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The Stoa
Translation

On Benefits

Book II

35 chapters

1

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

LET us consider, most excellent Liberalis, what still remains of
the earlier part of the subject; in what way a benefit should be
bestowed. I think that I can point out the shortest way to this;
let us give in the way in which we ourselves should like to
receive. Above all we should give willingly, quickly, and without
any hesitation; a benefit commands no gratitude if it has hung for
a long time in the hands of the giver, if he seems unwilling to
part with it, and gives it as though he were being robbed of it.
Even though some delay should intervene, let us by all means in our
power strive not to seem to have been in two minds about giving it
at all. To hesitate is the next thing to refusing to give, and
destroys all claim to gratitude. For just as the sweetest part of a
benefit is the kindly feeling of the giver, it follows that one who
has by his very delay proved that he gives unwillingly, must be
regarded not as having given anything, but as having been unable to
keep it from an importunate suitor. Indeed, many men are made
generous by want of firmness. The most acceptable benefits are
those which are waiting for us to take them, which are easy to be
received, and offer themselves to us, so that the only delay is
caused by the modesty of the receiver. The best thing of all is to
anticipate a person's wishes; the next, to follow them; the former
is the better course, to be beforehand with our friends by giving
them what they want before they ask us for it, for the value of a
gift is much enhanced by sparing an honest man the misery of asking
for it with confusion and blushes. He who gets what he asked for
does not get it for nothing, for indeed, as our austere ancestors
thought, nothing is so dear as that which is bought by prayers. Men
would be much more modest in their petitions to heaven, if these
had to be made publicly; so that even when addressing the gods,
before whom we can with all honour bend our knees, we prefer to
pray silently and within ourselves.

2

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

It is unpleasant, burdensome, and covers one with shame to have
to say, "Give me." You should spare your friends, and those whom
you wish to make your friends, from having to do this; however
quick he may be, a man gives too late who gives what he has been
asked for. We ought, therefore, to divine every man's wishes, and
when we have discovered them, to set him free from the hard
necessity of asking; you may be sure that a benefit which comes
unasked will be delightful and will not be forgotten. If we do not
succeed in anticipating our friends, let us at any rate cut them
short when they ask us for anything, so that we may appear to be
reminded of what we meant to do, rather than to have been asked to
do it. Let us assent at once, and by our promptness make it appear
that we meant to do so even before we were solicited. As in dealing
with sick persons much depends upon when food is given, and plain
water given at the right moment sometimes acts as a remedy, so a
benefit, however slight and commonplace it may be, if it be
promptly given without losing a moment of time, gains enormously in
importance, and wins our gratitude more than a far more valuable
present given after long waiting and deliberation. One who gives so
readily must needs give with good will; he therefore gives
cheerfully and shows his disposition in his countenance.

3

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Many who bestow immense benefits spoil them by their silence
or slowness of speech, which gives them an air of moroseness, as
they say "yes" with a face which seems to say "no." How much better
is it to join kind words to kind actions, and to enhance the value
of our gifts by a civil and gracious commendation of them! To cure
your friend of being slow to ask a favour of you, you may join to
your gift the familiar rebuke, "I am angry with you for not having
long ago let me know what you wanted, for having asked for it so
formally, or for having made interest with a third party." "I
congratulate myself that you have been pleased to make trial of me;
hereafter, if you want anything, ask for it as your right; however,
for this time I pardon your want of manners." By so doing you will
cause him to value your friendship more highly than that, whatever
it may have been, which he came to ask of you. The goodness and
kindness of a benefactor never appears so great as when on leaving
him one says, "I have to-day gained much; I am more pleased at
finding him so kind than if I had obtained many times more of this,
of which I was speaking, by some other means; I never can make any
adequate return to this man for his goodness."

4

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Many, however, there are who, by harsh words and contemptuous
manner, make their very kindnesses odious, for by speaking and
acting disdainfully they make us sorry that they have granted our
requests. Various delays also take place after we have obtained a
promise; and nothing is more heartbreaking than to be forced to beg
for the very thing which you already have been promised. Benefits
ought to be bestowed at once, but from some persons it is easier to
obtain the promise of them than to get them. One man has to be
asked to remind our benefactor of his purpose; another, to bring it
into effect; and thus a single present is worn away in passing
through many hands, until hardly any gratitude is left for the
original promiser, since whoever we are forced to solicit after the
giving of the promise receives some of the gratitude which we owe
to the giver. Take care, therefore, if you wish your gifts to be
esteemed, that they reach those to whom they are promised entire,
and, as the saying is, without any deduction. Let no one intercept
them or delay them; for no one can take any share of the gratitude
due for your gifts without robbing you of it.

5

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Nothing is more bitter than long uncertainty; some can bear to
have their hopes extinguished better than to have them deferred. Yet
many men are led by an unworthy vanity into this fault of putting
off the accomplishment of their promises, merely in order to swell
the crowd of their suitors, like the ministers of royalty, who
delight in prolonging the display of their own arrogance, hardly
thinking themselves possessed of power unless they let each man see
for a long time how powerful they are. They do nothing promptly, or
at one sitting; they are indeed swift to do mischief, but slow to do
good. Be sure that the comic poet speaks the most absolute truth in
the verses:--

"Know you not this? If you your gifts delay,
You take thereby my gratitude away."

And the following lines, the expression of virtuous pain--a high-
spirited man's misery,--

"What thou doest, do quickly;"

and:--

"Nothing in the world
Is worth this trouble; I had rather you
Refused it to me now."

When the mind begins through weariness to hate the promised
benefit, or while it is wavering in expectation of it, how can it
feel grateful for it? As the most refined cruelty is that which
prolongs the torture, while to kill the victim at once is a kind of
mercy, since the extremity of torture brings its own end with it--
the interval is the worst part of the execution--so the shorter
time a benefit hangs in the balance, the more grateful it is to the
receiver. It is possible to look forward with anxious disquietude
even to good things, and, seeing that most benefits consist in a
release from some form of misery, a man destroys the value of the
benefit which he confers, if he has the power to relieve us, and
yet allows us to suffer or to lack pleasure longer than we need.
Kindness is always eager to do good, and one who acts by love
naturally acts at once; he who does us good, but does it tardily
and with long delays, does not do so from the heart. Thus he loses
two most important things: time, and the proof of his good will to
us; for a lingering consent is but a form of denial.

