Rolfe · trans. J. C. Rolfe (1927)
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<argument> The reply of a certain philosopher, when he was asked why he turned pale in a storm at sea.
</argument> WE were sailing from Cassiopa to Brundisium over the Ionian sea, violent, vast and storm-tossed. During almost the whole of the night which followed our first day a fierce side-wind blew, which had filled our ship with water. Then afterwards, while we were all still lamenting, and working hard at the pumps, day at last dawned. But there was no less danger and no slackening of the violence of the wind; on the contrary, more frequent whirlwinds, a black sky, masses of fog, and a kind of fearful cloud-forms, which they called typhones, or typhoons, seemed to hang over and threaten us, ready to overwhelm the ship.
In our company was an eminent philosopher of the Stoic sect, whom I had known at Athens as a man of no slight importance, holding the young men who were his pupils under very good control. In the midst of the great dangers of that time and that tumult of sea and sky I looked for him, desiring to know in what state of mind he was and whether he was unterrified and courageous. And then I beheld the man frightened and ghastly pale, not indeed uttering any lamentations, as all the rest were doing, nor any outcries of that kind, but in his loss of colour and distracted expression not differing much from the others. But when the sky cleared, the sea grew calm, and the heat of danger cooled, then the Stoic was approached by a rich Greek from Asia, a man of elegant apparel, as we saw, and with an abundance of baggage and many attendants, while he himself showed signs of a luxurious person and disposition. This man, in a bantering tone, said: What does this mean, Sir philosopher, that when we were in danger you were afraid and turned pale, while I neither feared nor changed colour? And the philosopher, after hesitating for a moment about the propriety of answering him, said: If in such a terrible storm I did show a little fear, you are not worthy to be told the reason for it. But, if you please, the famous Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, shall answer for me, who on being asked on a similar occasion by a man much like you why he feared, though a philosopher, while his questioner on the contrary had no fear, replied that they had not the same motives, for his questioner need not be very anxious about the life of a worthless coxcomb, but he himself feared for the life of an Aristippus.
With these words then the Stoic rid himself of the rich Asiatic. But later, when we were approaching Brundisium and sea and sky were calm, I asked him what the reason for his fear was, which he had refused to reveal to the man who had improperly addressed him. And he quietly and courteously replied: Since you are desirous of knowing, hear what our forefathers, the founders of the Stoic sect, thought about that brief but inevitable and natural fear, or rather, said he, read it, for if you read it, you will be the more ready to believe it and you will remember it better. Thereupon before my eyes he drew from his little bag the fifth book of the Discourses of the philosopher Epictetus, which, as arranged by Arrian, undoubtedly agree with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus.
In that book I read this statement, which of course was written in Greek : The mental visions, which the philosophers call fantasi/ai or 'phantasies,' by which the mind of man on the very first appearance of an object is impelled to the perception of the object, are neither voluntary nor controlled by the will, but through a certain power of their own they force their recognition upon men; but the expressions of assent, which they call sugkataqe/seis, by which these visions are recognized, are voluntary and subject to man's will. Therefore when some terrifying sound, either from heaven or from a falling building or as a sudden announcement of some danger, or anything else of that kind occurs, even the mind of a wise man must necessarily be disturbed, must shrink and feel alarm, not from a preconceived idea of any danger, but from certain swift and unexpected attacks which forestall the power of the mind and of reason. Presently, however, the wise man does not approve ' such phantasies,' that is to say, such terrifying mental visions (to quote the Greek, 'he does not consent to them nor confirm them'), but he rejects and scorns them, nor does he see in them anything that ought to excite fear. And they say that there is this difference between the mind of a foolish man and that of a wise man, that the foolish man thinks that such ' visions ' are in fact as dreadful and terrifying as they appear at the original impact of them on his mind, and by his assent he approves of such ideas as if they were rightly to be feared, and 'confirms' them; for prosepidoca/zei is the word which the Stoics use in their discourses on the subject. But the wise man, after being affected for a short time and slightly in his colour and expression, 'does not assent,' but retains the steadfastness and strength of the opinion which he has always had about visions of this kind, namely that they are in no wise to be feared but excite terror by a false appearance and vain alarms.
That these were the opinions and utterances of Epictetus the philosopher in accordance with the beliefs of the Stoics I read in that book which I have mentioned, and I thought that they ought to be recorded for this reason, that when things of the kind which I have named chance to occur, we may not think that to fear for a time and, as it were, turn white is the mark of a foolish and weak man, but in that brief but natural impulse we yield rather to human weakness than because we believe that those things are what they seem.
Rolfe’s notes (4)
- A town in the north-eastern part of Corcyra, also called Cassiope.
- Typhon, according to Hesiod, was a son of Typhoeus (see note on xvii. 10. 9) and father of the winds; but by later poets he was identified with Typhos or Typhoeus. His name was given to the violent storms called typhoons.
- Frag. Phil. Graec. ii. 407. 16.
- Frag. 9, p. 408, Schenkl., L.C.L. II. 448 ff.
