot cease from doing, and they never regret their original
decision, No doubt it is impossible for them to stop short, or to
desert to the other side, but it is so for no other reason than
that their own force holds them to their purpose. It is from no
weakness that they persevere; no, they have no mind to leave the
best course, and by this it is fated that they should proceed.
When, at the time of the original creation, they arranged the
entire universe, they paid attention to us as well as to the rest,
and took thought about the human race; and for this reason we
cannot suppose that it is merely for their own pleasure that they
move in their orbits and display their work since we also are a
part of that work. We are, therefore; under an obligation to the
sun and moon and the rest of the heavenly host, because, although
they may rise in order to bestow more important benefits than those
which we receive from them, yet they do bestow these upon us as
they pass on their way to greater things. Besides this, they assist
us of set purpose, and, therefore, lay us under an obligation,
because we do not in their case stumble by chance upon a benefit
bestowed by one who knew not what he was doing, but they knew that
we should receive from them the advantages which we do; so that,
though they may have some higher aim, though the result of their
movements may be something of greater importance than the
preservation of the human race, yet from the beginning thought has
been directed to our comforts, and the scheme of the world has been
arranged in a fashion which proves that our interests were neither
their least nor last concern. It is our duty to show filial love
for our parents, although many of them had no thought of children
when they married. Not so with the gods: they cannot but have known
what they were doing when they furnished mankind with food and
comforts. Those for whose advantage so much was created, could not
have been created without design. Nature conceived the idea of us
before she formed us, and, indeed, we are no such trifling piece of
work as could have fallen from her hands unheeded. See how great
privileges she has bestowed upon us, how far beyond the human race
the empire of mankind extends; consider how widely she allows us to
roam, not having restricted us to the land alone, but permitted us
to traverse every part of herself; consider, too, the audacity of
our intellect, the only one which knows of the gods or seeks for
them, and how we can raise our mind high above the earth, and
commune with those divine influences: you will perceive that man is
not a hurriedly put together, or an unstudied piece of work. Among
her noblest products nature has none of which she can boast more
than man, and assuredly no other which can comprehend her boast.
What madness is this, to call the gods in question for their
bounty? If a man declares that he has received nothing when he is
receiving all the while, and from those who will always be giving
without ever receiving anything in return, how will he be grateful
to those whose kindness cannot be returned without expense? and how
great a mistake is it not to be thankful to a giver, because he is
good even to him who disowns him, or to use the fact of his bounty
being poured upon us in an uninterrupted stream, as an argument to
prove that he cannot help bestowing it. Suppose that such men as
these say, "I do not want it," "Let him keep it to himself," "Who
asks him for it?" and so forth, with all the other speeches of
insolent minds: still, he whose bounty reaches you, although you
say that it does not, lays you under an obligation nevertheless;
indeed, perhaps the greatest part of the benefit which he bestows
is that he is ready to give even when you are complaining against
him.

24

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Do you not see how parents force children during their
infancy to undergo what is useful for their health? Though the
children cry and struggle, they swathe them and bind their limbs
straight lest premature liberty should make them grow crooked,
afterwards instill into them a liberal education, threatening those
who are unwilling to learn, and finally, if spirited young men do
not conduct themselves frugally, modestly, and respectably, they
compel them to do so. Force and harsh measures are used even to
youths who have grown up and are their own masters, if they, either
from fear or from insolence, refuse to take what is good for them.
Thus the greatest benefits that we receive, we receive either
without knowing it, or against our will, from our parents.