6

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

The manner in which things are said or done, my Liberalis,
forms a very important part of every transaction. We gain much by
quickness, and lose much by slowness. Just as in darts, the
strength of the iron head remains the same, but there is an
immeasureable difference between the blow of one hurled with the
full swing of the arm and one which merely drops from the hand, and
the same sword either grazes or pierces according as the blow is
delivered; so, in like manner, that which is given is the same, but
the manner in which it is given makes the difference. How sweet,
how precious is a gift, when he who gives does not permit himself
to be thanked, and when while he gives he forgets that he has
given! To reproach a man at the very moment that you are doing him
a service is sheer madness; it is to mix insult with your favours.
We ought not to make our benefits burdensome, or to add any
bitterness to them. Even if there be some subject upon which you
wish to warn your friend, choose some other time for doing so.

7

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Fabius Verrucosus used to compare a benefit bestowed by a
harsh man in an offensive manner to a gritty loaf of bread, which a
hungry man is obliged to receive, but which is painful to eat. When
Marius Nepos of the praetorian guard asked Tiberius Caesar for help
to pay his debts, Tiberius asked him for a list of his creditors;
this is calling a meeting of creditors, not paying debts. When the
list was made out, Tiberius wrote to Nepos telling him that he had
ordered the money to be paid, and adding some offensive reproaches.
The result of this was that Nepos owed no debts, yet received no
kindness; Tiberius, indeed, relieved him from his creditors, but
laid him under no obligation. Tiberius, however, had some design in
doing so; I imagine he did not wish more of his friends to come to
him with the same request. His mode of proceeding was, perhaps,
successful in restraining men's extravagant desires by shame, but
he who wishes to confer benefits must follow quite a different
path. In all ways you should make your benefit as acceptable as
possible by presenting it in the most attractive form; but the
method of Tiberius is not to confer benefits, but to reproach.

8

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Moreover, if incidentally I should say what I think of this
part of the subject, I do not consider that it is becoming even to
an emperor to give merely in order to cover a man with shame. "And
yet," we are told, "Tiberius did not even by this means attain his
object; for after this a good many persons were found to make the
same request. He ordered all of them to explain the reasons of
their indebtedness before the senate, and when they did so, granted
them certain definite sums of money." This is not an act of
generosity, but a reprimand. You may call it a subsidy, or an
imperial contribution; it is not a benefit, for the receiver cannot
think of it without shame. I was summoned before a judge, and had
to be tried at bar before I obtained what I asked for.

9

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Accordingly, all writers on ethical philosophy tell us that
some benefits ought to be given in secret, others in public. Those
things which it is glorious to receive, such as military
decorations or public offices, and whatever else gains in value the
more widely it is known, should be conferred in public; on the
other hand, when they do not promote a man or add to his social
standing, but help him when in weakness, in want, or in disgrace,
they should be given silently, and so as to be known only to those
who profit by them.

10

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Sometimes even the person who is assisted must be deceived, in
order that he may receive our bounty without knowing the source
from whence it flows. It is said that Arcesilaus had a friend who
was poor, but concealed his poverty; who was ill, yet tried to hide
his disorder, and who had not money for the necessary expenses of
existence. Without his knowledge, Arcesilaus placed a bag of money
under his pillow, in order that this victim of false shame might
rather seem to find what he wanted than to receive. "What," say
you, "ought he not to know from whom he received it?" Yes; let him
not know it at first, if it be essential to your kindness that he
should not; afterwards I will do so much for him, and give him so
much that he will perceive who was the giver of the former benefit;
or, better still, let him not know that he has received any thing,
provided I know that I have given it. "This," you say, "is to get
too little return for one's goodness." True, if it be an investment
of which you are thinking; but if a gift, it should be given in the
way which will be of most service to the receiver. You should be
satisfied with the approval of your own conscience; if not, you do
not really delight in doing good, but in being seen to do good.
"For all that," say you, "I wish him to know it." Is it a debtor
that you seek for? "For all that, I wish him to know it." What!
though it be more useful, more creditable, more pleasant for him
not to know his benefactor, will you not consent to stand aside? "I
wish him to know." So, then, you would not save a man's life in the
dark? I do not deny that, whenever the matter admits of it, one
ought to take into consideration the pleasure which we receive from
the joy of the receiver of our kindness; but if he ought to have
help and is ashamed to receive it--if what we bestow upon him pains
him unless it be concealed--I forbear to make my benefits public.
Why should I not refrain from hinting at my having given him
anything, when the first and most essential rule is, never to
reproach a man with what you have done for him, and not even to
remind him of it. The rule for the giver and receiver of a benefit
is, that the one should straightway forget that he has given, the
other should never forget that he has received it.