Latin · Latin text, ed. 1927
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aResponsio cuiusdam philosophi, interrogati quam ob causam maris tempestate palluerit. 1NAVIGABAMUS a Cassiopa Brundisium mare Ionium violentum et vastum et iactabundum. 2Nox deinde quae diem primum secuta est, in ea fere tota ventus a latere saeviens navem undis compleverat. 3Tum postea, complorantibus nostris omnibus atque in sentina satis agentibus, dies quidem tandem inluxit. Sed nihil de periculo neque de saevitia venti remissum, quin turbines etiam crebriores et caelum atrum et fumigantes globi et figurae quaedam nubium metuendae quos typhonas vocabant, inpendere inminereque ac depressurae navem videbantur. 4In eadem fuit philosophus in disciplina Stoica celebratus, quem ego A the nis cognoveram non parva virum auctoritate satisque attente discipulos iuvenes continentem. 5Eum tunc in tantis periculis inque illo tumultu caeli marisque requirebam oculis, scire cupiens quonam statu animi et an interritus intrepidusque esset. 6Atque ibi hominem conspicimus pavidum et expallidum, ploratus quidem nullos, sicuti ceteri omnes, nec ullas eiusmodihuiusmodi voces cientem, sed coloris et voltus turbatione non multum a ceteris differenten. 7At ubi caelum enituit et deferbuit mare et ardor ille periculi deflagravit, accedit ad Stoicum Graecus quispiam dives ex Asia, magno, ut videbamus, cultu paratuque rerum et familiae, atque ipse erat multis corporis animique deliciis affluens. 8Is quasi inludens: Quid hoc, inquit, est, o philosophe, quod, cum in periculis essemus, timuisti tu et palluisti? Ego neque timui neque pallui. 9Et philosophus aliquantum cunctatus an respondere ei conveniret, Si quid ego, inquit. in tanta violentia tempestatum videor paulum pavefactus, non tu istius rei ratione audienda dignus es. 10Set tibi sane Aristippus, ille Socratis discipulus, pro me responderit, qui in simili tempore a simillimo tui homine interrogatus quare philosophus timeret, cum ille contra nihil metueret, non eandem esse causam sibi atque illi respondit, quoniam is quidem esset non magnopere sollicitus pro anima nequissimi nebulonis, ipsum autem pro Aristippi anima timere. 11His tunc verbis Stoicus divitem ilium Asiaticum a sese molitus est. 12Sed postea, cum Brundisium adventaremus malaciaque esset venti ac maris, percontatus eum sum quaenam illa ratio esset pavoris sui, quam dicere ei supersedisset a quo fuerat non satis digne compellatus? 13Atque ille mihi placide et comiter: Quoniam, inquit, audiendi cupidus es, audi quid super isto brevi quidem, sed necessario et naturali pavore maiores nostri, conditores sectae Stoicae, senserint, vel potius, inquit, lege; nam et facilius credideris, si legas, et memineris magis. Atque ibi coram ex sarcinula sua librum protulit Epicteti philosophi quintum Διαλέξεων, quas ab Arriano digestas congruere scriptis ζήνωνος et Chrysippi non dubium est. 15In eo libro Graeca scilicet oratione scriptam hanc sententiam legimus: Visa animi, quas φαντασίας philosophi appellant, quibus mens hominis prima statim specie accidentis ad animum rei pellitur, non voluntatis sunt neque arbitrariae, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitanda; 16probationes autem, quas συγκαταφέσεις vocant, quibus eadem visa noscuntur, voluntariae sunt fiuntque hominum arbitratu. 17Propterea cum sonus aliquis formidabilis aut caelo aut ex ruina aut repentinus nescio cuius periculi nuntius vel quid aliud est eiusmodi factum, sapientis quoque animum paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere necessum est, non opinione alicuius mali praecepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis, officium mentis atque rationis praevertentibus. 18Mox tamen ille sapiens ibidem τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας id est visa istaec animi sui terrifica, non adprobat, hoc est οὐ συγκαττατιθεται οὐδὲ προσεπιδοξάζει, sed abicit respuitque nec ei metuendum esse in his quicquam videtur. 19Atque hoc inter insipientis sapientisque animum differre dicunt, quod insipiens, qualia sibi esse primo animi sui pulsu visa sunt saeva et aspera, talia esse vero putat et eadem incepta, tamquam si iure metuenda sint, sua quoque adsensione adprobat καὶ προσεπιδοξάζει hoc enim verbo Stoici, cum super istaistare disserunt, utuntur. 20Sapiens autem, cum breviter et strictim colore atque vultu motus est, οὐ συγκατατίθεαι, sed statum vigoremque sententiae suae retinet quam de huiuscemodi visis semper habuit, ut de minime metuendis, sed fronte falsa et formidineformidinie inani territantibus. 21Haec Epictetum philosophum ex decretis Stoicorum sensisse atque dixisse, in eo quo dixi libro legimus adnotandaque esse idcirco existimavimus, ut rebus forte id genus quibus dixi obortis pavescere sensim et quasi albescere, non insipientis esse hominis neque ignavi putemus et in eo tamen brevi motu naturali magis infirmitati cedamus quam quod esse ea qualia visa sunt censeamus.
Editor’s notes (6)
- Lemmata of Book xix omitted in ω ; appear in various forms i
- expallidum, Hosius; extrilidum, ω ; exterritum, J. F.
- Aristippius, J. Gronov; Aristippus, ω ; Hertz placed a lacuna after ille, suggesting egregius Socratis ille to fill it.
- qui cum in simili, ω ; qui (in) consimili, suggested by Hosius.
- est, J. Gronov; ex, δ; γ omits.
- Kronenberg transfers οὐδὲ προσεπιδοξάζει to § 20, after συγκατατίθεται.