25

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Those persons who are ungrateful and repudiate benefits, not
because they do not wish to receive them, but in order that they
may not be laid under an obligation for them, are like those who
fall into the opposite extreme, and are over grateful, who pray
that some trouble or misfortune may befall their benefactors to
give them an opportunity of proving how gratefully they remember
the benefit which they have received. It is a question whether they
are right, and show a truly dutiful feeling; their state of mind is
morbid, like that of frantic lovers who long for their mistress to
be exiled, that they may accompany her when she leaves her country
forsaken by all her friends, or that she may be poor in order that
she may the more need what they give her, or who long that she may
be ill in order that they may sit by her bedside, and who, in
short, out of sheer love form the same wishes as her enemies would
wish for her. Thus the results of hatred and of frantic love are
very nearly the same; and these lovers are very like those who hope
that their friends may meet with difficulties which they may
remove, and who thus do a wrong that they may bestow a benefit,
whereas it would have been much better for them to do nothing, than
by a crime to gain an opportunity of doing good service. What
should we say of a pilot who prayed to the gods for dreadful storms
and tempests, in order that danger might make his skill more highly
esteemed? what of a general who should pray that a vast number of
the enemy surround his camp, fill the ditches by a sudden charge,
tear down the rampart round his panic-stricken army, and plant its
hostile standards at the very gates, in order that he might gain
more glory by restoring his broken ranks and shattered fortunes?
All such men confer their benefits upon us by odious means, for
they beg the gods to harm those whom they mean to help, and wish
them to be struck down before they raise them up; it is a cruel
feeling, brought about by a distorted sense of gratitude, to wish
evil to befall one whom one is bound in honour to succour.

26

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"My wish," argues our opponent, "does him no harm, because
when I wish for the danger I wish for the rescue at the same time."
What you mean by this is not that you do no wrong, but that you do
less than if you wished that the danger might befall him, without
wishing for the rescue. It is wicked to throw a man into the water
in order that you may pull him out, to throw him down that you may
raise him up, or to shut him up that you may release him. You do
not bestow a benefit upon a man by ceasing to wrong him, nor can it
ever be a piece of good service to anyone to remove from him a
burden which you yourself imposed on him. True, you may cure the
hurt which you inflict, but I had rather that you did not hurt me
at all. You may gain my gratitude by curing me because I am
wounded, but not by wounding me in order that you may cure me: no
man likes scars except as compared with wounds, which he is glad to
see thus healed, though he had rather not have received them. It
would be cruel to wish such things to befall one from whom you had
never received a kindness; how much more cruel is it to wish that
they may befall one in whose debt you are.

27

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"I pray," replies he, "at the same time, that I may be able
to help him." In the first place, if I stop you short in the middle
of your prayer, it shows at once that you are ungrateful: I have
not yet heard what you wish to do for him; I have heard what you
wish him to suffer. You pray that anxiety and fear and even worse
evil than this may come upon him. You desire that he may need aid:
this is to his disadvantage; you desire that he may need your aid:
this is to your advantage. You do not wish to help him, but to be
set free from your obligation to him: for when you are eager to
repay your debt in such a way as this, you merely wish to be set
free from the debt, not to repay it. So the only part of your wish
that could be thought honourable proves to be the base and
ungrateful feeling of unwillingness to lie under an obligation: for
what you wish for is, not that you may have an opportunity of
repaying his kindness, but that he may be forced to beg you to do
him a kindness. You make yourself the superior, and you wickedly
degrade beneath your feet the man who has done you good service.
How much better would it be to remain in his debt in an honourable
and friendly manner, than to seek to discharge the debt by these
evil means! You would be less to blame if you denied that you had
received it, for your benefactor would then lose nothing more than
what he gave you, whereas now you wish him to be rendered inferior
to you, and brought by the loss of his property and social position
into a condition below his own benefits. Do you think yourself
grateful? Just utter your wishes in the hearing of him to whom you
wish to do good. Do you call that a prayer for his welfare, which
can be divided between his friend and his enemy, which, if the last
part were omitted, you would not doubt was pronounced, by one who
opposed and hated him? Enemies in war have sometimes wished to
capture certain towns in order to spare them, or to conquer certain
persons in order to pardon, them, yet these were the wishes of
enemies, and what was the kindest part of them began by cruelty.
Finally, what sort of prayers do you think those can be which he,
on whose behalf they are made, hopes more earnestly than any one
else may not be granted? In hoping that the gods may injure a man,
and that you may help him, you deal most dishonourably with him,
and you do not treat the gods themselves fairly, for you give them
the odious part to play, and reserve the generous one for yourself:
the gods must do him wrong in order that you may do him a service.
If you were to suborn an informer to accuse a man, and afterwards
withdrew him, if you engaged a man in a law suit and afterwards
gave it up, no one would hesitate to call you a villain: what
difference does it make, whether you attempt to do this by
chicanery or by prayer, unless it be that by prayer you raise up
more powerful enemies to him than by the other means? You cannot
say "Why, what harm do I do him?" your prayer is either futile or
harmful, indeed it is harmful even though nothing comes of it. You
do your friend wrong by wishing him harm: you must thank the gods
that you do him no harm. The fact of your wishing it is enough: we
ought to be just as angry with you as if you had effected it.