11

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

A constant reference to one's own services wounds our friend's
feelings. Like the man who was saved from the proscription under
the triumvirate by one of Caesar's friends, and afterwards found it
impossible to endure his preserver's arrogance, they wish to cry,
"Give me back to Caesar." How long will you go on saying, "I saved
you, I snatched you from the jaws of death?" This is indeed life,
if I remember it by my own will, but death if I remember it at
yours; I owe you nothing, if you saved me merely in order to have
some one to point at. How long do you mean to lead me about? how
long do you mean to forbid me to forget my adventure? If I had been
a defeated enemy, I should have been led in triumph but once. We
ought not to speak of the benefits which we have conferred; to
remind men of them is to ask them to return them. We should not
obtrude them, or recall the memory of them; you should only remind
a man of what you have given him by giving him something else. We
ought not even to tell others of our good deeds. He who confers a
benefit should be silent, it should be told by the receiver; for
otherwise you may receive the retort which was made to one who was
everywhere boasting of the benefit which he had conferred: "You
will not deny," said his victim, "that you have received a return
for it?" "When?" asked he. "Often," said the other, "and in many
places, that is, wherever and whenever you have told the story."
What need is there for you to speak, and to take the place which
belongs to another? There is a man who can tell the story in a way
much more to your credit, and thus you will gain glory for not
telling it your self. You would think me ungrateful if, through
your own silence, no one is to know of your benefit. So far from
doing this, even if any one tells the story in our presence, we
ought to make answer, "He does indeed deserve much more than this,
and I am aware that I have not hitherto done any great things for
him, although I wish to do so." This should not be said jokingly,
nor yet with that air by which some persons repel those whom they
especially wish to attract. In addition to this, we ought to act
with the greatest politeness towards such persons. If the farmer
ceases his labours after he has put in the seed, he will lose what
he has sown; it is only by great pains that seeds are brought to
yield a crop; no plant will bear fruit unless it be tended with
equal care from first to last, and the same rule is true of
benefits. Can any benefits be greater than those which children
receive from their parents? Yet these benefits are useless if they
be deserted while young, if the pious care of the parents does not
for a long time watch over the gift which they have bestowed. So it
is with other benefits; unless you help them, you will lose them;
to give is not enough, you must foster what you have given. If you
wish those whom you lay under an obligation to be grateful to you,
you must not merely confer benefits upon them, but you must also
love them. Above all, as I said before, spare their ears; you will
weary them if you remind them of your goodness, if you reproach
them with it you will make them hate you. Pride ought above all
things to be avoided when you confer a benefit. What need have you
for disdainful airs, or swelling phrases? the act itself will exalt
you. Let us shun vain boasting: let us be silent, and let our deeds
speak for us. A benefit conferred with haughtiness not only wins no
gratitude, but causes dislike.

12

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Gaius Caesar granted Pompeius Pennus his life, that is, if not
to take away life be to grant it; then, when Pompeius was set free
and returning thanks to him, he stretched out his left foot to be
kissed. Those who excuse this action, and say that it was not done
through arrogance, say that he wished to show him a gilded, nay a
golden slipper studded with pearls. "Well," say they, "what
disgrace can there be in a man of consular rank kissing gold and
pearls, and what part of Caesar's whole body was it less pollution
to kiss?" So, then, that man, the object of whose life was to
change a free state into a Persian despotism, was not satisfied
when a senator, an aged man, a man who had filled the highest
offices in the state, prostrated himself before him in the presence
of all the nobles, just as the vanquished prostrate themselves
before their conqueror! He discovered a place below his knees down
to which he might thrust liberty. What is this but trampling upon
the commonwealth, and that, too, with the left foot, though you may
say that this point does not signify? It was not a sufficiently
foul and frantic outrage for the emperor to sit at the trial of a
consular for his life wearing slippers, he must needs push his
shoes into a senator's face.

13

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

O pride, the silliest fault of great good fortune! how
pleasant it is to take nothing from thee! how dost thou turn all
benefits into outrages! how dost thou delight in all excess! how
ill all things become thee! The higher thou risest the lower thou
art, and provest that the good things by which thou art so puffed
up profit thee not; thou spoilest all that thou givest. It is worth
while to inquire why it is that pride thus swaggers and changes the
form and appearance of her countenance, so that she prefers a mask
to her own face. It is pleasant to receive gifts when they are
conferred in a kindly and gentle manner, when a superior in giving
them does not exalt himself over me, but shows as much good feeling
as possible, placing himself on a level with me, giving without
parade, and choosing a time when I am glad of his help, rather than
waiting till I am in the bitterest need. The only way by which you
can prevail upon proud men not to spoil their gifts by their
arrogance is by proving to them that benefits do not appear greater
because they are bestowed with great pomp and circumstance; that no
one will think them greater men for so doing, and that excessive
pride is a mere delusion which leads men to hate even what they
ought to love.

14

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

There are some things which injure those who receive them,
things which it is not a benefit to give but to withhold; we should
therefore consider the usefulness of our gift rather than the wish
of the petitioner to receive it; for we often long for hurtful
things, and are unable to discern how ruinous they are, because our
judgment is biassed by our feelings; when, however, the longing is
past, when that frenzied impulse which masters our good sense has
passed away, we abhor those who have given us hurtful gifts. As we
refuse cold water to the sick, or swords to the grief-stricken or
remorseful, and take from the insane whatever they might in their
delirium use to their own destruction, so must we persist in
refusing to give anything whatever that is hurtful, although our
friends earnestly and humbly, nay, sometimes even most piteously
beg for it. We ought to look at the end of our benefits as well
as the beginning, and not merely to give what men are glad to
receive, but what they will hereafter be glad to have received.
There are many who say, "I know that this will do him no good, but
what am I to do? he begs for it, I cannot withstand his entreaties.
Let him see to it; he will blame himself, not me." Not so: you he
will blame, and deservedly; when he comes to his right mind, when
the frenzy which now excites him has left him, how can he help
hating the man who has assisted him to harm and to endanger
himself? It is a cruel kindness to allow one's self to be won over
into granting that which injures those who beg for it. Just as it
is the noblest of acts to save men from harm against their will, so
it is but hatred, under the mask of civility, to grant what is
harmful to those who ask for it. Let us confer benefits of such a
kind, that the more they are made use of the better they please,
and which never can turn into injuries. I never will give money to
a man if I know that he will pay it to an adulteress, nor will I be
found in connexion with any wicked act or plan; if possible, I will
restrain men from crime; if not, at least I will never assist them
in it. Whether my friend be driven into doing wrong by anger, or
seduced from the path of safety by the heat of ambition, he shall
never gain the means of doing mischief except from himself, nor
will I enable him one day to say, "He ruined me out of love for
me." Our friends often give us what our enemies wish us to receive;
we are driven by the unseasonable fondness of the former into the
ruin which the latter hope will befall us. Yet, often as it is the
case, what can be more shameful than that there should be no
difference between a benefit and hatred?

15

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Let us never bestow gifts which may recoil upon us to our
shame. As the sum total of friendship consists in making our
friends equal to ourselves, we ought to consider the interests of
both parties; I must give to him that wants, yet so that I do not
want myself; I must help him who is perishing, yet so that I do not
perish myself, unless by so doing I can save a great man or a great
cause. I must give no benefit which it would disgrace me to ask
for. I ought not to make a small benefit appear a great one, nor
allow great benefits to be regarded as small; for although it
destroys all feeling of gratitude to treat what you give like a
creditor, yet you do not reproach a man, but merely set off your
gift to the best advantage by letting him know what it is worth.
Every man must consider what his resources and powers are, so that
we may not give either more or less than we are able. We must also
consider the character and position of the person to whom we give,
for some men are too great to give small gifts, while others are
too small to receive great ones. Compare, therefore, the character
both of the giver and the receiver, and weigh that which you give
between the two, taking care that what is given be neither too
burdensome nor too trivial for the one to give, nor yet such as the
receiver will either treat with disdain as too small, or think too
great for him to deal with.

