Yonge · trans. C. D. Yonge (1853)
Chapter 12
Certainly; Cato, said I, you are employing very admirable language, and such as expresses clearly what you mean; and, therefore, you seem to me to be teaching philosophy in Latin, and, as it were, to be presenting it with the freedom of the city. For up to this time she has seemed like a stranger at Rome, and has not put herself in the way of our conversation; and that, too, chiefly because of a certain highly polished thinness of things and words. For I am aware that there are some men who are able to philosophise in any language, but who still employ no divisions and no definitions; and who say themselves that they approve of those things alone to which nature silently assents. Therefore, they discuss, without any great degree of labour, matters which are not very obscure. And, on this account, I am now prepared to listen eagerly to you, and to commit to memory all the names which you give to those matters to which this discussion refers. For, perhaps, I myself may some day have reason to employ them too.
You, then, appear to me to be perfectly right, and to be acting in strict accordance with our usual way of speaking, when you lay it down that there are vices the exact opposites of virtues; for that which is blameable (vituperabile) for its own sake, I think ought, from that very fact, to be called a vice; and perhaps this verb, vitupero, is derived from vitium. But if you had translated κακία by malitia, then the usage of the Latin language would have limited us to one particular vice; but, as it is, all vice is opposed to all virtue by one generic opposite name.
Yonge renders 3.40–3.41 together here.
trans. C. D. Yonge (1853)
Yonge’s notes (1)
- “Malitia, badness of quality . . . . especially malice, ill-will, spite, malevolence, artfulness, cunning, craft.”—Riddle and Arnold, Lat. Dict.
Latin · Latin text, ed. 1915
Ne tu, inquam, Cato, verbis illustribus et id, quod vis, declarantibus! itaque mihi videris Latine docere philosophiam et ei quasi civitatem dare. quae quidem adhuc peregrinari Romae videbatur nec offerre sese nostris sermonibus, et ista maxime propter limatam quandam et rerum et verborum tenuitatem. scio enim esse quosdam, qui quavis lingua philosophari possint; nullis enim partitionibus, nullis definitionibus utuntur ipsique dicunt ea se modo probare, quibus natura tacita adsentiatur. itaque in rebus minime obscuris non multus est apud eos disserendi labor. quare attendo te studiose et, quaecumque rebus iis, de quibus hic sermo est, nomina inponis, memoriae mando; mihi enim erit isdem istis fortasse iam utendum. Virtutibus igitur rectissime mihi videris et ad consuetudinem nostrae orationis vitia posuisse contraria. quod enim vituperabile est per se ipsum, id eo ipso vitium nominatum puto, vel etiam a vitio dictum vituperari. sin κακίαν malitiam dixisses, ad aliud nos unum certum vitium consuetudo Latina traduceret. nunc omni virtuti vitium contrario nomine opponitur.
Latin text, ed. 1915 · CC BY-SA
Editor’s notes (6)
- ante aut post verbis excidisse videtur uteris
- inlustr. A
- quavis dett. quāvis ABE quamvis RNV
- rectissime igitur BE
- id eo ideo E io R
- vitium dett, vitio