28

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"If," argues our adversary, "my prayers had any efficacy,
they would also have been efficacious to save him from danger." In
the first place, I reply, the danger into which you wish me to fall
is certain, the help which I should receive is uncertain. Or call
them both certain; it is that which injures me that comes first.
Besides, you understand the terms of your wish; I shall be tossed
by the storm without being sure that I have a haven of rest at
hand.

Think what torture it must have been to me, even if I receive your
help, to have stood in need of it: if I escape safely, to have
trembled for myself; if I be acquitted, to have had to plead my
cause. To escape from fear, however great it may be, can never be
so pleasant as to live in sound unassailable safety. Pray that you
may return my kindnesses when I need their return, but do not pray
that I may need them. You would have done what you prayed for, had
it been in your power.

29

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

How far more honourable would a prayer of this sort be: "I
pray that he may remain in such a position as that he may always
bestow benefits and never need them: may he be attended by the
means of giving and helping, of which he makes such a bountiful
use; may he never want benefits to bestow, or be sorry for any
which he has bestowed; may his nature, fitted as it is for acts of
pity, goodness, and clemency, be stimulated and brought out by
numbers of grateful persons, whom I trust he will find without
needing to make trial of their gratitude; may he refuse to be
reconciled to no one, and may no one require to be reconciled to
him: may fortune so uniformly continue to favour him that no one
may be able to return his kindness in any way except by feeling
grateful to him."

How far more proper are such prayers as these, which do not put you
off to some distant opportunity, but express your gratitude at
once? What is there to prevent your returning your benefactor's
kindness, even while he is in prosperity? How many ways are there
by which we can repay what we owe even to the affluent--for
instance, by honest advice, by constant intercourse, by courteous
conversation, pleasing him without flattering him, by listening
attentively to any subject which he may wish to discuss, by keeping
safe any secret that he may impart to us, and by social
intercourse. There is no one so highly placed by fortune as not to
want a friend all the more because he wants nothing.

30

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

The other is a melancholy opportunity, and one which we ought
always to pray may be kept far from us: must the gods be angry with
a man in order that you may prove your gratitude to him? Do you not
perceive that you are doing wrong, from the very fact that those to
whom you are ungrateful fare better? Call up before your mind
dungeons, chains, wretchedness, slavery, war, poverty: these are
the opportunities for which you pray; if any one has any dealings
with you, it is by means of these that you square your account. Why
not rather wish that he to whom you owe most may be powerful and
happy? for, as I have just said, what is there to prevent your
returning the kindness even of those who enjoy the greatest
prosperity? to do which, ample and various opportunities will
present themselves to you, What! do you not know that a debt can be
paid even to a rich man? Nor will I trouble you with many instances
of what you may do. Though a man's riches and prosperity may
prevent your making him any other repayment, I will show you what
the highest in the land stand in need of, what is wanting to those
who possess everything. They want a man to speak the truth, to save
them from the organized mass of falsehood by which they are beset,
which so bewilders them with lies that the habit of hearing only
what is pleasant instead of what is true, prevents their knowing
what truth really is. Do you not see how such persons are driven to
ruin by the want of candour among their friends, whose loyalty has
degenerated into slavish obsequiousness? No one, when giving them
his advice, tells them what he really thinks, but each vies with
the other in flattery; and while the man's friends make it their
only object to see who can most pleasantly deceive him, he himself
is ignorant of his real powers, and, believing himself to be as
great a man as he is told that he is, plunges the State in useless
wars, which bring disasters upon it, breaks off a useful and
necessary peace, and, through a passion of anger which no one
checks, spills the blood of numbers of people, and at last sheds
his own. Such persons assert what has never been investigated as
certain facts, consider that to modify their opinion is as
dishonourable as to be conquered, believe that institutions which
are just flickering out of existence will last for ever, and, thus
overturn great States, to the destruction of themselves and all who
are connected with them. Living as they do in a fool's paradise,
resplendent with unreal and short-lived advantages, they forget
that, as soon as they put it out of their power to hear the truth,
there is no limit to the misfortunes which they may expect.