16

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Alexander, who was of unsound mind, and always full of
magnificent ideas, presented somebody with a city. When the man to
whom he gave it had reflected upon the scope of his own powers, he
wished to avoid the jealousy which so great a present would excite,
saying that the gift did not suit a man of his position. "I do not
ask," replied Alexander, "what is becoming for you to receive, but
what is becoming for me to give." This seems a spirited and kingly
speech, yet really it is a most foolish one. Nothing is by itself a
becoming gift for any one: all depends upon who gives it, to whom
he gives it, when, for what reason, where, and so forth, without
which details it is impossible to argue about it. Inflated
creature! if it did not become him to receive this gift, it could
not become thee to give it. There should be a proportion between
men's characters and the offices which they fill; and as virtue in
all cases should be our measure, he who gives too much acts as
wrongly as he who gives too little. Even granting that fortune has
raised you so high, that, where other men give cups, you give
cities (which it would show a greater mind in you not to take than
to take and squander), still there must be some of your friends who
are not strong enough to put a city in their pockets.

17

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

A certain cynic asked Antigonus for a talent. Antigonus
answered that this was too much for a cynic to ask for. After this
rebuff he asked for a penny. Antigonus answered that this was too
little for a king to give. "This kind of hair-splitting" (you say)
"is contemptible: he found the means of giving neither. In the
matter of the penny he thought of the king, in that of the talent
he thought of the cynic, whereas with respect to the cynic it would
have been right to receive the penny, with respect to the king it
would have been right to give the talent. Though there may be
things which are too great for a cynic to receive, yet nothing is
so small, that it does not become a gracious king to bestow it." If
you ask me, I applaud Antigonus; for it is not to be endured that a
man who despises money should ask for it. Your cynic has publicly
proclaimed his hatred of money, and assumed the character of one
who despises it: let him act up to his professions. It is most
inconsistent for him to earn money by glorifying his poverty. I
wish to use Chrysippus's simile of the game of ball, in which the
ball must certainly fall by the fault either of the thrower or of
the catcher; it only holds its course when it passes between the
hands of two persons who each throw it and catch it suitably. It is
necessary, however, for a good player to send the ball in one way
to a comrade at a long distance, and in another to one at a short
distance. So it is with a benefit: unless it be suitable both for
the giver and the receiver, it will neither leave the one nor reach
the other as it ought. If we have to do with a practised and
skilled player, we shall throw the ball more recklessly, for
however it may come, that quick and agile hand will send it back
again; if we are playing with an unskilled novice, we shall not
throw it so hard, but far more gently, guiding it straight into his
very hands, and we shall run to meet it when it returns to us. This
is just what we ought to do in conferring benefits; let us teach
some men how to do so, and be satisfied if they attempt it, if they
have the courage and the will to do so. For the most part, however,
we make men ungrateful, and encourage them, to be so, as if our
benefits were only great when we cannot receive any gratitude for
them; just as some spiteful ball-players purposely put out their
companion, of course to the ruin of the game, which cannot be
carried on without entire agreement Many men are of so depraved a
nature that they had rather lose the presents which they make than
be thought to have received a return for them, because they are
proud, and like to lay people under obligations: yet how much
better and more kindly would it be if they tried to enable the
others also to perform their parts, if they encouraged them in
returning gratitude, put the best construction upon all their acts,
received one who wished to thank them just as cordially as if he
came to repay what he had received, and easily lent themselves to
the belief that those whom they have laid under an obligation wish
to repay it. We blame usurers equally when they press harshly for
payment, and when they delay and make difficulties about taking
back the money which they have lent; in the same way, it is just as
right that a benefit should be returned, as it is wrong to ask any
one to return it. The best man is he who gives readily, never asks
for any return, and is delighted when the return is made, because,
having really and truly forgotten what he gave, he receives it as
though it were a present.

18

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Some men not only give, but even receive benefit haughtily, a
mistake into which we ought not to fall: for now let us cross over
to the other side of the subject, and consider how men should behave
when they receive benefits. Every function which is performed by two
persons makes equal demands upon both: after you have considered
what a father ought to be, you will perceive that there remains an
equal task, that of considering what a son ought to be: a husband
has certain duties, but those of a wife are no less important. Each
of these give and take equally, and each require a similar rule of
life, which, as Hecaton observes, is hard to follow: indeed, it is
difficult for us to attain to virtue, or even to anything that comes
near virtue: for we ought not only to act virtuously but to do so
upon principle. We ought to follow this guide throughout our lives,
and to do everything great and small according to its dictates:
according as virtue prompts us we ought both to give and to
receive. Now she will declare at the outset that we ought not to
receive benefits from every man. "From whom, then, ought we to
receive them?" To answer you briefly, I should say, from those to
whom we have given them. Let us consider whether we ought not to be
even more careful in choosing to whom we should owe than to whom we
should give. For even supposing that no unpleasantness should
result (and very much always does), still it is a great misery to
be indebted to a man to whom you do not wish to be under an
obligation; whereas it is most delightful to receive a benefit from
one whom you can love even after he has wronged you, and when the
pleasure which you feel in his friendship is justified by the
grounds on which it is based. Nothing is more wretched for a modest
and honourable man than to feel it to be his duty to love one whom
it does not please him to love. I must constantly remind you that I
do not speak of wise men, who take pleasure in everything that is
their duty, who have their feelings under command, and are able to
lay down whatever law they please to themselves and keep it, but
that I speak of imperfect beings struggling to follow the right
path, who often have trouble in bending their passions to their
will. I must therefore choose the man from whom I will accept a
benefit; indeed, I ought to be more careful in the choice of my
creditor for a benefit than for money; for I have only to pay the
latter as much as I received of him, land when I have paid it I am
free from all obligation; but to the other I must both repay more,
and even when I have repaid his kindness we remain connected, for
when I have paid my debt I ought again to renew it, while our
friendship endures unbroken. Thus, as I ought not to make an
unworthy man my friend, so I ought not to admit an unworthy man
into that most holy bond of gratitude for benefits, from which
friendship arises. You reply, "I cannot always say 'No': sometimes
I must receive a benefit even against my will. Suppose I were given
something by a cruel and easily offended tyrant, who would take it
as an affront if his bounty were slighted? am I not to accept it?
Suppose it were offered by a pirate, or a brigand, or a king of the
temper of a pirate or brigand. What ought I to do? Such a man is
not a worthy object for me to owe a benefit to." When I say that
you ought to choose, I except vis major and fear, which destroy all
power of choice. If you are free, if it lies with you to decide
whether you will or not, then you will turn over in your own mind
whether you will take a gift from a man or not; but if your
position makes it impossible for you to choose, then be assured
that you do not receive a gift, you merely obey orders. No one
incurs any obligation by receiving what it was not in his power to
refuse; if you want to know whether I wish to take it, arrange
matters so that I have the power of saying 'No.' "Yet suppose he
gave you your life." It does not matter what the gift was, unless
it be given and received with good will: you are not my preserver
because you have saved my life. Poison sometimes acts as a
medicine, yet it is not on that account regarded as wholesome. Some
things benefit us but put us under no obligation: for instance a
man who intended to kill a tyrant, cut with his sword a tumour from
which he suffered: yet the tyrant did not show him gratitude
because by wounding him he had healed a disease which surgeons had
feared to meddle with.