31

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

When Xerxes declared war against Greece, all his courtiers
encouraged his boastful temper, which forgot how unsubstantial his
grounds for confidence were. One declared that the Greeks would not
endure to hear the news of the declaration of war, and would take
to flight at the first rumour of his approach; another, that with
such a vast army Greece could not only be conquered, but utterly
overwhelmed, and that it was rather to be feared that they would
find the Greek cities empty and abandoned, and that the panic
flight of the enemy would leave them only vast deserts, where no
use could be made of their enormous forces. Another told him that
the world was hardly large enough to contain him, that the seas
were too narrow for his fleets, the camps would not take in his
armies, the plains were not wide enough to deploy his cavalry in,
and that the sky itself was scarcely large enough to enable all his
troops to hurl their darts at once. While much boasting of this
sort was going on around him, raising his already overweening self-
confidence to a frantic pitch, Demaratus, the Lacedaemonian, alone
told him that the disorganized and unwieldy multitude in which he
trusted, was in itself a danger to its chief, because it possessed
only weight without strength; for an army which is too large cannot
be governed, and one which cannot be governed, cannot long exist.
"The Lacedaemonians," said he, "will meet you upon the first
mountain in Greece, and will give you a taste of their quality. All
these thousands of nations of yours will be held in check by three
hundred men: they will stand firm at their posts, they will defend
the passes entrusted to them with their weapons, and block them up
with their bodies: all Asia will not force them to give way; few as
they are, they will stop all this terrible invasion, attempted
though it be by nearly the whole human race. Though the laws of
nature may give way to you, and enable you to pass from Europe to
Asia, yet you will stop short in a bypath; consider what your
losses will be afterwards, when you have reckoned up the price
which you have to pay for the pass of Thermopylae; when you learn
that your march can be stayed, you will discover that you may be
put to flight. The Greeks will yield up many parts of their country
to you, as if they were swept out of them by the first terrible
rush of a mountain torrent; afterwards they will rise against you
from all quarters and will crush you by means of your own strength.
What people say, that your warlike preparations are too great to be
contained in the countries which you intend to attack, is quite
true; but this is to our disadvantage. Greece will conquer you for
this very reason, that she cannot contain you; you cannot make use
of the whole of your force. Besides this, you will not be able to
do what is essential to victory--that is, to meet the manoeuvres of
the enemy at once, to support your own men if they give way, or to
confirm and strengthen them when their ranks are wavering; long
before you know it, you will be defeated. Moreover, you should not
think that because your army is so large that its own chief does
not know its numbers, it is therefore irresistible; there is
nothing so great that it cannot perish; nay, without any other
cause, its own excessive size may prove its ruin." What Demaratus
predicted came to pass. He whose power gods and men obeyed, and who
swept away all that opposed him, was bidden to halt by three
hundred men, and the Persians, defeated in every part of Greece,
learned how great a difference there is between a mob and an army.
Thus it came to pass that Xerxes, who suffered more from the shame
of his failure than from the losses which he sustained, thanked
Demaratus for having been the only man who told him the truth, and
permitted him to ask what boon he pleased. He asked to be allowed
to drive a chariot into Sardis, the largest city in Asia, wearing a
tiara erect upon his head, a privilege which was enjoyed by kings
alone. He deserved his reward before he asked for it, but how
wretched must the nation have been, in which there was no one who
would speak the truth to the king except one man. who did not speak
it to himself.

32

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

The late Emperor Augustus banished his daughter, whose
conduct went beyond the shame of ordinary immodesty, and made
public the scandals of the imperial house
*****
*****
Led away by his passion, he divulged all these crimes which, as
emperor, he ought to have kept secret with as much care as he
punished them, because the shame of some deeds asperses even him
who avenges them. Afterwards, when by lapse of time shame took the
place of anger in his mind, he lamented that he had not kept
silence about matters which he had not learned until it was
disgraceful to speak of them, and often used to exclaim, "None of
these things would have happened to me, if either Agrippa or
Maecenas had lived!" So hard was it for the master of so many
thousands of men to repair the loss of two. When his legions were
slaughtered, new ones were at once enrolled; when his fleet was
wrecked, within a few days another was afloat; when the public
buildings were consumed by fire, finer ones arose in their stead;
but the places of Agrippa and Maecenas remained unfilled throughout
his life. What am I to imagine? that there were not any men like
these, who could take their place, or that it was the fault of
Augustus himself, who preferred mourning for them to seeking for
their likes? We have no reason for supposing that it was the habit
of Agrippa or Maecenas to speak the truth to him; indeed, if they
had lived they would have been as great dissemblers as the rest. It
is one of the habits of kings to insult their present servants by
praising those whom they have lost, and to attribute the virtue of
truthful speaking to those from whom there is no further risk of
hearing it.

33

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

However, to return to my subject, you see how easy it is to
return the kindness of the prosperous, and even of those who occupy
the highest places of all mankind. Tell them, not what they wish to
hear, but what they will wish that they always had heard; though
their ears be stopped by flatteries, yet sometimes truth may
penetrate them; give them useful advice. Do you ask what service
you can render to a prosperous man? Teach him not to rely upon his
prosperity, and to understand that it ought to be supported by the
hands of many trusty friends. Will you not have done much for him,
if you take away his foolish belief that his influence will endure
for ever, and teach him that what we gain by chance passes away
soon, and at a quicker rate than it came; that we cannot fall by
the same stages by which we rose to the height of good fortune, but
that frequently between it and ruin there is but one step? You do
not know how great is the value of friendship, if you do not
understand how much you give to him to whom you give a friend, a
commodity which is scarce not only in men's houses, but in whole
centuries, and which is nowhere scarcer than in the places where it
is thought to be most plentiful. Pray, do you suppose that those
books of names, which your nomenclator can hardly carry or remember, are those of friends?
It is not your friends who crowd to knock at your door, and who are
admitted to your greater or lesser levees.

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. The nomenclator was a slave who attended his master in canvassing and on similar occasions, for the purpose of telling him the names of whom he met in the street.
34

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

To divide one's friends into classes is an old trick of
kings and their imitators; it shows great arrogance to think that
to touch or to pass one's threshold can be a valuable privilege, or
to grant as an honour that you should sit nearer one's front door
than others, or enter house before them, although within the house
there are many more doors, which shut out even those who have been
admitted so far. With us Gaius Gracchus, and shortly after him
Livius Drusus, were the first to keep themselves apart from the
mass of their adherents, and to admit some to their privacy, some
to their more select, and others to their general receptions. These
men consequently had friends of the first and second rank, and so
on, but in none had they true friends. Can you apply the name of
friend to one who is admitted in his regular order to pay his
respects to you? or can you expect perfect loyalty from one who is
forced to slip into your presence through a grudgingly-opened door?
How can a man arrive at using bold freedom of speech with you, if
he is only allowed in his proper turn to make use of the common
phrase, "Hail to you," which is used by perfect strangers? Whenever
you go to any of these great men, whose levees interest the whole
city, though you find all the streets beset with throngs of people,
and the passers-by hardly able to make their way through the crowd,
you may be sure that you have come to a place where there are many
men, but no friends of their patron. We must not seek our friends
in our entrance hall, but in our own breast; it is there that he
ought to be received, there retained, and hoarded up in our minds.
Teach this, and you will have repaid your debt of gratitude.