19

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

You see that the actual thing itself is not of much
importance, because it is not regarded as a benefit at all, if you
do good when you intended to do evil; in such a case the benefit is
done by chance, the man did harm. I have seen a lion in the
amphitheatre, who recognized one of the men who fought with wild
beasts, who once had been his keeper, and protected him against the
attacks of the other animals. Are we, then, to say that this
assistance of the brute was a benefit? By no means, because it did
not intend to do it, and did not do it with kindly intentions. You
may class the lion and your tyrant together: each of them saved a
man's life, yet neither conferred a benefit. Because it is not a
benefit to be forced to receive one, neither is it a benefit to be
under an obligation to a man to whom we do not wish to be indebted.
You must first give me personal freedom of decision, and then your
benefit.

20

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

The question has been raised, whether Marcus Brutus ought to
have received his life from the hands of Julius Caesar, who, he had
decided, ought to be put to death.

As to the grounds upon which he put him to death, I shall discuss
them elsewhere; for to my mind, though he was in other respects a
great man, in this he seems to have been entirely wrong, and not to
have followed the maxims of the Stoic philosophy. He must either
have feared the name of "King," although a state thrives best under
a good king, or he must have hoped that liberty could exist in a
state where some had so much to gain by reigning, and others had so
much to gain by becoming slaves. Or, again, he must have supposed
that it would be possible to restore the ancient constitution after
all the ancient manners had been lost, and that citizens could
continue to possess equal rights, or laws remain inviolate, in a
state in which he had seen so many thousands of men fighting to
decide, not whether they should be slaves or free, but which master
they should serve. How forgetful he seems to have been, both of
human nature and of the history of his own country, in supposing
that when one despot was destroyed another of the same temper would
not take his place, though, after so many kings had perished by
lightning and the sword, a Tarquin was found to reign! Yet Brutus
did right in receiving his life from Caesar, though he was not
bound thereby to regard Caesar as his father, since it was by a
wrong that Caesar had come to be in a position to bestow this
benefit. A man does not save your life who does not kill you; nor
does he confer a benefit, but merely gives you your discharge.

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. The 'discharge' alluded to is that which was granted to the beaten one of a pair of gladiators, when their duel was not to the death.
21

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

It seems to offer more opportunity for debate to consider what
a captive ought to do, if a man of abominable vices offers him the
price of his ransom? Shall I permit myself to be saved by a wretch?
When safe, what recompense can I make to him? Am I to live with an
infamous person? Yet, am I not to live with my preserver? I will
tell you my opinion. I would accept money, even from such a person,
if it were to save my life; yet I would only accept it as a loan,
not as a benefit. I would repay him the money, and if I were ever
able to preserve him from danger I would do so. As for friendship,
which can only exist between equals, I would not condescend to be
such a man's friend; nor would I regard him as my preserver, but
merely as a money-lender, to whom I am only bound to repay what I
borrowed from him.

A man may be a worthy person for me to receive a benefit from, but
it will hurt him to give it. For this reason I will not receive it,
because he is ready to help me to his own prejudice, or even
danger. Suppose that he is willing to plead for me in court, but by
so doing will make the king his enemy. I should be his enemy, if,
when he is willing to risk himself for me, if I were not to risk
myself without him, which moreover is easier for me to do.****

As an instance of this, Hecaton calls the case of Arcesilaus silly,
and not to the purpose. Arcesilaus, he says, refused to receive a
large sum of money which was offered to him by a son, lest the son
should offend his penurious father. What did he do deserving of
praise, in not receiving stolen goods, in choosing not to receive
them, instead of returning them? What proof of self-restraint is
there in refusing to receive another man's property. If you want an
instance of magnanimity, take the case of Julius Graecinus, whom
Caius Caesar put to death merely on the ground that he was a better
man than it suited a tyrant for anyone to be. This man, when he was
receiving subscriptions from many of his friends to cover his
expenses in exhibiting public games, would not receive a large sum
which was sent him by Fabius Persicus; and when he was blamed for
rejecting it by those who think more of what is given than of who
gives it, he answered, "Am I to accept a present from a man when I
would not accept his offer to drink a glass of wine with him?"

When a consular named Rebilius, a man of equally bad character,
sent a yet larger sum to Graecinus, and pressed him to receive it.
"I must beg," answered he, "that you will excuse me. I did not take
money from Persicus either." Ought we to call this receiving
presents, or rather taking one's pick of the senate?