35

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

If you are useful to your friend only when he is in distress,
and are superfluous when all goes well with him, you form a mean
estimate of your own value. As you can bear yourself wisely both in
doubtful, in prosperous, and in adverse circumstances, by showing
prudence in doubtful cases, courage in misfortune, and self-
restraint in good fortune, so in all circumstances you can make
yourself useful to your friend. Do not desert him in adversity, but
do not wish that it may befall him: the various incidents of human
life will afford you many opportunities of proving your loyalty to
him without wishing him evil. He who prays that another may become
rich, in order that he may share his riches, really has a view to
his own advantage, although his prayers are ostensibly offered in
behalf of his friend; and similarly he who wishes that his friend
may get into some trouble from which his own friendly assistance
may extricate him--a most ungrateful wish--prefers himself to his
friend, and thinks it worthwhile that his friend should be unhappy,
in order that he may prove his gratitude. This very wish makes him
ungrateful, for he wishes to rid himself of his gratitude as though
it were a heavy burden. In returning a kindness it makes a great
difference whether you are eager to bestow a benefit, or merely to
free yourself from a debt. He who wishes to return a benefit will
study his friend's interests, and will hope that a suitable
occasion will arise; he who only wishes to free himself from an
obligation will be eager to do so by any means whatever, which
shows very bad feeling. "Do you say," we may be asked, "that
eagerness to repay kindness belongs to a morbid feeling of
gratitude?" I cannot explain my meaning more clearly than by
repeating what I have already said. You do not want to repay, but
to escape from the benefit which you. have received. You seem to
say, "When shall I get free from this obligation? I must strive by
any means in my power to extinguish my debt to him." You would be
thought to be far from grateful, if you wished to pay a debt to him
with his own money; yet this wish of yours is even more unjust; for
you invoke curses upon him, and call down terrible imprecations
upon the head of one who ought to be held sacred by you. No one, I
suppose, would have any doubt of your wickedness if you were openly
to pray that he might suffer poverty, captivity, hunger, or fear;
yet what is the difference between openly praying for some of these
things, and silently wishing for them? for you do wish for some of
these. Go, and enjoy your belief that this is gratitude, to do what
not even an ungrateful man would do, supposing he confined himself
to repudiating the benefit, and did not go so far as to hate his
benefactor.

36

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Who would call Aeneas pious, if he wished that his native
city might be captured, in order that he might save his father from
captivity? Who would point to the Sicilian youths as good examples
for his children, if they had prayed that Aetna might flame with
unusual heat and pour forth a vast mass of fire in order to afford
them an opportunity of displaying their filial affection by
rescuing their parents from the midst of the conflagration? Rome
owes Scipio nothing if he kept the Punic War alive in order that he
might have the glory of finishing it; she owes nothing to the Decii
if they prayed for public disasters, to give themselves an
opportunity of displaying their brave self-devotion. It is the
greatest scandal for a physician to make work for himself; and many
who have aggravated the diseases of their patients that they may
have the greater credit for curing them, have either failed to cure
them, at all or have done so at the cost of the most terrible
suffering to their victims.

37

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

It is said (at any rate Hecaton tells us) that when
Callistratus with many others was driven into exile by his factious
and licentiously free country, some one prayed that such trouble
might befall the Athenians that they would be forced to recall the
exiles, on hearing which, he prayed that God might forbid his
return upon such terms. When some one tried to console our own
countryman, Rutilius, for his exile, pointing out that civil war
was at hand, and that all exiles would soon be restored to Rome, he
answered with even greater spirit, "What harm have I done you, that
you should wish that I may return to my country more unhappily than
I quit it? My wish is, that my country should blush at my being
banished, rather than that she should mourn at my having returned."
An exile, of which every one is more ashamed than the sufferer, is
not exile at all. These two persons, who did not wish to be
restored to their homes at the cost of a public disaster, but
preferred that two should suffer unjustly than that all should
suffer alike, are thought to have acted like good citizens; and in
like manner it does not accord with the character of a grateful
man, to wish that his benefactor may fall into troubles which he
may dispel; because, even though he may mean well to him, yet he
wishes him evil. To put out a fire which you yourself have lighted,
will not even gain acquittal for you, let alone credit.

38

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

In some states an evil wish was regarded as a crime. It is
certain that at Athens Demades obtained a verdict against one who
sold furniture for funerals, by proving that he had prayed for
great gains, which he could not obtain without the death of many
persons. Yet it is a stock question whether he was rightly found
guilty. Perhaps he prayed, not that he might sell his wares to many
persons, but that he might sell them dear, or that he might procure
what he was going to sell, cheaply. Since his business consisted of
buying and selling, why should you consider his prayer to apply to
one branch of it only, although he made profit from both? Besides
this, you might find every one of his trade guilty, for they all
wish, that is, secretly pray, as he did. You might, moreover, find
a great part of the human race guilty, for who is there who does
not profit by his neighbour's wants? A soldier, if he wishes for
glory, must wish for war; the farmer profits by corn being dear; a
large number of litigants raises the price of forensic eloquence;
physicians make money by a sickly season; dealers in luxuries are
made rich by the effeminacy of youth; suppose that no storms and no
conflagrations injured our dwellings, the builder's trade would be
at a standstill. The prayer of one man was detected, but it was
just like the prayers of all other men. Do you imagine that
Arruntius and Haterius, and all other professional legacy-hunters
do not put up the same prayers as undertakers and grave-diggers?
though the latter know not whose death it is that they wish for,
while the former wish for the death of their dearest friends, from
whom, on account of their intimacy, they have most hopes of
inheriting a fortune. No one's life does the undertaker any harm,
whereas these men starve if their friends are long about dying;
they do not, therefore, merely wish for their deaths in order that
they may receive what they have earned by a disgraceful servitude,
but in order that they may be set free from a heavy tax. There can,
therefore, be no doubt that such persons repeat with even greater
earnestness the prayer for which the undertaker was condemned, for
whoever is likely to profit such men by dying, does them an injury
by living. Yet the wishes of all these are alike well known and
unpunished. Lastly, let every man examine his own self, let him
look into the secret thoughts of his heart and consider what it is
that he silently hopes for; how many of his prayers he would blush
to acknowledge, even to himself; how few there are which we could
repeat in the presence of witnesses!

39

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Yet we must not condemn every thing which we find worthy of
blame, as, for instance, this wish about our friends which we have
been discussing, arises from a misdirected feeling of affection,
and falls into the very error which it strives to avoid, for the
man is ungrateful at the very time when he hurries to prove his
gratitude. He prays aloud, "May he fall into my power, may he need
my influence, may not be able to be safe and respectable without my
aid, may he be so unfortunate that whatever return I make to him
may be regarded as a benefit." To the gods alone he adds, "May
domestic treasons encompass him, which can be quelled by me alone;
may some powerful and virulent enemy, some excited and armed mob,
assail him; may he be set upon by a creditor or an informer."

40

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

See, how just you are; you would never have wished any of these
misfortunes to befall him, if he had not bestowed a benefit upon
you. Not to speak of the graver guilt which you incur by returning
evil for good, you distinctly do wrong in not waiting for the
fitting time for each action, for it is as wrong to anticipate this
as it is not to take it when it comes. A benefit ought not always
to be accepted, and ought not in all cases to be returned. If you
were to return it to me against my will, you would be ungrateful,
how much more ungrateful are you, if you force me to wish for it?
Wait patiently; why are you unwilling to let my bounty abide with
you? Why do you chafe at being laid under an obligation? why, as
though you were dealing with a harsh usurer, are you in such a
hurry to sign and seal an equivalent bond? Why do you wish me to
get into trouble? Why do you call upon the gods to ruin me? If this
is your way of returning a kindness, what would you do if you were
exacting repayment of a debt?