22

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

When we have decided to accept, let us accept with
cheerfulness, showing pleasure, and letting the giver see it, so
that he may at once receive some return for his goodness: for as it
is a good reason for rejoicing to see our friend happy, it is a
better one to have made him so. Let us, therefore, show how
acceptable a gift is by loudly expressing our gratitude for it; and
let us do so, not only in the hearing of the giver, but everywhere.
He who receives a benefit with gratitude, repays the first
instalment of it.

23

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

There are some, who only like to receive benefits privately:
they dislike having any witnesses and confidants. Such men, we may
believe, have no good intentions. As a giver is justified in
dwelling upon those qualities of his gift which will please the
receiver, so a man, when he receives, should do so publicly; you
should not take from a man what you are ashamed to owe him. Some
return thanks to one stealthily, in a corner, in a whisper. This is
not modesty, but a kind of denying of the debt: it is the part of
an ungrateful man not to express his gratitude before witnesses.
Some object to any accounts being kept between them and their
benefactors, and wish no brokers to be employed or witnesses to be
called, but merely to give their own signature to a receipt. Those
men do the like, who take care to let as few persons as possible
know of the benefits which they have received. They fear to receive
them in public, in order that their success may be attributed
rather to their own talents than to the help of others: they are
very seldom to be found in attendance upon those to whom they owe
their lives and their fortunes, and thus, while avoiding the
imputation of servility, they incur that of ingratitude.

24

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Some men speak in the most offensive terms of those to whom
they owe most. There are men whom it is safer to affront than to
serve, for their dislike leads them to assume the airs of persons
who are not indebted to us: although nothing more is expected of
them than that they should remember what they owe us, refreshing
their memory from time to time, because no one can be grateful who
forgets a kindness, and he who remembers it, by so doing proves his
gratitude. We ought neither to receive benefits with a fastidious
air, nor yet with a slavish humility: for if a man does not care
for a benefit when it is freshly bestowed--a time at which all
presents please us most--what will he do when its first charms have
gone off? Others receive with an air of disdain, as much as to say.
"I do not want it; but as you wish it so very much, I will allow
you to give it to me." Others take benefits languidly, and leave
the giver in doubt as to whether they know that they have received
them; others barely open their lips in thanks, and would be less
offensive if they said nothing. One ought to proportion one's
thanks to the importance of the benefit received, and to use the
phrases, "You have laid more of us than you think under an
obligation," for everyone likes to find his good actions extend
further than he expected. "You do not know what it is that you have
done for me; but you ought to know how much more important it is
than you imagine." It is in itself an expression of gratitude to
speak of one's self as overwhelmed by kindness; or "I shall never
be able to thank you sufficiently; but, at any rate, I will never
cease to express everywhere my inability to thank you."

25

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

By nothing did Furnius gain greater credit with Augustus, and
make it easy for him to obtain anything else for which he might
ask, than by merely saying, when at his request Augustus pardoned
his father for having taken Antonius's side, "One wrong alone I
have received at your hands, Caesar; you have forced me to live and
to die owing you a greater debt of gratitude than I can ever
repay."

What can prove gratitude so well as that a man should never
be satisfied, should never even entertain the hope of making any
adequate return for what he has received? By these and similar
expressions we must try not to conceal our gratitude, but to
display it as clearly as possible. No words need be used; if we
only feel as we ought, our thankfulness will be shown in our
countenances. He who intends to be grateful, let him think how he
shall repay a kindness while he is receiving it. Chrysippus says
that such a man must watch for his opportunity, and spring forward
whenever it offers, like one who has been entered for a race, and
who stands at the starting-point waiting for the barriers to be
thrown open; and even then he must use great exertions and great
swiftness to catch the other, who has a start of him.

26

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

We must now consider what is the main cause of ingratitude.
It is caused by excessive self-esteem, by that fault innate in all
mortals, of taking a partial view of ourselves and our own acts, by
greed, or by jealousy.

Let us begin with the first of these. Every one is prejudiced in
his own favour, from which it follows that he believes himself to
have earned all that he receives, regards it as payment for his
services, and does not think that he has been appraised at a
valuation sufficiently near his own. "He has given me this," says
he, "but how late, after how much toil? how much more might I have
earned if I had attached myself to So and so, or to So and so? I
did not expect this; I have been treated like one of the herd; did
he really think that I only deserved so little? why, it would have
been less insulting to have passed me over altogether."

27

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

The augur Cnaeus Lentulus, who, before his freedmen reduced
him to poverty, was one of the richest of men, who saw himself in
possession of a fortune of four hundred millions--I say advisedly,
"saw," for he never did more than see it--was as barren and
contemptible in intellect as he was in spirit. Though very
avaricious, yet he was so poor a speaker that he found it easier to
give men coins than words. This man, who owed all his prosperity to
the late Emperor Augustus, to whom he had brought only poverty,
encumbered with a noble name, when he had risen to be the chief man
in Rome, both in wealth and influence, used sometimes to complain
that Augustus had interrupted his legal studies, observing that he
had not received anything like what he had lost by giving up the
study of eloquence. Yet the truth was that Augustus, besides
loading him with other gifts, had set him free from the necessity
of making himself ridiculous by labouring at a profession in which
he never could succeed.

Greed does not permit any one to be grateful; for what is given is
never equal to its base desires, and the more we receive the more
we covet, for avarice is much more eager when it has to deal with
great accumulations of wealth, just as the power of a flame is
enormously greater in proportion to the size of the conflagration
from which it springs. Ambition in like manner suffers no man to
rest satisfied with that measure of public honours, to gain which
was once the limit of his wildest hope; no one is thankful for
becoming tribune, but grumbles at not being at once promoted to the
post of praetor; nor is he grateful for this if the consulship does
not follow; and even this does not satisfy him if he be consul but
once. His greed ever stretches itself out further, and he does not
understand the greatness of his success because he always looks
forward to the point at which he aims, and never back towards that
from which he started.

28

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

A more violent and distressing vice than any of these is
jealousy which disturbs us by suggesting comparisons. "He gave me
this, but he gave more to that man, and he gave it to him before
me;" after which he sympathises with no one, but pushes his own
claims to the prejudice of every one else. How much more
straightforward and modest is it to make the most of what we have
received, knowing that no man is valued so highly by any one else
as by his own, self! "I ought to have received more, but it was not
easy for him to give more; he was obliged to distribute his
liberality among many persons. This is only the beginning; let me
be contented, and by my gratitude encourage him to show me more
favour; he has not done as much as he ought, but he will do so the
more frequently; he certainly preferred that man to me, but he has
preferred me before many others; that man is not my equal either in
virtue or in services, but he has some charm of his own: by
complaining I shall not make myself deserve to receive more, but
shall become unworthy of what I have received. More has been given
to those most villainous men than has been given to me; well, what
is that to the purpose? how seldom does Fortune show judgment in
her choice? We complain every day of the success of bad men; very
often the hail passes over the estates of the greatest villains and
strikes down the crops of the best of men; every man has to take
his chance, in friendship as well as in everything else." There is
no benefit so great that spitefulness can pick no holes in it, none
so paltry that it cannot be made more of by friendly
interpretation. We shall never want a subject for complaint if we
look at benefits on their wrong side.

29

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

See how unjustly the gifts of heaven are valued even by some
who profess themselves philosophers, who complain that we are not
as big as elephants, as swift as stags, as light as birds, as
strong as bulls; that the skins of seals are stronger, of hinds
prettier, of bears thicker, of beavers softer than ours; that dogs
excel us in delicacy of scent, eagles in keenness of sight, crows
in length of days, and many beasts in ease of swimming. And
although nature itself does not allow some qualities, as for
example strength and swiftness, to be combined in the same person,
yet they call it a monstrous thing that men are not compounded of
different and inconsistent good qualities, and call the gods
neglectful of us because we have not been given health which even
our vices cannot destroy, or knowledge of the future. They scarcely
refrain from rising to such a pitch of impudence as to hate nature
because we are below the gods, and not on an equality with them.
How much better is it to turn to the contemplation of so many great
blessings, and to be thankful that the gods have been pleased to
give us a place second only to themselves in this most beautiful
abode, and that they have appointed us to be the lords of the
earth! Can any one compare us with the animals over whom we rule?
Nothing has been denied us except what could not have been granted.
In like manner, thou that takest an unfair view of the lot of
mankind, think what blessings our Father has bestowed upon us, how
far more powerful animals than ourselves we have broken to harness,
how we catch those which are far swifter, how nothing that has life
is placed beyond the reach of our weapons! We have received so many
excellencies, so many crafts, above all our mind, which can pierce
at once whatever it is directed against, which is swifter than the
stars in their courses, for it arrives before them at the place
which they will reach after many ages; and besides this, so many
fruits of the earth, so much treasure, such masses of various
things piled one upon another. You may go through the whole order
of nature, and since you find no entire creature which you would
prefer to be, you may choose from each, the special qualities which
you would like to be given to yourself; then, if you rightly
appreciate the partiality of nature for you, you cannot but confess
yourself to be her spoiled child. So it is; the immortal gods have
unto this day always held us most dear, and have bestowed upon us
the greatest possible honour, a place nearest to themselves. We
have indeed received great things, yet not too great.

30

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

I have thought it necessary, my friend Liberalis, to state
these facts, both because when speaking of small benefits one ought
to make some mention of the greatest, and because also this
shameless and hateful vice (of ingratitude), starting with these,
transfers itself from them to all the rest. If a man scorn these,
the greatest of all benefits, to whom will he feel gratitude, what
gift will he regard as valuable or deserving to be returned: to
whom will he be grateful for his safety or his life, if he denies
that he has received from the gods that existence which he begs
from them daily? He, therefore, who teaches men to be grateful,
pleads the cause not only of men, but even of the gods, for though
they, being placed above all desires, cannot be in want of
anything, yet we can nevertheless offer them our gratitude.

No one is justified in seeking an excuse for ingratitude in his own
weakness or poverty, or in saying, "What am I to do, and how? When
can I repay my debt to my superiors the lords of heaven and earth?"
Avaricious as you are, it is easy for you to give them thanks,
without expense; lazy though you be, you can do it without labour.
At the same instant at which you received your debt towards them,
if you wish to repay it, you have done as much as any one can do,
for he returns a benefit who receives it with good will.

31

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

This paradox of the Stoic philosophy, that he returns a
benefit who receives it with good will, is, in my opinion, either
far from admirable, or else it is incredible. For if we look at
everything merely from the point of view of our intentions, every
man has done as much as he chose to do; and since filial piety,
good faith, justice, and in short every virtue is complete within
itself, a man may be grateful in intention even though he may not
be able to lift a hand to prove his gratitude. Whenever a man
obtains what he aimed at, he receives the fruit of his labour. When
a man bestows a benefit, at what does he aim? clearly to be of
service and afford pleasure to him upon whom he bestows it. If he
does what he wishes, if his purpose reaches me and fills us each
with joy, he has gained his object. He does not wish anything to be
given to him in return, or else it becomes an exchange of
commodities, not a bestowal of benefits. A man steers well who
reaches the port for which he started: a dart hurled by a steady
hand performs its duty if it hits the mark; one who bestows a
benefit wishes it to be received with gratitude; he gets what he
wanted if it be well received. "But," you say, "he hoped for some
profit also." Then it was not a benefit, the property of which is
to think nothing of any repayment. I receive what was given me in
the same spirit in which it was given: then I have repaid it. If
this be not true, then this best of deeds has this worst of
conditions attached to it, that it depends entirely upon fortune
whether I am grateful or not, for if my fortune is adverse I can
make no repayment. The intention is enough. "What then? am I not to
do whatever I may be able to repay it, and ought I not ever to be
on the watch for an opportunity of filling the bosom of him from whom I have received any
kindness? True; but a benefit is in an evil plight if we cannot be
grateful for it even when we are empty-handed.