41

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Above all, therefore, my Liberalis, let us learn to live
calmly under an obligation to others, and watch for opportunities
of repaying our debt without manufacturing them. Let us remember
that this anxiety to seize the first opportunity of setting
ourselves free shows ingratitude; for no one repays with good will
that which he is unwilling to owe, and his eagerness to get it out
of his hands shows that he regards it as a burden rather than as a
favour. How much better and more righteous is it to bear in mind
what we owe to our friends, and to offer repayment, not to obtrude
it, nor to think ourselves too much indebted; because a benefit is
a common bond which connects two persons. Say "I do not delay to
repay your kindness to me; I hope that you will accept my gratitude
cheerfully. If irresistible fate hangs over either of us, and
destiny rules either that you must receive your benefit back again,
or that I must receive a second benefit, why then, of us two, let
him give that was wont to give. I am ready to receive it.

"'Tis not the part of Turnus to delay."

That is the spirit which I shall show whenever the time comes; in
the meanwhile the gods shall be my witnesses.

42

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

I have noted in you, my Liberalis, and as it were touched
with my hand a feeling of fussy anxiety not to be behindhand in
doing what is your duty. This anxiety is not suitable to a grateful
mind, which, on the contrary, produces the utmost confidence in
oneself, and which drives away all trouble by the consciousness of
real affection towards one's benefactor. To say "Take back what you
gave me," is no less a reproach than to say "You are in my debt."
Let this be the first privilege of a benefit, that he who bestowed
it may choose the time when he will have it returned. "But I fear
that men may speak ill of me." You do wrong if you are grateful
only for the sake of your reputation, and not to satisfy your
conscience. You have in this matter two judges, your benefactor,
whom you ought not, and yourself, whom you cannot deceive. "But,"
say you, "if no occasion of repayment offers, am I always to remain
in his debt?" Yes; but you should do so openly, and willingly, and
should view with great pleasure what he has entrusted to you. If
you are vexed at not having yet returned a benefit, you must be
sorry that you ever received it; but if he deserved that you should
receive a benefit from him, why should he not deserve that you
should long remain in his debt?

43

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Those persons are much mistaken who regard it as a proof of
a great mind to make offers to give, and to fill many men's pockets
and houses with their presents, for sometimes these are due not to
a great mind, but to a great fortune; they do not know how far more
great and more difficult it sometimes is to receive than to lavish
gifts. I must disparage neither act; it is as proper to a noble
heart to owe as to receive, for both are of equal value when done
virtuously; indeed, to owe is the more difficult, because it
requires more pains to keep a thing safe than to give it away. We
ought not therefore to be in a hurry to repay, nor need we seek to
do so out of due season, for to hasten to make repayment at the
wrong time is as bad as to be slow to do so at the right time. My
benefactor has entrusted his bounty to me: I ought not to have any
fears either on his behalf or on my own. He has a sufficient
security; he cannot lose it except he loses me--nay, not even if he
loses me. I have returned thanks to him for it--that is, I have
requited him. He who thinks too much about repaying a benefit must
suppose that his friend thinks too much about receiving repayment.
Make no difficulty about either course. If he wishes to receive his
benefit back again, let us return it cheerfully; if he prefers to
leave it in our hands, why should we dig up his treasure? why
should we decline to be its guardians? he deserves to be allowed to
do whichever he pleases. As for fame and reputation, let us regard
them as matters which ought to accompany, but which ought not to
direct our actions.

Sources for this text

  • Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

    L. Annaeus Seneca On Benefits, trans. Aubrey Stewart (London: George Bell & Sons, 1887)

    Public domain · Source file

    Transcription: Wikisource

On Benefits
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