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. Sinus, the fold of the toga over the breast, used as a pocket by the Romans. The great French actor Talma, when dressed for the first time in correct classical costume, indignantly asked where he was to put his snuff-box.
32

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"A man," it is argued, "who has received a benefit, however
gratefully he may have received it, has not yet accomplished all
his duty, for there remains the part of repayment; just as in
playing at ball it is something to catch the ball cleverly and
carefully, but a man is not called a good player unless he can
handily and quickly send back the ball which he has caught." This
analogy is imperfect; and why? Because to do this creditably
depends upon the movement and activity of the body, and not upon
the mind: and an act of which we judge entirely by the eye, ought
to be all clearly displayed. But if a man caught the ball as he
ought to do, I should not call him a bad player for not returning
it, if his delay in returning it was not caused by his own fault.
"Yet," say you, "although the player is not wanting in skill,
because he did one part of his duty, and was able to do the other
part, yet in such a case the game is imperfect, for its perfection
lies in sending the ball backwards and forwards." I am unwilling to
expose this fallacy further; let us think that it is the game, not
the player that is imperfect: so likewise in the subject which we
are discussing, the thing which is given lacks something, because
another equal thing ought to be returned for it, but the mind of
the giver lacks nothing, because it has found another mind equal to
itself, and as far as intentions go, has effected what it wished.

33

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

A man bestows a benefit upon me: I receive it just as he
wished it to be received: then he gets at once what he wanted, and
the only thing which he wanted, and therefore I have proved myself
grateful. After this it remains for me to enjoy my own resources,
with the addition of an advantage conferred upon me by one whom I
have obliged; this advantage is not the remainder of an imperfect
service, but an addition to a perfected service.
For example, Phidias makes a statue. Now the product of an art is
one thing, and that of a trade is another. It is the business of
the art to make the thing which he wished to make, and that of the
trade to make it with a profit. Phidias has completed his work,
even though he does not sell it. The product, therefore, of his
work is threefold: there is the consciousness of having made it,
which he receives when his work is completed; there is the fame
which he receives; and thirdly, the advantage which he obtains by
it, in influence, or by selling it, or otherwise. In like manner
the first fruit of a benefit is the consciousness of it, which we
feel when we have bestowed it upon the person whom we chose;
secondly and thirdly there is the credit which we gain by doing so,
and there are those things which we may receive in exchange for it.
So when a benefit has been graciously received, the giver has
already received gratitude, but has not yet received recompense for
it: that which we owe in return is therefore something apart from
the benefit itself, for we have paid for the benefit itself when we
accept it in a grateful spirit.

Stewart’s notes (1)
  1. Nothing is wanted to make a benefit, conferred from good motives, perfect: if it is returned, the gratitude is to be counted as net profit.
34

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

"What," say you, "can a man repay a benefit, though he does
nothing?" He has taken the first step, he has offered you a good
thing with good feeling, and, which is the characteristic of
friendship, has placed you both on the same footing. In the next
place, a benefit is not repaid in the same manner as a loan: you
have no reason for expecting me to offer you any payment; the
account between us depends upon the feelings alone. What I say will
not appear difficult, although it may not at first accord with your
ideas, if you will do me the favour to remember that there are more
things than there are words to express them. There is an enormous
mass of things without names, which we do not speak of under
distinctive names of their own, but by the names of other things
transferred to them. We speak of our own foot, of the foot of a
couch, of a sail, or of a poem; we apply the word 'dog' to a hound,
a fish, and a star. Because we have not enough words to assign a
separate name to each thing, we borrow a name whenever we want one.
Bravery is the virtue which rightly despises danger, or the science
of repelling, sustaining, or inviting dangers: yet we call a brave
man a gladiator, and we use the same word for a good-for-nothing
slave, who is led by rashness to defy death. Economy is the science
of avoiding unnecessary expenditure, or the art of using one's
income with moderation: yet we call a man of mean and narrow mind,
most economical, although there is an immeasurable distance between
moderation and meanness. These things are naturally distinct, yet
the poverty of our language compels us to call both these men
economical, just as he who views slight accidents with rational
contempt, and he who without reason runs into danger are alike
called brave. Thus a benefit is both a beneficent action, and also
is that which is bestowed by that action, such as money, a house,
an office in the state: there is but one name for them both, though
their force and power are widely different.

35

Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

Wherefore, give me your attention, and you will soon perceive
that I say nothing to which you can object. That benefit which
consists of the action is repaid when we receive it graciously;
that other, which consists of something material, we have not then
repaid, but we hope to do so. The debt of goodwill has been
discharged by a return of goodwill; the material debt demands a
material return. Thus, although we may declare that he who has
received a benefit with good-will has returned the favour, yet we
counsel him to return to the giver something of the same kind as
that which he has received. Some part of what we have said departs
from the conventional line of thought, and then rejoins it by
another path. We declare that a wise man cannot receive an injury;
yet, if a man hits him with his fist, that man will be found guilty
of doing him an injury. We declare that a fool can possess nothing;
yet if a man stole anything from a fool, we should find that man
guilty of theft. We declare that all men are mad, yet we do not
dose all men with hellebore; but we put into the hands of these
very persons, whom we call madmen, both the right of voting and of
pronouncing judgment. Similarly, we say that a man who has received
a benefit with good-will has returned the favour, yet we leave him
in debt nevertheless--bound to repay it even though he has repaid
it. This is not to disown benefits, but is an encouragement to us
neither to fear to receive benefits, nor to faint under the too
great burden of them. "Good things have been given to me; I have
been preserved from starving; I have been saved from the misery of
abject poverty; my life, and what is dearer than life, my liberty,
has been preserved. How shall I be able to repay these favours?
When will the day come upon which I can prove my gratitude to him?"
When a man speaks thus, the day has already come. Receive a
benefit, embrace it, rejoice, not that you have received it, but
that you have to owe it and return it; then you will never be in
peril of the great sin of being rendered ungrateful by mischance. I
will not enumerate any difficulties to you, lest you should
despair, and faint at the prospect of a long and laborious
servitude. I do not refer you to the future; do it with what means
you have at hand. You never will be grateful unless you are so
straightway. What, then, will you do? You need not take up arms,
yet perhaps you may have to do so; you need not cross the seas, yet
it may be that you will pay your debt, even when the wind threatens
to blow a gale. Do you wish to return the benefit? Then receive it
graciously; you have then returned the favour--not, indeed, so that
you can think yourself to have repaid it, but so that you can owe
it with a quieter conscience.

Sources for this text

  • Stewart · trans. Aubrey Stewart (1887)

    L. Annaeus Seneca On Benefits, trans. Aubrey Stewart (London: George Bell & Sons, 1887)

    Public domain · Source file

    Transcription: Wikisource

On Benefits
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